SHARE Knowledge Hub

What should you know about conduct of operations and operational discipline?

For hazardous operations, a procedure is useful only when it matches plant reality and people follow its control intent. Define safe operating limits, shift ownership, abnormal response and stop authority; verify performance at the plant, investigate drift and repair weak controls before restart.

Updated 2026-10-22Great Britain and Northern IrelandVersion 2.1

Understanding What should you know about conduct of operations and operational discipline?

For hazardous operations, a procedure is useful only when it matches plant reality and people follow its control intent. Define safe operating limits, shift ownership, abnormal response and stop authority; verify performance at the plant, investigate drift and repair weak controls before restart.

Why this matters at work

Observe how real work compares with the intended method. Ask whether time, access, tools, staffing and information make the method achievable. Record deviations and address their causes through engineering, planning or procedure improvement. A manager should verify correction and communicate relevant changes across shifts. HSE treats procedures as one part of risk control: they must support competence and physical protection. A signed procedure alone cannot demonstrate that the system is safe or that actual operating limits are known.

Record the loss, affected equipment and temporary restrictions. Investigate deterioration, unsuitable fittings, vibration, maintenance and operating conditions, then verify a lasting correction before authorised return to service. Check other similar connections and whether alarms, drainage or ignition control were compromised. Review why the recurring defect became normal and whether reporting or maintenance priorities discouraged escalation. The example does not define a universal acceptable leak size; the substance and credible consequences determine the required technical response.

How organisations manage this in practice

Identify the protective function, the scenario it controls and what capability is lost. Determine whether operation can continue safely under the actual risk assessment and authorised arrangements; some impairments require shutdown or restriction. Any compensating measure must be credible, resourced and within the available response time. Do not assume a person watching a screen provides equivalent protection to an automatic engineered function. Control simultaneous impairments and communicate them in permits and handovers. Maintain a visible impairment record with owner, reason, scope, restrictions, review time and restoration requirements. Resolve the underlying fault rather than repeatedly extending a temporary override. Restoration requires verified correction, correct settings and suitable testing before deliberately removing compensating measures. Record who verified the function and how operations accepted it. Review recurring causes and cumulative durations at management level. Neither this answer nor an override form establishes a site-specific basis for continuing operation.

Ask workers to describe the critical controls and demonstrate how they know those controls work. Compare procedures with actual conditions and examine where normal work requires improvisation. Sample overdue maintenance, repeat alarms, temporary repairs and unresolved actions. Include nights and contractors. Look at whether production pressures or staffing make the prescribed method unrealistic. A low reported-incident count can reflect underreporting rather than reliable control.

Focus on exceptions and decisions that affect safe control: current operating state, abnormal conditions, open permits, isolations, overrides, impaired barriers, leaks, temporary changes and outstanding actions. Use exact equipment references and controlled records. Identify which person owns each unresolved item, any restrictions and the next required action. Avoid a routine copied statement that hides change. Allow sufficient overlap and direct discussion for consequential information. The incoming person should cross-check important details and ask for clarification before accepting responsibility. If the required person or information is absent, use planned supervisory coverage and safe-state arrangements. Maintain an auditable record without replacing face-to-face understanding with signatures. Sample actual handovers for completeness, comprehension and follow-through. Communication arrangements must consider noise, workload, language and accessibility. A handover is a transfer of usable knowledge and responsibility; it cannot retrospectively validate an uncertain isolation or incomplete maintenance task.

What does good conduct of operations look like in practice?

Good conduct of operations means the organisation runs the plant or workplace in a controlled, disciplined and repeatable way, especially when conditions change.

Operational discipline is often misunderstood as simply telling people to follow procedures. In a mature system, procedures are accurate, usable and owned; supervisors verify critical work in the field; operators know the safe operating envelope; shift handovers transfer the real plant state; and deviations are visible rather than hidden as local workarounds.

The strongest sites treat everyday operating discipline as a major accident barrier. A missed handover, informal bypass, unclear line-up, deferred alarm, weak procedure or normalised workaround can defeat several technical safeguards at once. That is why conduct of operations should link procedures, training, alarm response, permits, isolations, MOC, maintenance, leadership field checks and learning from abnormal events.

