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Management of change in process safety
Management of change identifies how an alteration could affect a major accident scenario or protective barrier before it is made. The changed state should be checked and authorised before use, including temporary, procedural, staffing and equipment changes.
Owner: SHARE Knowledge Hub editorial team.
Understanding Management of change in process safety
Management of change is the controlled process for finding and addressing new major accident risks before a modified plant, process, procedure or organisation is put into service. It applies to temporary and emergency changes as well as planned projects. A change is complete only when design, documentation, competence and protective functions have been proved in the new state.
Why this matters at work
Pipe rerouting, nozzle changes, new support, relocated equipment and temporary bypasses can introduce vibration, thermal expansion, corrosion, impact exposure, drainage or maintenance access risks. The design review must cover loads and failure modes across the connected system, not only the new component.
Compare the proposed state with the existing hazard study and process safety information. Identify new initiators, credible deviations, consequences, safeguards, common causes and startup/maintenance modes. Record assumptions and actions with owners; an unclosed action is not a completed assessment.
How organisations manage this in practice
Keep the change open through a defined period of operation. Use indicators that can reveal the particular barrier weakened by the change, and give adverse findings an explicit route back to review. Set a monitoring period and indicators tied to the changed hazard: unexpected alarms, near misses, failed proof tests, leaks, overrides, maintenance demand, overtime or delayed response. Compare performance with the acceptance criteria. Capture both leading and lagging information and ask the people doing the job what has become harder. A rise in workarounds or manual interventions may show a design defect before a reportable event. Include contractor feedback and environmental observations. Define thresholds that prompt adjustment, restriction or formal re-review. A temporary trial must have a decision date and measurable success criteria. The MOC owner closes the loop by verifying sustained control rather than closing at first operation. Feed learning into asset specifications, design standards, hazard studies and procedures. Review repeated similar changes for systemic weaknesses in procurement, maintenance or staffing decisions.
Record the original basis and proposed values, affected scenarios, simulation or calculation, independent review and test plan. Inform operators of new alarm meaning and action. A nuisance-alarm reduction is not a justification for weakening a high-consequence safeguard without equivalent risk control.
The owner of each change should be able to answer: what is different, what can go wrong, which measures prevent or limit it, what has been proved, what remains restricted, and who has authority to operate? If those answers are uncertain, hold or reduce the affected operation.
Control the temporary state as well as the final design
A pump replacement may appear similar while changing supports, duties, protective functions or operating assumptions. A temporary bypass needs its own controlled boundary and expiry.

Compare the change
Check function, materials, duty, supports, interfaces and protection against the verified baseline.
Assess every state
Review installation, temporary arrangements, commissioning, emergency/start-up implications and any bypass through the authorised process.
Verify completion
Confirm required tests, documents, training, restoration and the authorised start-up decision; close temporary actions with evidence.
“Like for like” wording does not replace a technical comparison or authorise bypassing protection.
How can I practise this topic in 3D?

A temporary bypass outlives its approved change
All related inspection points 7 across 1 location
Crown Fuels terminal 7 inspection points
Practice in the SHAREhub environment. Browser practice is separate from workplace competence and formal learning records.
What is management of change in process safety?
Management of change (MOC) is the controlled route for identifying how an alteration could affect a major-accident scenario or barrier before it is made, then proving the new state is safe before use.
Screen technical, procedural, organisational, staffing, control-system, substance, temporary and emergency changes. A new valve type, altered set point or reduced shift cover can change the safety basis even if the job looks small. The process should connect screening, competent hazard review, authorisation, implementation, pre-start verification and close-out. HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures and HSE organisational change and major accident hazards.
This method is useful at any high-consequence site. The Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) duties apply only after threshold and jurisdiction checks; Great Britain (GB) and Northern Ireland (NI) have separate 2015 regimes. HSE COMAH 2015 overview and HSENI Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations.
How can a small change cause a major accident?
A changed component, operating method or staffing assumption can defeat a barrier, start a release or delay response. Consequences may appear far from the modified item.
At Flixborough, a reactor was removed and a temporary bypass connected adjacent vessels. The bypass failed, releasing cyclohexane before a major explosion. The lesson is the need for competent design review, understanding of connected plant and verification of temporary arrangements; it is not a claim that every bypass has the same cause. HSE Flixborough incident case and HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures.
| Stage | Change risk | Control question |
|---|---|---|
| Trigger | Vessel unavailable; temporary route proposed. | What is the original design and hazard basis?Sources: HSE Flixborough incident case; HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures |
| Alteration | Bypass changes geometry, load and containment. | Who competently checks mechanical and process effects?Sources: HSE Flixborough incident case; HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures |
| Top event | Connection or pipe fails. | What inspection, pressure and pre-start proof is required?Sources: HSE Flixborough incident case; HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures |
| Escalation | Flammable release ignites. | How do isolation, layout and emergency controls limit harm?Sources: HSE Flixborough incident case; HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures |
Which changes need screening?
Screen any change that could alter hazardous inventory, process conditions, equipment, software, procedure, organisation or emergency assumptions. A like-for-like claim must be verified, not assumed.
