Independent SHAREhub process-safety awareness. Selected learning maps to a numbered process-safety syllabus topic; this is not the NEBOSH qualification, approved provision, specialist design instruction or work authorisation. GB guidance is distinguished from corresponding NI requirements; establish applicability for the actual jurisdiction and establishment.
This reader supplies the complete teaching. Use the interactive LMS course for assessed activities, saved progress and completion.
LESSON 1
Organise around the major-event scenario
Explain why a system must connect to actual hazards.
Existing SHAREhub photographic illustration. The written fictional case supplies the condition and decision evidence.
Organise around the major-event scenario
A management system should make important controls dependable in the real operation. Begin with the credible event: what can lose control, which functions prevent or limit it and what information shows their condition. A folder of procedures cannot answer these questions by its size alone.
Map the arrangements needed across operation, maintenance, competence, change and emergency response. The useful test is whether those arrangements support the same current process and its dependencies. Avoid creating separate departmental stories that look complete but leave the interface between them unexplained.
Why should the PSM system start with major accident scenarios?
The PSM system should start with scenarios because paperwork only matters if it controls a real route to a major accident.
A generic checklist can miss the danger. A site storing flammable liquid needs to understand overfill, vapour formation, ignition, bund failure, firewater runoff and emergency response. A reactor site needs to understand runaway reaction, pressure relief, incompatible additions, cooling failure and emergency shutdown. A toxic gas system needs to understand detection, isolation, ventilation, shelter, evacuation and responder protection.
Once the scenario is defined, the organisation can ask better questions: what prevents the event, what detects it, what controls it, what limits consequences, what emergency actions are needed and what evidence proves each layer is healthy.
Trace dependencies between organisational arrangements.
Photorealistic illustrative UK workplace scene. Review checks: Avoid / redesign: Clear normal, abnormal, start-up and shutdown instructions. Control the task: Hazards, impairments, permits, alarms and abnormal conditions communicated. Verify before release: Field-verified procedures and revision history.
Connect the management elements
Operating control can depend on maintained equipment, accurate information and capable people. A change can affect all three, while emergency arrangements address consequences if prevention fails. These are related functions rather than competing safety initiatives.
For each dependency, identify an owner, required input and handover. The system should reveal when one element changes the basis of another. A maintenance update not reaching operations, for example, can leave a procedure describing an unavailable function. Management review needs visibility of these links, not only evidence that each department held a meeting.
Which core elements make up a process safety management system?
Core PSM elements cover knowledge, hazard analysis, operating control, competence, integrity, change, emergency response, audit and learning.
Best-practice guide · six simple steps
Best-practice guide: Establishing a process safety management system
Start with the key actions, then explore value, a workplace example, harm, stronger controls and further help. Choose a step or use Previous and Next; the guide does not advance automatically.
Keep one card or the full set for social sharing, team briefings and learning. Each PDF contains one card per page. Read the full topic for explanations, questions and source links.
Read all six steps as text
1. Which core elements make up a process safety management system?
Core PSM elements cover knowledge, hazard analysis, operating control, competence, integrity, change, emergency response, audit and learning.
Avoid / redesign: Clear normal, abnormal, start-up and shutdown instructions.
Control the task: Hazards, impairments, permits, alarms and abnormal conditions communicated.
Verify before release: Field-verified procedures and revision history.
Core PSM elements cover knowledge, hazard analysis, operating control, competence, integrity, change, emergency response, audit and learning. A process safety management system keeps major-accident hazards, safety-critical barriers and decision rights under control through the whole plant life.
Apply it: Which part of this plan would you check at the workface before authorising the task?
2. Turn establishing a process safety management system knowledge into a decision
Use the evidence to improve the actual work arrangement.
Change at source: Clear normal, abnormal, start-up and shutdown instructions.
Make it observable: Field-verified procedures and revision history.
Keep useful evidence: Transfer log, proof-test record, bypass decision, defect action, owner, technical approval and hand-back record.
A process safety management system keeps major-accident hazards, safety-critical barriers and decision rights under control through the whole plant life. Start with credible release, fire, explosion and toxic scenarios; give each barrier a performance standard, owner and test; and make impairments, change, learning and restart decisions visible. Transfer log, proof-test record, bypass decision, defect action, owner, technical approval and hand-back record.
Apply it: What evidence would show that the change improves this task, rather than only completing a record?
Hold / review: Do not transfer if a critical trip is bypassed, failed or unverified, or if the receiving capacity is uncertain.
Monitor transfer against limits and respond to the defined alarm and trip sequence; communicate deviations at shift handover. Confirm final level, restore and test any temporary isolation, close permits and return barriers to normal status.