Conduct of operations lifecycle
AreaWhat good looks likeEvidence
Operating envelopeDefine normal, abnormal, start-up, shutdown and emergency limits so people know when they are inside or outside safe operation.Operating limits, alarm response, trip set-points and deviation rules.
Procedure qualityProcedures should be usable at the point of work: clear steps, hold points, critical actions, expected readings and stop conditions.Approved procedure, field validation and user feedback.
Shift handoverHandover should transfer plant state, isolations, overrides, impairments, abnormal conditions, permits and outstanding actions.Structured handover log and supervisor review.
Control room and field disciplinePanel decisions and field actions must align so valves, lines, permits, alarms and equipment status match the intended operation.Rounds, log sheets, independent verification and alarm response records.
Deviation managementWorkarounds, temporary repairs, bypasses and informal changes must be recorded, risk assessed and time limited.Deviation register, impairment log, MOC or technical authority approval.
Learning loopNear misses, excursions, failed checks and operator feedback should improve procedures, training, alarm rationalisation and maintenance priorities.Learning review and closed improvement actions.
Supervisor and worker discipline checks
CheckWhat to verify
Pre-job briefingConfirm task, hazards, limits, roles, communication, permits, isolations and stop criteria before work starts.
Field verificationCheck the plant or equipment condition matches the procedure before critical steps are taken.
Independent checkUse a second competent person for line-up, isolation, restart, critical valve position or high-consequence steps.
Abnormal condition responsePause, stabilise, communicate and escalate rather than improvising outside procedure or operating limits.
End-of-task handbackConfirm equipment state, housekeeping, documentation, permits, temporary controls and open defects before leaving the job.
SHAREsimulate

How can I practise this topic in 3D?

The start procedure disagrees with the field equipment
3D workplace practiceSHAREsim

The start procedure disagrees with the field equipment

All related inspection points 1 across 1 location
Crown Fuels terminal 1 inspection point

Practice in the SHAREhub environment. Browser practice is separate from workplace competence and formal learning records.

Carry the actual operating state across a shift change

Use a clearly shift case to join up the detailed controls. During Crownway’s evening shift, an operating parameter is abnormal and a safeguard is recorded as impaired. A temporary instruction restricts the affected transfer while maintenance investigates. The incoming shift must receive that actual state, its expiry or review condition and the person authorised to decide the next step.

Operational discipline is more than following a temporary note. The supervisor verifies that the note agrees with current plant conditions and the approved operating envelope, reconciles conflicting work and keeps the task held when those conditions are not met. Only the designated authority releases restart after the required checks and communication. This example illustrates control of operations, not a plant operating instruction or automatic COMAH classification.

Crownway: an impairment crosses the evening handover

Illustrative example. A transfer remains restricted after an abnormal indication; the next shift is under pressure to resume the loading programme.

Decision. The incoming supervisor reconciles the impairment, temporary instruction and maintenance status with the area authority before assignment.

Evidence to check. Current operating limits, safeguard status, temporary restrictions, work records and a clear restart decision owner.

Hold or escalation point. No local workaround, informal bypass or restart solely because the next shift has arrived.

Follow-up. Close the temporary change through the approved process and review why the abnormal condition and handover arose.

Hand over the plant state, including what is impaired

A shift-state record should make abnormal conditions, isolations, inhibited protection and outstanding actions visible to the incoming team.

Process operators monitoring equipment from a UK industrial control room. Photorealistic illustration.
Illustrative UK workplace scene. Read the practical checks below for responsibilities, evidence and limits. Download image · Download smaller image
  1. Record actual state

    Identify normal/abnormal operation, protection impairments and any assessed temporary arrangements.

  2. Transfer understanding

    Incoming and outgoing owners resolve critical uncertainties and confirm the actions and limits that apply.

  3. Hold and verify

    Do not begin the affected transfer while a critical state is unknown. Use the authorised restoration and operational-acceptance route.

The board is illustrative and gives no site-real set point, bypass authority or operating instruction.

What are the key points about conduct of operations and operational discipline?

Conduct of operations means keeping the plant within approved limits through usable procedures, verified status, disciplined handover and a clear stop response to abnormal conditions or failed barriers.

  • Conduct of operations and operational discipline is a process safety topic that helps an organisation identify, control and assure the barriers needed to prevent or limit major accidents.
  • In practice, conduct of operations and operational discipline should appear in design reviews, operating procedures, maintenance plans, training matrices, management meetings, audit protocols and emergency exercises.
  • For study and website use, treat this part of conduct of operations and operational discipline as a link between technical hazard understanding and management discipline.
  • Several near misses, alarm problems, leaks, permit findings or maintenance deferrals are reviewed separately and closed locally.
  • For conduct of operations and operational discipline, a useful role test is to ask five people in different functions what they would do if a critical control was unavailable.
  • Assurance for conduct of operations and operational discipline should be evidence-based.
  • This chapter explains conduct of operations and operational discipline as a process safety management subject.