Examples include alternative materials or gasket, temporary hose, new contractor, revised maintenance interval, control-logic update, alarm setting, utility tie-in, new operating limit, staffing reduction or altered emergency route. Consider cumulative and simultaneous changes. Some routine replacements may pass a documented like-for-like screen; if specification or function differs, send them through full review. HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures and HSE organisational change and major accident hazards.
| Change type | Example | Potential effect |
|---|---|---|
| Plant or material | Alternative seal or substance grade. | Compatibility, containment or reaction differs.Sources: HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures; HSE organisational change and major accident hazards |
| Control system | Trip set point or software logic. | Safety function or independence changes.Sources: HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures; HSE organisational change and major accident hazards |
| Procedure | New start-up sequence. | Different abnormal state or operator response.Sources: HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures; HSE organisational change and major accident hazards |
| People and organisation | Reduced night engineering cover. | Delayed defect response or lost technical authority.Sources: HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures; HSE organisational change and major accident hazards |
| Temporary or emergency | Bypass or provisional hose. | Unreviewed load, inventory or expiry risk.Sources: HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures; HSE organisational change and major accident hazards |
What is the first MOC screening decision?
Define the existing and proposed state, the reason, affected assets and duration. Decide whether credible scenarios or credited controls could change, and record the basis.
Process change screening: baseline and true equivalence
Read the complete visual as text
- Start: A different material, part, setting, method, staffing arrangement or temporary state is proposed.
- Question 1: Is the approved baseline reconciled with the actual as-found plant and affected boundary? Decision owner: Change owner with engineering and operations.
- YES: Record the existing/proposed state, reason, assets, connected equipment and duration for screening. Owner: Change owner with engineering and operations. CONTINUE → QUESTION 2.
- NO • HOLD: Hold the alteration and reconcile drawings, process information, field configuration and affected personnel. Owner: Change owner with engineering and operations. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 1 AFTER CORRECTION.
- UNKNOWN • HOLD: Hold the affected decision while the owner resolves the missing evidence. Hold the alteration and reconcile drawings, process information, field configuration and affected personnel. Owner: Change owner with engineering and operations. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 1 AFTER CORRECTION.
- Question 2: Could any major-accident scenario, barrier, inventory, emergency role or COMAH scope change? Decision owner: Competent multidisciplinary screening team.
- YES: Open formal change control and competent hazard review; involve technical, operations and other affected owners. Owner: Competent multidisciplinary screening team. CONTINUE → QUESTION 3.
- NO • TRUE EQUIVALENCE: Record competent evidence of true equivalence and the authorised maintenance route; still verify the replacement against the approved baseline. Owner: Competent multidisciplinary screening team. OUTCOME → RECORD AND HAND OVER.
- UNKNOWN: Hold the alteration and open competent hazard review to resolve the scenario, function or scope uncertainty. Owner: Competent multidisciplinary screening team. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 2 AFTER CORRECTION.
- Question 3: Are the change owner, review depth, affected disciplines and next hold point defined? Decision owner: Responsible change manager.
- YES: Carry the scoped record into assessment of both the future and implementation states. Owner: Responsible change manager. OUTCOME → RECORD AND HAND OVER.
- NO • HOLD: Keep the change held until competent responsibilities, resources, study depth and decision gates are assigned. Owner: Responsible change manager. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 3 AFTER CORRECTION.
- UNKNOWN • HOLD: Hold the affected decision while the owner resolves the missing evidence. Keep the change held until competent responsibilities, resources, study depth and decision gates are assigned. Owner: Responsible change manager. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 3 AFTER CORRECTION.
- Outcome: Retain the screening evidence, equivalence or formal-review route, responsible owner, study depth and next hold point.
- Stop and escalation boundary: This route does not approve operation or waive law, a failed barrier or an unassessed change. No universal COMAH quantity, bypass period, safety integrity level or risk score is supplied. The legacy plant-change material is a method reference; current applicable COMAH/legal duties govern the actual site.
Use current drawings, process information, operating limits, barrier register and field walk. Identify connected equipment, neighbouring work and affected personnel. A “minor” label should describe the result of competent screening, not bypass it. If information is missing, hold the alteration until the boundary is understood. HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures.
What must the hazard review examine?
Examine new initiating events, changed consequences, barrier dependencies, human tasks, abnormal modes and off-site effects. Scale the method to the hazard and complexity.
Change assessment: future state and transition state
2 linked parts. Follow the question numbers and complete the applicable route.
Part 1 of 2 · Questions 1–3
Continue · Part 2 of 2 · Questions 4–5
Read the complete visual as text
- Start: A screened plant or organisational change requires a proportionate competent hazard assessment.
- Question 1: Are credible future-state events traced through normal, upset, startup, shutdown, maintenance and emergency modes? Decision owner: Multidisciplinary hazard-review lead.
- YES: Link initiating events, barriers, dependencies, human tasks and off-site/environmental receptors. Owner: Multidisciplinary hazard-review lead. CONTINUE → QUESTION 2.
- NO • HOLD: Complete or redesign the future-state assessment; retain the affected implementation hold while scenarios remain unassessed. Owner: Multidisciplinary hazard-review lead. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 1 AFTER CORRECTION.
- UNKNOWN • HOLD: Hold the affected decision while the owner resolves the missing evidence. Complete or redesign the future-state assessment; retain the affected implementation hold while scenarios remain unassessed. Owner: Multidisciplinary hazard-review lead. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 1 AFTER CORRECTION.
- Question 2: Are implementation risks assessed, including isolation, simultaneous work, temporary cover, workload and incomplete protection? Decision owner: Implementation/operations lead with contractor and technical owners.
- YES: Document transition safeguards separately from the final plant safeguards. Owner: Implementation/operations lead with contractor and technical owners. CONTINUE → QUESTION 3.