Apply it: At which point would you hold this example, and what evidence would allow it to proceed?
Connect the task, the route to the person and the control that can fail.
Overdue safety critical maintenance: A barrier may fail on demand.
Repeated small leaks: Containment degradation becomes normal.
Alarm floods or nuisance alarms: Operators may miss critical warnings.
Overdue safety critical maintenance: A barrier may fail on demand. Repeated small leaks: Containment degradation becomes normal. Alarm floods or nuisance alarms: Operators may miss critical warnings.
Apply it: Who could be exposed, including other trades, cleaners, maintainers and people nearby?
5. Choose controls for establishing a process safety management system
Start with the stronger practicable options and verify their effect.
Operating procedures: Clear normal, abnormal, start-up and shutdown instructions.
Safe operating envelope: Defined limits and required response to exceedance.
Shift handover: Hazards, impairments, permits, alarms and abnormal conditions communicated.
Alarm response: Alarms are meaningful, prioritised and understood.
Permit interfaces: Maintenance and operations share isolation and hazard information.
Operating procedures: Clear normal, abnormal, start-up and shutdown instructions. Safe operating envelope: Defined limits and required response to exceedance. Shift handover: Hazards, impairments, permits, alarms and abnormal conditions communicated. Alarm response: Alarms are meaningful, prioritised and understood. Permit interfaces: Maintenance and operations share isolation and hazard information. Read the full control table for qualifications, ownership and verification. Use the actual task and applicable jurisdiction; existing technical approval remains unchanged.
Apply it: Which stronger option can be used here, and who will verify it before accepting the remaining risk?
6. Use the full establishing a process safety management system lesson
Follow the official sources below and retain the task-specific evidence.
Official guidance: HSE COMAH 2015 overview
Official guidance: HSENI COMAH overview
Task decision: Transfer log, proof-test record, bypass decision, defect action, owner, technical approval and hand-back record.
Use the full topic for the decision points, practical examples, detailed control tables and source scope. HSE guidance applies to Great Britain; use HSENI for the Northern Ireland route and the source’s stated jurisdiction. A simplified guide does not change the page’s technical-review or approval status.
Apply it: Which official source and full-topic section will you use to resolve the next decision?
Simplified learning guide. Use the full topic, current official guidance and the actual work arrangements. Workplace scenarios labelled fictional are illustrative examples.
Different frameworks use different wording, but the substance is consistent. A site needs to know its hazards, control operations, maintain equipment, manage people and contractors, control change, prepare for emergencies and learn from evidence. See HSE COMAH 2015 overview.
The elements should not be isolated departments. A weak MOC can damage asset integrity. Poor competence can defeat procedures. Weak indicators can hide degraded barriers. Poor leadership can normalise overdue safety critical actions.
Core PSM elements - Core PSM elements
Element
What it controls
Useful evidence
Process safety information
Hazardous substances, design basis, operating limits and equipment information.
P&IDs, SDS, relief basis, safe limits and drawings.
Hazard identification and risk analysis
Credible scenarios and safeguards.
HAZOP, LOPA, bowties and action records.
Operating procedures and safe systems
Normal, abnormal, start-up, shutdown and emergency operation.
Field-verified procedures and shift handover records.
Competence and training
People in safety critical roles and tasks.
Training matrix, assessments and authorisations.
Asset integrity
Safety critical equipment and containment.
Inspection, test, maintenance and backlog evidence.
Contractor and permit control
High-risk work interfaces.
PTW, isolation, induction and supervision records.
Management of change
Technical, procedural, organisational and temporary change.
MOC screening, risk review and approval.
Emergency planning
Response to credible major accident scenarios.
Exercises, learning and plan updates.
Audit and review
System effectiveness and improvement.
Audit reports, indicators and leadership decisions.
Applied case
Fictional exercise: A new maintenance restriction is absent from the operating handover.
Dependency
One element supplies information another needs.
Finding
Keep the conclusion scoped to the demonstrated gap.
Test your decision
Which system connection failed to be demonstrated?
Proof that all maintenance work is poor.
Transfer of the relevant equipment condition into operational control.
Only attendance at departmental meetings.
Compare the explanation
Transfer of the relevant equipment condition into operational control.
Identify information needed to understand the hazard.
Existing SHAREhub photographic illustration. The written fictional case supplies the condition and decision evidence.
Know the process before judging it
Process knowledge includes material properties, configuration, intended operation and relevant limits or design assumptions. Its detail depends on the task and decision. A safety data sheet can inform substance hazards but does not describe every plant connection or operating condition.