What is operational discipline?

It is consistent execution of an understood, workable operating envelope with a reliable response when conditions depart from it.

The HSE operating-procedures guide expects procedures for normal work and foreseeable abnormal or emergency conditions. Discipline requires a usable procedure, competent people, a clear plant-status record and a supervisor who does not reward bypassing controls to meet output. For a solvent tank transfer, specify receiving tank, line-up, inventory limit, high-high trip, independent check, shutdown and handover. If level indication conflicts or the trip is inhibited, the operator stops the transfer, secures the system and seeks competent investigation; continuing under a verbal assurance is unsafe.

How should operations be run and handed over?

Prepare, exchange and cross-check a written and spoken handover of plant state, abnormal conditions and incomplete work.

Three process operators compare a generic console display and inert handover log, with tanks and connected pipework visible through a window.
Illustrative two-way handover. Check current plant evidence, responsibilities and unresolved protection status. No real setting, available trip, bypass authority or restart permission is provided.

Question the impairment, not just the signed log

Question the impairment, not just the signed log. Three control-room operators compare a generic display, inert log and tank/pipe context outside the window. Markers connect indicated status, recorded state and the plant requiring verification. No real set points, bypass route, trip availability or restart authorisation is supplied.
Conceptual functions only. Use the actual procedure, safe operating envelope, protective-system evidence and controlled restoration route.
Full written explanation

Shift handover: prepare, exchange and cross-check current plant state, including impaired protection and open work.

  1. Make the real state visible. Record abnormal conditions, alarms, impaired protection, isolations and outstanding work with clear owners.
  2. Exchange and question. Use two-way spoken and written handover. Resolve contradictions instead of inheriting an unexplained entry.
  3. Cross-check before transfer. Verify critical status against the actual plant and applicable procedure. Escalate an unresolved safeguard state.

Change the pathway

  • Indication is not protection proof. A normal-looking display or generic yellow tile cannot establish trip availability.
  • A signature is not understanding. Preserve the actual limits, actions and work boundaries, not an informal workaround.
  • Restoration has its own checks. Correction, competent verification and hand-back precede separate restart authorisation.

Evidence check: Conceptual functions only. Use the actual procedure, safe operating envelope, protective-system evidence and controlled restoration route.

Full operating, COMAH applicability and separate GB/NI legal context

Primary references: HSE: prepare, exchange and cross-check a handover (GB) · HSE: operating procedures and controlled changes (GB)

Open the complete HD image (new tab)Download image

Full operating, COMAH applicability and separate GB/NI legal context

Primary references: HSE: prepare, exchange and cross-check a handover (GB) · HSE: operating procedures and controlled changes (GB)

The HSE handover guide describes preparation, exchange and cross-check. At the transfer panel, the outgoing operator records tank level, active alarms, inhibited safeguards, isolation status, permit boundaries and who owns open actions. The incoming operator questions anomalies and confirms critical status against the plant or control display. The supervisor resolves contradictions before authorising transfer. A permit-to-work must specify the maintenance boundary and hand-back, rather than becoming a disconnected form.

On a small screen, scroll this table sideways to read all columns.

Tank transfer shift handover
StageWorker actionVerification and stop
PrepareOutgoing operator records current tank, line, levels, inhibits and open permits.Supervisor checks completeness; hold if state is uncertain.
ExchangeBoth operators discuss abnormal trends, work in progress and limits.Incoming operator reads back critical limits and owner.
Cross-checkIncoming operator checks tank/line status and alarm/inhibit register at plant.Stop transfer on mismatch; supervisor/engineer resolve and sign restart.

How can the hierarchy of controls reduce process risk before relying on operational discipline?

The failure chain often begins with weak procedures, changing plant, incomplete handover or production pressure; the top event occurs when a barrier no longer prevents loss of control.

An ageing transfer valve leaks, the high-high trip is inhibited after a fault, and the handover mentions only the maintenance ticket number. The next shift assumes the trip is available and transfers too much product. Separate preventive barriers are transfer limits, verified line-up and an independent tested trip; mitigations include containment and emergency isolation. Supervisory sampling of the actual task, proof-test records, alarm/inhibit status and near-miss trends expose degradation before a release. The safety lead should investigate a bypass as a control-system defect as well as a behaviour issue.

On a small screen, scroll this table sideways to read all columns.