- NO • HOLD: Replan or phase implementation, reduce exposure or hold where the temporary state cannot be controlled. Owner: Implementation/operations lead with contractor and technical owners. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 2 AFTER CORRECTION.
- UNKNOWN • HOLD: Hold the affected decision while the owner resolves the missing evidence. Replan or phase implementation, reduce exposure or hold where the temporary state cannot be controlled. Owner: Implementation/operations lead with contractor and technical owners. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 2 AFTER CORRECTION.
- Question 3: Have safer options and combined-barrier effects been compared? Decision owner: Process-safety and design owners.
- YES: Record the control choice, feasibility and remaining assumptions for both states. Owner: Process-safety and design owners. CONTINUE → QUESTION 4.
- NO • HOLD: Rework options and common-cause/dependency analysis before committing to the design or implementation route. Owner: Process-safety and design owners. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 3 AFTER CORRECTION.
- UNKNOWN • HOLD: Hold the affected decision while the owner resolves the missing evidence. Rework options and common-cause/dependency analysis before committing to the design or implementation route. Owner: Process-safety and design owners. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 3 AFTER CORRECTION.
- Question 4: Are competent resources and consequential actions in place for the planned phase? Decision owner: Responsible change manager.
- YES: Assign the actual technical and operations authority and verify critical prerequisites. Owner: Responsible change manager. CONTINUE → QUESTION 5.
- NO • HOLD: Redesign, phase, reduce exposure or hold; do not waive unresolved high-consequence actions for schedule. Owner: Responsible change manager. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 4 AFTER CORRECTION.
- UNKNOWN • HOLD: Hold the affected decision while the owner resolves the missing evidence. Redesign, phase, reduce exposure or hold; do not waive unresolved high-consequence actions for schedule. Owner: Responsible change manager. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 4 AFTER CORRECTION.
- Question 5: Are approved operating limits, inspection hold points, tests and pre-start criteria explicit? Decision owner: Engineering and operations authorities.
- YES: Approve a bounded implementation plan with recorded assumptions, actions and hold owners. Owner: Engineering and operations authorities. OUTCOME → RECORD AND HAND OVER.
- NO • HOLD: Keep the phase held until the acceptance evidence and named decision points are defined; do not invent limits in the diagram. Owner: Engineering and operations authorities. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 5 AFTER CORRECTION.
- UNKNOWN • HOLD: Hold the affected decision while the owner resolves the missing evidence. Keep the phase held until the acceptance evidence and named decision points are defined; do not invent limits in the diagram. Owner: Engineering and operations authorities. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 5 AFTER CORRECTION.
- Outcome: A signed competent assessment covers both future and transition states, with assumptions, actions, owners and evidence required at each hold.
- Stop and escalation boundary: This route does not approve operation or waive law, a failed barrier or an unassessed change. No universal COMAH quantity, bypass period, safety integrity level or risk score is supplied.
A focused multidisciplinary review may be enough for a bounded change; a complex modification may need a formal hazard and operability or other study. Test normal, start-up, shutdown, maintenance, utility failure and emergency conditions. Challenge assumptions about relief, isolation, ignition, common-cause failure, operator time and contractor interfaces. Record actions, owners and evidence needed before start. HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures and HSE COMAH control systems.
How should the review compare safer options?
Compare the proposed change with doing the task another way or removing its hazard. Then test the effect on connected plant, safeguards, people and operating limits before authorising the preferred option.
A replacement transfer pump may fit the pipework yet have different flow, pressure, material, seal or control behaviour. The engineer compares the required duty, process and chemical compatibility, downstream capacity, tank-overfill protection, electrical or hazardous-area suitability and maintainability. Operations checks the real startup, shutdown and abnormal states; maintenance checks access, isolation and replacement parts. A claimed like-for-like change needs evidence of equivalence.
Record the options, the hazards removed and introduced, the reason for rejecting stronger controls, the engineering assumptions and who can approve each decision. Update affected drawings and instructions, brief the people whose work changes, and verify the installation and protected commissioning checks before release. An unexplained new limit, missing design information or unverified safety function holds the change.
How can the hierarchy of controls control new and altered risks during process changes?
A change review should remove or reduce hazards at source before adding a protective device, operating restriction or PPE. The selected measures must address the changed installation and every affected operating and maintenance state.
Illustrative decision: a site proposes replacing a transfer pump with a higher-output unit to improve throughput. This changes more than a work order: pressure, flow, receiving capacity, protection, isolation and maintenance may be affected. The engineer coordinates the comparison with operations and the manager authorises the supported option.
ERICPD means Eliminate, Reduce (including substitution), Isolate, Control, PPE and Discipline. The five-level hierarchy groups measures as elimination, substitution, engineering controls, administrative controls and PPE. They overlap: isolation is usually an engineering measure; control can include engineered and administrative measures. Discipline means maintaining and checking the controls, supervising the method and learning from defects, rather than blaming someone or accepting weaker protection.
The comparison is an original illustrative application of the general HSE hierarchy, not a machine-specific method, permit or design approval. The employer must choose measures for the actual work and jurisdiction. Apply the separate Northern Ireland legal route where relevant; the local assessment and competent technical decision govern release.
Who can authorise a change?
Define technical, operational and management authority before work starts. Approval should follow a completed risk review and explicit hold points, not a signature on an empty form.
Engineering checks design integrity and standards; operations checks plant state and usability; maintenance checks installation and testability; safety and emergency leads challenge consequences. The responsible manager owns resources, timing and release. A person cannot approve beyond their competence or waive unresolved high-consequence actions merely to meet a schedule. HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures and HSE organisational change and major accident hazards.