HSE’s five-level hierarchy is the GB framework for elimination, substitution, engineering, administrative controls and PPE. ERICPD is complementary. Select measures for the actual hazard and work location, then verify physical and human controls separately.

What evidence shows good management of conduct of operations and operational discipline?

Good evidence shows that the topic is understood, controls are in place, people are competent and actions are reviewed.

Risk assessment and planning

Before a planned start, shutdown or change of operating mode, confirm the permitted limits, available utilities, alarm and trip status, people on duty and open maintenance work. Record any unresolved deviation and keep the plant in a safe state until the authorised owner confirms the controls and the handover are ready.

Inspection, audit and monitoring

Sample live operating records, overrides, shift handovers and the state of critical barriers. Compare the evidence with the approved procedure and investigate gaps before restart.

Learning and improvement

Use deviations, near misses and worker feedback to revise operating instructions and test whether corrective actions changed the way work is done. Handover and competence checks should cover abnormal as well as routine operation.

Which controls make operational discipline credible?

Design and maintain critical physical barriers, then give people usable limits and a tested stop route.

An uncertain trip state holds the affected transfer

An uncertain trip state holds the affected transfer. An illustrative equipment room places a closed neutral tank, equipment enclosure and connected pipework beside ordinary uninjured people reviewing inert task facts. Picture key: 1 identifies the closed tank; 2 identifies the enclosure and pipework; 3 identifies the inert task facts. The picture identifies no chemical or service and establishes no actual receipt, dosing, flow, inventory, energy or valve state, protective function, containment or eyewash performance. The separate conceptual receipt diagram retains sensing, a navy normal-indication branch and a red sensing-to-logic/power-to-required-final-action chain. Normal indication is not proof of the trip. Its solid receipt arrow indicates direction only; the receiving-tank liquid shape supplies no actual level or content. Bund/drainage remains separate, unarrowed mitigation. Verify availability, independence, configuration and test scope against the actual plant; no pictured equipment is assigned to that conceptual chain. All four complete handover checks retain their source order: compare current state; resolve protection questions; hold an unresolved transfer; use controlled restoration. Their independent headings are unnumbered. Unknown or failed required protection holds the affected transfer. Correction, competent verification and a clear hand-back precede the owner’s separate restart decision; the diagram supplies no plant configuration, trip setting, proof-test method, bypass authority, safe operating limit or restart permission. The full accountable roles, evidence limits and both chemical-process-handover and water-utility-simulator examples accompany the explanation. The physical picture is neither a verified water utility nor a simulator state. Use the complete topic for the actual operating envelope, work and permit boundaries, engineering evidence, controlled restoration, separate GB/NI COMAH applicability and source qualifications. Existing Crownway and Crown Fuels teaching examples remain subject to their own technical and classification limits. No new operating, testing, isolation, emergency, clinical or legal instruction is given.
Closed tank, enclosure/pipework and inert facts support the complete conceptual indication/protection diagram and separate mitigation; visible equipment and papers do not prove a working trip or permit transfer.
Full written explanation

An illustrative equipment room places a closed neutral tank, equipment enclosure and connected pipework beside ordinary uninjured people reviewing inert task facts. Picture key: 1 identifies the closed tank; 2 identifies the enclosure and pipework; 3 identifies the inert task facts. The picture identifies no chemical or service and establishes no actual receipt, dosing, flow, inventory, energy or valve state, protective function, containment or eyewash performance. The separate conceptual receipt diagram retains sensing, a navy normal-indication branch and a red sensing-to-logic/power-to-required-final-action chain. Normal indication is not proof of the trip. Its solid receipt arrow indicates direction only; the receiving-tank liquid shape supplies no actual level or content. Bund/drainage remains separate, unarrowed mitigation. Verify availability, independence, configuration and test scope against the actual plant; no pictured equipment is assigned to that conceptual chain. All four complete handover checks retain their source order: compare current state; resolve protection questions; hold an unresolved transfer; use controlled restoration. Their independent headings are unnumbered. Unknown or failed required protection holds the affected transfer. Correction, competent verification and a clear hand-back precede the owner’s separate restart decision; the diagram supplies no plant configuration, trip setting, proof-test method, bypass authority, safe operating limit or restart permission. The full accountable roles, evidence limits and both chemical-process-handover and water-utility-simulator examples accompany the explanation. The physical picture is neither a verified water utility nor a simulator state. Use the complete topic for the actual operating envelope, work and permit boundaries, engineering evidence, controlled restoration, separate GB/NI COMAH applicability and source qualifications. Existing Crownway and Crown Fuels teaching examples remain subject to their own technical and classification limits. No new operating, testing, isolation, emergency, clinical or legal instruction is given.