Record the legal gate before installation
At proposal/design, the change owner records applicability, notifications, advance submissions and any statutory hold before construction or modification. In GB, MAPP and safety-report reviews have five-year backstops and earlier triggers. Significant modifications require review before modification and necessary revised report parts must reach the competent authority in advance. A new-establishment route has its own pre-construction/pre-operation or modification submission and conclusions gate. This is not regulator approval for every routine MOC. At handback confirm as-built conformity and close-out evidence. HSE L111: COMAH advance review/submission gates NI applicability and timing must be determined against its separate current COMAH instrument.
How is installation controlled?
Implement only the approved design and work method. Coordinate isolation, permits, contractors, adjacent operations and design deviations as the work unfolds.
Use clear equipment identity, drawings, materials and quality checks. Stop and return to hazard review if a part, route or method differs from the approved change. Temporary devices and bypasses need visible status and expiry. An installation record should show what was actually built, not just what was planned. HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures and HSE COMAH operating procedures.
What must be checked before hazardous start-up?
A pre-start review confirms the installed change, safety functions, procedures, competence and emergency arrangements match the approved basis before hazardous material or energy is introduced.
Modification complete: reconcile before hazardous start-up
2 linked parts. Follow the question numbers and complete the applicable route.
Part 1 of 2 · Questions 1–3
Continue · Part 2 of 2 · Questions 4–5
Read the complete visual as text
- Start: Construction, software upload, contractor work or a procedure revision is reported complete.
- Question 1: Does the as-built plant match the approved design, material, setting and safety basis? Decision owner: Engineering and operations receiving owners.
- YES: Reconcile actual configuration, line-up and any temporary devices or overrides. Owner: Engineering and operations receiving owners. CONTINUE → QUESTION 2.
- NO • HOLD: Hold hazardous start-up and assess the deviation against the approved change basis. Owner: Engineering and operations receiving owners. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 1 AFTER CORRECTION.
- UNKNOWN • HOLD: Hold the affected decision while the owner resolves the missing evidence. Hold hazardous start-up and assess the deviation against the approved change basis. Owner: Engineering and operations receiving owners. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 1 AFTER CORRECTION.
- Question 2: Have required inspections and full-function tests passed, including affected safeguards? Decision owner: Competent engineering test authority.
- YES: Retain the named function, acceptance criterion and actual results, including applicable leak/pressure and alarm/trip checks. Owner: Competent engineering test authority. CONTINUE → QUESTION 3.
- NO • HOLD: Repair and retest the affected function; a lamp or component check does not demonstrate the whole required safeguard. Owner: Competent engineering test authority. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 2 AFTER CORRECTION.
- UNKNOWN • HOLD: Hold the affected decision while the owner resolves the missing evidence. Repair and retest the affected function; a lamp or component check does not demonstrate the whole required safeguard. Owner: Competent engineering test authority. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 2 AFTER CORRECTION.
- Question 3: Are operators competent and briefed for the changed task and limits? Decision owner: Operations and training owner.
- YES: Confirm usable instructions and a shift handover matched to the installed state. Owner: Operations and training owner. CONTINUE → QUESTION 4.
- NO • HOLD: Hold affected start-up; complete practical training, knowledge transfer and shift information. Owner: Operations and training owner. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 3 AFTER CORRECTION.
- UNKNOWN • HOLD: Hold the affected decision while the owner resolves the missing evidence. Hold affected start-up; complete practical training, knowledge transfer and shift information. Owner: Operations and training owner. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 3 AFTER CORRECTION.
- Question 4: Are instructions, drawings, maintenance and emergency arrangements current? Decision owner: Document owners, maintenance and emergency leads.
- YES: Confirm that the live work and response basis matches the approved envelope. Owner: Document owners, maintenance and emergency leads. CONTINUE → QUESTION 5.
- NO • HOLD: Keep the affected startup held; correct controlled information and emergency assumptions before release. Owner: Document owners, maintenance and emergency leads. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 4 AFTER CORRECTION.
- UNKNOWN • HOLD: Hold the affected decision while the owner resolves the missing evidence. Keep the affected startup held; correct controlled information and emergency assumptions before release. Owner: Document owners, maintenance and emergency leads. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 4 AFTER CORRECTION.
- Question 5: Are safety-critical actions closed with evidence and technical/operations authorities ready to release a defined envelope? Decision owner: Named technical acceptance and operations release authorities.
- YES: Record named release, limits, shift handover and early-life monitoring; retain later close-out actions as controlled items. Owner: Named technical acceptance and operations release authorities. OUTCOME → RECORD AND HAND OVER.
- NO • HOLD: Hold startup and verify the missing critical action or authority; a construction-complete statement is not operating approval. Owner: Named technical acceptance and operations release authorities. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 5 AFTER CORRECTION.
- UNKNOWN • HOLD: Hold the affected decision while the owner resolves the missing evidence. Hold startup and verify the missing critical action or authority; a construction-complete statement is not operating approval. Owner: Named technical acceptance and operations release authorities. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 5 AFTER CORRECTION.
- Outcome: Retain as-built evidence, tests, technical acceptance, operations release, early-life monitoring and later demonstrated close-out.
- Stop and escalation boundary: This route does not approve operation or waive law, a failed barrier or an unassessed change. No universal COMAH quantity, bypass period, safety integrity level or risk score is supplied.
Check punch-list items by consequence, pressure or leak tests as applicable, trip and alarm functions, valve line-up, control-system configuration, isolations removed under control, updated drawings and operator training. A test result must name the function and acceptance criteria. Do not transfer a temporary work permit into permanent operating approval. HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures, HSE COMAH control systems and HSE COMAH operating procedures.
When is the change truly closed?
Close only when design intent is demonstrated, affected documents and training are updated, actions are verified and the operating owner accepts the installed state.
Record the as-built condition, residual limits, removed temporary devices, test evidence, revised procedures, maintenance tasks, inspection plan, emergency assumptions and any required safety-report revision. Assign a post-start review for a change whose performance needs observation. A closed form with missing field evidence is not close-out. HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures and HSE HSG254 Developing process safety indicators.
How are temporary changes prevented from becoming permanent by drift?
Give each temporary change a competent basis, owner, operating limit, expiry or trigger, monitoring and a plan for permanent correction or removal.
Urgent or temporary process change: safe state to restoration
2 linked parts. Follow the question numbers and complete the applicable route.
Part 1 of 2 · Questions 1–4
Continue · Part 2 of 2 · Questions 5–7
Read the complete visual as text
- Start: A fault, leak or missing safeguard creates pressure for an urgent modification or bypass.
- Question 1: Is there an active release, fire, explosion, exposure or other immediate danger? Decision owner: Person discovering the danger and site emergency lead.
- YES • EMERGENCY: Raise the alarm, warn others, withdraw to safety and follow the local emergency plan now. Do not wait for the change or reporting paperwork. Owner: Person discovering the danger and site emergency lead. STOP / REFER → APPROPRIATE RESPONSE.
- NO: Keep the system in a protected state and examine the affected work decision. Owner: Person discovering the danger and site emergency lead. CONTINUE → QUESTION 2.
- UNKNOWN: Protect people from the possible hazard and obtain the site emergency/competent response from a safe position. Do not enter or restart to find out. Owner: Person discovering the danger and site emergency lead. STOP / REFER → APPROPRIATE RESPONSE.
- Question 2: Can the plant be put into a safer state while competent review occurs? Decision owner: Operations and emergency/technical authority.
- YES: Put it into the assessed safer state and retain that protection while the review is completed. Owner: Operations and emergency/technical authority. CONTINUE → QUESTION 3.
- NO: Stop or reduce hazardous operation through the site’s assessed safe arrangement; seek the competent response rather than improvising a bypass. Owner: Operations and emergency/technical authority. STOP / REFER → APPROPRIATE RESPONSE.
- UNKNOWN: Protect people and hold/reduce hazardous operation until competent advice establishes the safe-state option. Owner: Operations and emergency/technical authority. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 2 AFTER CORRECTION.
- Question 3: Are the current scenario, affected functions and combined impairments established? Decision owner: Process-safety and engineering authority.
- YES: Assess the minimum intervention and both installed and transition risks. Owner: Process-safety and engineering authority. CONTINUE → QUESTION 4.
- NO • HOLD: Keep operation stopped or reduced while scenario and combined-barrier evidence are resolved. Owner: Process-safety and engineering authority. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 3 AFTER CORRECTION.
- UNKNOWN • HOLD: Hold the affected decision while the owner resolves the missing evidence. Keep operation stopped or reduced while scenario and combined-barrier evidence are resolved. Owner: Process-safety and engineering authority. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 3 AFTER CORRECTION.
- Question 4: Are the temporary operating limits, named authority, monitoring and hard endpoint explicit? Decision owner: Responsible operations authority and change owner.
- YES: Record the bounded proposal and restoration plan in the temporary-change register. Owner: Responsible operations authority and change owner. CONTINUE → QUESTION 5.
- NO • HOLD: Do not release the temporary proposal; define the competent basis and endpoint. An extension needs a new decision. Owner: Responsible operations authority and change owner. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 4 AFTER CORRECTION.
- UNKNOWN • HOLD: Hold the affected decision while the owner resolves the missing evidence. Do not release the temporary proposal; define the competent basis and endpoint. An extension needs a new decision. Owner: Responsible operations authority and change owner. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 4 AFTER CORRECTION.
- Question 5: Can the solution be installed and tested against the approved safety basis? Decision owner: Engineering and implementation owners.
- YES: Verify actual installation and required safeguards before a named release decision. Owner: Engineering and implementation owners. CONTINUE → QUESTION 6.
- NO • HOLD: Do not release; correct installation, dependencies or failed tests and repeat the verification. Owner: Engineering and implementation owners. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 5 AFTER CORRECTION.
- UNKNOWN • HOLD: Hold the affected decision while the owner resolves the missing evidence. Do not release; correct installation, dependencies or failed tests and repeat the verification. Owner: Engineering and implementation owners. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 5 AFTER CORRECTION.
- Question 6: Are affected people informed and the required monitoring operating? Decision owner: Operations and shift supervisors.
- YES: Only the named authority may decide the bounded temporary state; track it to the hard endpoint and restoration. Owner: Operations and shift supervisors. AT RESTORATION → Q7.
- NO • HOLD: Do not release the temporary condition; establish shift communication, competent cover and live monitoring. Owner: Operations and shift supervisors. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 6 AFTER CORRECTION.
- UNKNOWN • HOLD: Hold the affected decision while the owner resolves the missing evidence. Do not release the temporary condition; establish shift communication, competent cover and live monitoring. Owner: Operations and shift supervisors. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 6 AFTER CORRECTION.
- Question 7: At restoration, is normal protection tested and the temporary instruction/device withdrawn? Decision owner: Engineering verifies; operations accepts restoration.