Water-utility simulator: tank-transfer indication, protective action and mitigation need separate evidence.

  1. Compare current state. Check the actual display, log, impairments and permit boundaries for the intended transfer.
  2. Resolve protection questions. Use the approved basis and relevant competent test evidence; an indication is not the trip.
  3. Hold an unresolved transfer. Do not rely on a briefing, informal bypass or paper entry while critical status conflicts remain.
  4. Use controlled restoration. Correction, competent verification and a clear hand-back precede the owner’s separate restart decision.

When the evidence does not fit: Unknown or failed required protection holds the affected transfer. Do not infer a safe operating limit, available trip or restart permission from this schematic.

Who acts: Operations and shift owners with the responsible competent engineering and permit/maintenance roles.

Changed workplace

Chemical-process handover: Cross-check actual state and open impairments before affected work.

Water-utility simulator: Practise the defined abnormal response; simulation is not live-plant acceptance.

Evidence check: Conceptual functions only. Use the actual procedure, safe operating envelope, protective-system evidence and controlled restoration route.

Full operating, COMAH applicability and separate GB/NI legal context

Primary references: HSE: prepare, exchange and cross-check a handover (GB) · HSE: operating procedures and controlled changes (GB)

Open the complete HD image (new tab)Download image

Full operating, COMAH applicability and separate GB/NI legal context

Primary references: HSE: prepare, exchange and cross-check a handover (GB) · HSE: operating procedures and controlled changes (GB)

An independent trip is valuable only if the set point, sensor, logic and final valve are specified and proof-tested. The operator should see a clear status and know the response to an inhibit. Supervisors must challenge routine overrides and confirm permitted compensating measures before affected work; some failures require outright suspension. Procedure changes go through management of change, training and an observed trial. HSE HSG254 can help choose leading indicators such as overdue trip tests, open inhibits and procedure deviations, alongside lagging releases and demands.

Commission the overfill protection against the actual tank inventory, substance, transfer rate and available response time. A competent engineer verifies sensor, logic, set point, final-valve closure and containment against approved acceptance criteria; record test evidence and maintenance/proof-test arrangements. Before transfer, the operator checks plant status and open impairments. Planned tests, shift checks and change review check continued performance. A failed test or unresolved state conflict holds transfer; correction, competent verification and a clear hand-back precede the process owner’s recorded restart authorisation. HSE operating-procedure guidance and HSG254 support operating limits and barrier assurance; a briefing does not replace a failed trip.

What should the risk or assurance register include for conduct of operations and operational discipline?

The register should describe credible events, the controls relied on and the evidence that proves those controls are alive.

Risk and assurance register prompts
Event or issue Risk route Preventing controls Response or mitigation Evidence to check
Conduct of operations and operational discipline not identified in real work People, plant or operations are exposed because the assessment does not reflect the task, environment or people affected. Task-specific risk assessment, worker involvement, competent review and clear ownership. Pause the work, reassess the activity, brief affected people and close immediate gaps. Risk assessment, briefing records, supervisor checks and action close-out.
Controls degrade or are bypassed Controls that were suitable become ineffective through wear, change, pressure, poor maintenance or normalisation of shortcuts. Inspection, maintenance, monitoring, stop-work authority, defect reporting and management review. Escalate defects, apply temporary controls, investigate recurrence and check similar areas. Inspection findings, maintenance records, defect logs, audit results and management review.
Weak competence or communication Workers, supervisors or contractors do not understand the risk, limits, controls or escalation route. Role-based training, authorisation where needed, supervision, contractor control and refresher triggers. Re-brief the team, stop unsafe work and update competence records or supervision plans. Training matrix, authorisations, toolbox talks, observation records and incident learning.

How do fuel-transfer states support disciplined operations?

Keep the selected activity, intended transfer path and protection status explicit. The animation is a teaching sequence, not a live status display or operating instruction.

Crownway forecourt composition: tanker delivery and vapour return. Unvalidated classification document.
Interactive 3D explainerSHAREsim

Tanker delivery and vapour return

During the proposed tanker delivery, product enters the receiving tank and displaced vapour returns to the tanker by a separate path. The delivery-hose teaching envelope follows the connected hose route.

Activity focus: Trace the tanker connection, product hose and receiving fill before following the Stage 1b vapour-return path. Inspect the whole delivery working area, including nearby traffic, dispensers and drainage.