- YES: Record restoration and effectiveness evidence, close the temporary record and review lessons. Owner: Engineering verifies; operations accepts restoration. OUTCOME → RECORD AND HAND OVER.
- NO • HOLD: Keep the affected state restricted; correct, test and withdraw temporary controls under a new competent decision if the endpoint cannot be met. Owner: Engineering verifies; operations accepts restoration. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 7 AFTER CORRECTION.
- UNKNOWN • HOLD: Hold the affected decision while the owner resolves the missing evidence. Keep the affected state restricted; correct, test and withdraw temporary controls under a new competent decision if the endpoint cannot be met. Owner: Engineering verifies; operations accepts restoration. HOLD → REPEAT QUESTION 7 AFTER CORRECTION.
- Outcome: Restore normal protection, test the required functions, withdraw temporary instructions and close only with field evidence.
- Stop and escalation boundary: This route does not approve operation or waive law, a failed barrier or an unassessed change. No universal COMAH quantity, bypass period, safety integrity level or risk score is supplied.
Track temporary pipes, overrides, software settings, repairs and staffing cover in a visible register. Reassess the hazard if circumstances or duration changes; an extension is a new decision, not an automatic date edit. Escalate combined temporary impairments that share a scenario. HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures and HSE HSG254 Developing process safety indicators.
Make expiry an owned decision
Record maximum authorised duration and earlier withdrawal triggers, shift handover, cumulative impairments and the person who must stop the arrangement. An event-bounded duration needs a competent documented justification and a clear withdrawal condition. Expiry or failed conditions require withdrawal/hold; any extension needs fresh assessment and approval.
Can an emergency justify bypassing MOC?
Urgency can justify a shortened, proportionate review, but not absence of hazard assessment, competent authorisation, communication and later verification.
Future state and transition risk
Read the complete visual as text
- After the change: Trace normal, upset, startup, shutdown and emergency scenarios to barriers, people and environmental receptors.
- During the change: Review isolations, temporary cover, concurrent work, workload, interfaces and partly available protection.
- Compare safer options: Redesign or phase the proposal, resource competent work and set hold points and pre-start criteria. Assessing the end state alone leaves transition risk unresolved.
First make the plant safe. Define the immediate threat, minimum safe intervention, affected barriers and temporary limits. Record who authorised it and when the full review, documentation and restoration will occur. If safety cannot be demonstrated, hold operation rather than treat a production emergency as a safety exception. HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures.
Why must organisational and staffing changes enter MOC?
A new structure can remove experience, increase workload or break ownership of a safety-critical task without altering hardware.
Map alarm response, permit authority, inspection, technical challenge, emergency command and out-of-hours cover before and after the change. Consult those doing the work, phase changes where possible, assess the transition itself and monitor whether the new arrangement works. HSE’s organisational-change guidance treats these as major-accident controls. HSE organisational change and major accident hazards and HSE CHIS7 Organisational change and major accident hazards.
How do procedures and training follow a change?
Update the controlled method, limits, abnormal response and role authorisation before people use the modified plant.
The operator should see the actual changed valve, tag, alarm or sequence in the procedure. Train by demonstration, not only circulation of a document. Remove superseded instructions and brief contractors and emergency responders where their tasks change. Keep the change record linked to these proof points. HSE COMAH operating procedures and HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures.
What should a temporary transfer bypass decision look like?
A temporary bypass is a design change, not a maintenance shortcut. Crownway must hold transfer, prove the changed containment and barriers, set an expiry, and release only under named authority.
Change control from proposal to release
Read the complete visual as text
- Baseline and proposal: Identify the approved design and the actual field state. Screen technical, software, material, procedural, staffing and temporary differences.
- Assess both states: Consider the future plant and the transition while work occurs, including simultaneous work and incomplete or bypassed protection.
- Verify before release: Resolve critical actions, inspect and test the as-built state, update instructions and emergency arrangements and obtain named technical and operations release.
Temporary bypass and combined barriers
Read the complete visual as text
- A bypass changes the protection: Name the affected function, scenario, inventory and current operating state. Identify other overrides, repairs or overdue tests.
- Review the whole degraded state: Do not count barriers as independent without evidence. Unknown combined risk means hold or reduce hazardous exposure.
- Hard endpoint and restoration: Any lawful competent temporary decision needs limits, monitoring, communication, authority and expiry. Restore protection, test and withdraw temporary instructions before closure.
Apply the Flixborough learning locally
Read the complete visual as text
- Temporary engineering can be consequential: A temporary alteration can change load, containment, supports and interfaces beyond its apparent local purpose.
- Reconstruct the actual scenario: Use competent engineering to check the replacement, connected plant, operating state, hazards and relevant protection.
- Verify the temporary and restored states: Do not improvise a bypass or treat urgency as approval. Retain design basis, change review, installation checks, tests and named release without inventing a universal repair detail.
Crownway temporary-transfer bypass
Task, material and setting: Crownway Fuels Ltd, a fuel terminal, proposes a temporary transfer-line bypass while a leaking section is replaced. The line carries flammable liquid near other operations.
People and prerequisites: Operations, engineering, maintenance, contractor and emergency leads need the line inventory, pressure, original design, connected tanks, isolation and fire scenario.
Before: Hold the affected transfer. Screen the temporary design; competent engineers review mechanical loads, materials, pressure, isolation, overfill and emergency effects; record options and permit boundaries.
During: Install only the authorised design with verified isolation, quality checks, contractor coordination and visible temporary status; stop for any deviation.
Hold or stop: Do not introduce fuel if integrity, support, protection, test results, operating limits or emergency arrangements are uncertain, or if another credited barrier is impaired.
Completion and hand back: Carry out specified checks and protected tests, update drawings and temporary register, train operators, obtain named pre-start release, then remove the bypass by its deadline.
Evidence: Retain screen, hazard study, technical approvals, as-built check, pressure/leak and function tests, procedure, competence, temporary expiry and final removal record.
Where does the same lifecycle apply?
The MOC steps transfer across process settings, but the hazard review and legal regime must follow the actual substance, plant and location.
| Setting | Example change | Main review question |
|---|---|---|
| Fuel terminal | Temporary transfer line or tank control logic. | Overfill, vapour, ignition and neighbours.Sources: HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures; HSE COMAH control systems. |
| Chemical reactor | New feed grade or cooling control. | Reaction and relief basis.Sources: HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures; HSE COMAH control systems. |
| Ammonia refrigeration | Compressor or valve substitution. | Pressure and toxic-release protection.Sources: HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures; HSE introduction to pressure equipment. |
| Water treatment | Changed chemical storage or night cover. | Toxic release, response time and public interface.Sources: HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures; HSE organisational change and major accident hazards; HSE COSHH assessment and containment. |
Unsafe proposal requiring a hold: at a fuel terminal, a contractor proposes a temporary line while operators continue the affected transfer. A leak could ignite and affect nearby people. Prefer an outage and permanent repair; if a bypass is needed, competent design, isolation and leak testing are essential, with a stop for as-built mismatch or failed test. HSE Flixborough incident case.
Unsafe proposal requiring a hold: at a chemical reactor, an engineer proposes changing feed grade while a batch runs. Different chemistry can defeat cooling and relief, causing fire or toxic release. Assess a smaller batch or alternative feed through the approved reaction-hazard and change review before implementation. Resolve mixing, cooling, relief, compatibility and safe-state requirements before modification or charging; hold for unknown reaction behaviour or open critical pre-start action. HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures.
At a water-treatment store, a night-shift staffing change can delay toxic-leak isolation and affect workers or the public. Preserve competent cover and alarm response, rehearse the new rota and stop hazardous transfer if the required responder is unavailable. HSE organisational change and major accident hazards.
At an ammonia-refrigeration plant, a replacement valve changes pressure and isolation behaviour for maintainers. Verify rating, flow direction and connected protective devices, update the procedure and stop before charging if the installed valve differs from the approved specification. HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures.
Who owns each stage and handover?
A proposer identifies the change; competent reviewers assess hazards; operations controls plant state; managers resource and authorise; workers and contractors report deviations.
Name one accountable change owner and a technical authority with power to challenge. Each action needs a proof standard and closure owner. Inform every affected shift, maintainer, contractor and emergency role. The responsible operating manager signs the actual return-to-use state, not merely completion of construction. HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures and HSE organisational change and major accident hazards.
What competence should MOC roles demonstrate?
Authorise people for the specific decision and test their practical response to a changed barrier, then reassess after change, error or weak performance.
| Role | What to learn | Practical proof | Assessor and record | Reassessment trigger |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| New worker or contractor | Recognise changed tags, temporary status and stop route. | Points to the correct plant and raises a deviation. | Supervisor records area scope. | New change or event.Sources: HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures; HSE organisational change and major accident hazards |
| Operator | Know changed limits, alarms and pre-start checks. | Demonstrates safe stop on an abnormal transfer. | Operations lead records authorisation. | New procedure or alarm.Sources: HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures; HSE organisational change and major accident hazards |
| Maintainer | Know approved design, isolation and test. | Installs to drawing and verifies handback. | Engineering lead records task scope. | New material or method.Sources: HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures; HSE organisational change and major accident hazards |
| Engineer or technical authority | Know hazard study, design loads and barrier effects. | Reviews temporary bypass and rejects unsupported assumptions. | Competent peer review. | New hazard data or failure.Sources: HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures; HSE organisational change and major accident hazards |
| Supervisor or manager | Know hold points, temporary expiry and release authority. | Runs an incomplete pre-start scenario and holds. | Senior manager samples decision. | Overdue action or incident.Sources: HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures; HSE organisational change and major accident hazards |
| Safety adviser or auditor | Trace MOC through implementation and current plant. | Samples approved versus as-built state and action closure. | Independent competent reviewer. | Assurance finding or regime change.Sources: HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures; HSE organisational change and major accident hazards |
Voluntary-standard detail on hold
Specific standard editions, clauses and derived management-system detail are withheld until authorised text, rights and competent technical review are complete. Use applicable law and verified site evidence for current decisions.
For general health and safety management, see HSE managing health and safety.
Which GB and NI legal routes frame process-safety change?
COMAH change duties depend on threshold, tier and jurisdiction. The practical need to assess a change follows the hazard even when a site is outside COMAH.
Territorial change duties
Read the complete visual as text
- Great Britain: Apply relevant GB general, equipment and dangerous-substance duties and COMAH requirements where scope is established.
- Northern Ireland: Use the separate NI law and regulator route. Do not assume a GB statute or a process-industry label supplies NI scope.
- The change record is evidence: The record coordinates assessment, action, verification and authority. A signed form alone does not prove the modified plant is ready.