Contextual workplace scene. Use the task, control and evidence checks in this section; appearance alone does not establish safe conditions, individual health or approval.

Crownway depot composition: tanker loading: liquid out, vapour back. Unvalidated classification document.
Interactive 3D explainerSHAREsim

Tanker loading: liquid out, vapour back

Follow petrol from bulk storage into the tanker and the separate displaced-vapour route from the tanker to the terminal VRU.

Activity focus: Distinguish the product line, vapour collection line and tanker-loading protective controls.

Contextual workplace scene. Use the task, control and evidence checks in this section; appearance alone does not establish safe conditions, individual health or approval.

Educational illustration, not to scale. Coloured zones are teaching examples, not a site-specific hazardous-area classification.

What competence is needed for conduct of operations and operational discipline?

Competence should be practical, role-specific and checked through behaviour and evidence, not assumed from attendance alone.

Competence for conduct of operations and operational discipline should be matched to the role. Awareness may be enough for some people; others need practical authorisation, technical training, supervision skills or specialist advice.

Training should be refreshed after change, incidents, repeated defects, poor audit findings, new equipment, new guidance or a long gap since the task was last carried out.

Role-specific competence
Role Competence needed
Worker or operator Understands the hazard, expected controls, defect reporting route, stop-work triggers and personal responsibilities for conduct of operations and operational discipline.
Supervisor Can check the work area, challenge unsafe practice, confirm controls are in place and act on concerns or changing conditions.
Manager or dutyholder Provides resources, competent advice, suitable equipment, training, monitoring and action close-out.
Specialist or competent person Provides technical assessment, inspection, health advice, engineering input or legal interpretation where the topic requires specialist judgement.

What should each role learn and demonstrate?

Learning must match the decisions people make, from recognising danger to checking that controls work.

Briefings should tell people how to act, but attendance alone does not show competence. Assess the real decision or task, record who assessed it and revisit after a material change, failed control or incident. A local authorisation is task-specific; no universal external certificate is implied.

On a small screen, scroll this table sideways to read all columns.

Role-level learning and competence evidence
Role and learningDemonstration and assessorRecord and reassessment trigger
Transfer operatorDemonstrate line-up, trip-status check and abnormal stop; assessor is operations lead.Authorisation record; reassess after alarm miss, change or absence.
Shift supervisorRun a conflicting-status handover and stop decision; process-safety lead assesses.Handover and drill record; repeat after near miss.
Maintenance leadDemonstrate isolation and hand-back; site engineer assesses.Permit and test evidence; reassess after boundary change.

How can a management system sustain effective decisions?

Give each hazard or support route an owner, a control, a check and a response to failure.

Connect the operating envelope, handover, proof testing, permit interfaces and HSG254 indicators to named owners. Stop on a failed critical barrier and require a competent restart sign-off. An owner should sample actual work and corrective actions, not accept a policy or certificate as evidence that the controls work.

The free GB regulator guide HSE Managing for health and safety (HSG65) explains a plan–do–check–act approach: assign controls and owners, involve workers, check work as done, and correct failures. For Northern Ireland, use HSENI risk assessment guidance for the local duty. A certificate alone does not demonstrate that a control works.

What are the warning signs of weak management of conduct of operations and operational discipline?

Weak management is usually visible before harm occurs if supervisors and leaders look for practical warning signs.

  • The risk assessment mentions conduct of operations and operational discipline but does not describe the actual work, people, equipment or environment.
  • Controls rely mainly on people remembering rules rather than removing, reducing or isolating the hazard.
  • Training records exist, but supervisors cannot explain what good control looks like at the point of work.
  • Inspections repeatedly find the same defects or unsafe behaviours without lasting improvement.
  • Incidents, symptoms, complaints or near misses are treated as isolated events rather than management-system learning.
  • Senior managers receive activity numbers but not evidence that controls are effective.

Which terms are used?

These terms explain the operating and major-hazard decisions.

On a small screen, scroll this table sideways to read all columns.

Terms and plain-English meanings
TermMeaningUse here
COMAHControl of Major Accident HazardsQualifying major-hazard establishment regime; separate GB and NI instruments.
MAPPMajor Accident Prevention PolicyRequired for COMAH establishments in scope.
SMSSafety management systemOrganises major-hazard controls and assurance.
PTWPermit to workControlled high-risk task and hand-back interface.
InhibitTemporary removal or bypass of a safeguardRequires control, visibility, review and stop decision.