GB COMAH 2015 and NI COMAH 2015 are separate. In-scope operators must maintain a relevant management system; upper-tier safety-report claims may need review when risk-relevant modifications or new facts arise. Do not classify a site or prescribe a report revision from the word “process” alone. HSE COMAH 2015 overview and HSENI Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations.
| Route | Scope | Reader action |
|---|---|---|
| GB COMAH 2015 where in scope | Safety management arrangements include management of change; material changes can affect notification and upper-tier safety-report review. | Check substances, quantities, tier and current GB instrument before claiming a formal duty.Sources: GB Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 2015; HSE COMAH 2015 overview |
| NI COMAH 2015 where in scope | Separate NI safety management, notification and report routes apply to relevant changes. | Use NI law and competent authority; do not import GB regulation numbers.Sources: NI Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 2015; HSENI Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations |
| Broader high-consequence practice | Formal plant and people change control is prudent even where COMAH threshold is not met. | Apply the method to actual hazards; seek task-specific legal review for a workplace decision.Sources: HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures; HSE organisational change and major accident hazards |
How do managers know the MOC system works?
Sample real changes from proposal through as-built condition, pre-start proof and post-start performance. Investigate late changes and expired temporary arrangements.
Track screened changes, overdue actions, field deviations, failed functional tests, temporary extensions and changes linked to incidents. Compare records with workers and the actual plant; inspect whether a changed task was trained and emergency assumptions updated. HSG254-style leading and lagging measures can reveal a system that completes forms but misses risk. HSE HSG254 Developing process safety indicators and HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures.
When must a change or start-up stop?
Hold the change or affected plant when the modified state is unassessed, design differs from approval, a credited barrier fails, pre-start actions remain open or a temporary limit expires.
Secure the plant and people, record the deviation and return it to competent hazard review. Do not rely on a permit, form closure or production need to override a failed technical acceptance criterion. Restart only after revised approval, tests, training and named operational release. HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures and HSE COMAH control systems.
Which assumptions need reassessment after a fuel-system modification?
Compare a defined proposed change with the original arrangement. Existing classification and protection evidence cannot simply be moved with altered equipment.

Modification and reassessment
Moving a dispenser or changing a vent can alter interfaces and the assumptions behind existing drawings.
Activity focus: Identify affected classification, equipment, drainage and operating records before accepting the proposed change.
Contextual workplace scene. Use the task, control and evidence checks in this section; appearance alone does not establish safe conditions, individual health or approval.
Educational illustration, not to scale. Coloured zones are teaching examples, not a site-specific hazardous-area classification.
What do the acronyms and key terms mean?
These definitions separate a proposed change from its risk review and verified operating state.
Definitions are grounded in HSE COMAH plant modification and change procedures and HSE COMAH 2015 overview.
| Term | Full name | Meaning here |
|---|---|---|
| MOC | Management of change | Controlled screening, review, approval, implementation, pre-start proof and close-out. |
| COMAH | Control of Major Accident Hazards | Separate threshold-based GB and NI 2015 regimes. |
| HAZOP | Hazard and operability study | Structured review method that may be appropriate for complex changes. |
| MAPP | Major accident prevention policy | In-scope operator policy implemented by a safety management system. |
| ERICPD | Eliminate, Reduce, Isolate, Control, PPE, Discipline | Professional risk-control sequence, not legal authorisation. |
| PPE | Personal protective equipment | Residual worker protection, not a release barrier. |
| Like-for-like | Not an acronym | Replacement only after equivalence of specification and function is verified. |
| Pre-start review | Not an acronym | Check that installed plant and people are ready before hazardous operation. |
Which Crownway Fuels documents support this topic?
Open an editable document, read the preview, or find its place in the Crownway hierarchy. 8 resources relate to this page.
Fictional Crownway Fuels examples for English forecourts, with a separate illustrative bulk terminal. Check site applicability, permissions and actual controls before adapting any document for use.
Management of change and project design policy (8)
- Management of change and project design policy (CWF-POL-MOC · Completed fictional example)
Set company expectations, responsibilities and resources for management of change and project design.
Read preview · Download DOCX · Show in hierarchy - Management of change and project design procedure (CWF-PRO-MOC · Completed fictional example)
Explain who does what, in what sequence, the control rationale, evidence, escalation and safe restart conditions.
Read preview · Download DOCX · Show in hierarchy - Technical organisational and temporary change assessment (CWF-FRM-MOC-01 · Blank editable master)
Provide the site/task-specific technical organisational and temporary change assessment and retain its controlled output.
Read preview · Download DOCX · Show in hierarchy - Change actions and temporary change expiry register (CWF-REG-MOC-01 · Blank register with separate fictional worked entries)
Provide the site/task-specific change actions and temporary change expiry register and retain its controlled output.
Read preview · Download XLSX · Show in hierarchy - Design review and hazard study screen (CWF-CHK-MOC-01 · Blank editable master)
Provide the site/task-specific design review and hazard study screen and retain its controlled output.
Read preview · Download DOCX · Download PDF · Show in hierarchy - Construction and maintenance project CDM arrangements (CWF-PLN-MOC-01 · Completed fictional example)
Provide the site/task-specific construction and maintenance project cdm arrangements and retain its controlled output.
Read preview · Download DOCX · Show in hierarchy - Pre startup safety and environmental review (CWF-CHK-MOC-02 · Blank editable master)
Provide the site/task-specific pre startup safety and environmental review and retain its controlled output.
Read preview · Download DOCX · Download PDF · Show in hierarchy - Decommissioning closure and contaminated land review (CWF-FRM-MOC-02 · Blank editable master)
Provide the site/task-specific decommissioning closure and contaminated land review and retain its controlled output.
Read preview · Download DOCX · Show in hierarchy
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