Identify what the decision needs and where authoritative information is held. If the pack lacks a relevant property or design basis, state the missing information rather than guessing. Awareness does not authorise the learner to generate a safe pressure, temperature or compatibility conclusion from a general diagram.
What is process safety information and process knowledge?
It is the controlled technical knowledge needed to understand hazards, operating limits and safety-critical controls.
Best-practice guide · six simple steps
Best-practice guide: Process Safety Information and Process Knowledge
Start with the key actions, then explore value, a workplace example, harm, stronger controls and further help. Choose a step or use Previous and Next; the guide does not advance automatically.
Keep one card or the full set for social sharing, team briefings and learning. Each PDF contains one card per page. Read the full topic for explanations, questions and source links.
Read all six steps as text
1. What is process safety information and process knowledge?
The harm path begins when a stale drawing, property value or operating limit informs a real decision.
Avoid / redesign: Eliminate a hazardous configuration or redundant transfer path when design allows; update the design basis and verify the physical change so obsolete drawings cannot keep the old route alive in a later procedure.
Control the task: Isolate and engineer critical deviations with verified containment, interlocks, relief and independent shutdown.
Verify before release: Read the full task example, checks and stop points on this page.
The harm path begins when a stale drawing, property value or operating limit informs a real decision. A crew may isolate the wrong line or commission an unreviewed bypass; containment or protective capacity can then fail, releasing pressure, flammable or toxic material. Process safety information is the controlled account of what the plant contains, how it is designed to operate, and which conditions and safeguards prevent a major accident.
Apply it: Which part of this plan would you check at the workface before authorising the task?
2. Turn process safety information and process knowledge knowledge into a decision
Use the evidence to improve the actual work arrangement.
Change at source: Eliminate a hazardous configuration or redundant transfer path when design allows; update the design basis and verify the physical change so obsolete drawings cannot keep the old route alive in a later procedure.
Make it observable: Read the full task example, checks and stop points on this page.
Keep useful evidence: Current SDS, redlined and approved P&ID, property/design assumptions, hazard review, field walkdown, change record, tests and signed release.
Process safety information is the controlled account of what the plant contains, how it is designed to operate, and which conditions and safeguards prevent a major accident. Process knowledge is people’s ability to use that information at the point of work. Current SDS, redlined and approved P&ID, property/design assumptions, hazard review, field walkdown, change record, tests and signed release.
Apply it: What evidence would show that the change improves this task, rather than only completing a record?
3. Operational example: solvent-blend tank transfer information
Fictional example: a practical application of the existing topic lesson.
Setting: the process operator plans to store a lower-flash-point solvent blend in an existing tank with a temporary transfer connection and a vent near a walkway.
Act: Compare the blend properties, compatibility, hazardous-area basis, tank limits, transfer connection, P&ID and vent destination with the installed plant.
Hold / review: Do not introduce the blend if the drawing misses the connection, the hazardous-area basis is stale, or the vent route and protection are unverified.
Field-verify the temporary connection and valve tags, confirm ignition controls and emergency isolation, and brief operators on approved transfer limits. Revise the controlled drawings, SDS access, operating/emergency procedures and training before normal use; close the temporary change.
Apply it: At which point would you hold this example, and what evidence would allow it to proceed?
5. Choose controls for process safety information and process knowledge
Start with the stronger practicable options and verify their effect.
Eliminate: Eliminate a hazardous configuration or redundant transfer path when design allows; update the design basis and verify the physical change so obsolete drawings cannot keep the old route alive in a later procedure.
Reduce: Substitute or reduce hazardous inventory and operating conditions only after checking new fluid properties, compatibility and scenarios.
Isolate: Isolate and engineer critical deviations with verified containment, interlocks, relief and independent shutdown.
Control: Control, PPE and Discipline: revision control, management of change, competent technical approval and operator handover preserve the information.
Eliminate: Eliminate a hazardous configuration or redundant transfer path when design allows; update the design basis and verify the physical change so obsolete drawings cannot keep the old route alive in a later procedure. Reduce: Substitute or reduce hazardous inventory and operating conditions only after checking new fluid properties, compatibility and scenarios. Isolate: Isolate and engineer critical deviations with verified containment, interlocks, relief and independent shutdown. Control: Control, PPE and Discipline: revision control, management of change, competent technical approval and operator handover preserve the information. Read the full control table for qualifications, ownership and verification. Use the actual task and applicable jurisdiction; existing technical approval remains unchanged.
Apply it: Which stronger option can be used here, and who will verify it before accepting the remaining risk?
6. Use the full process safety information and process knowledge lesson
Follow the official sources below and retain the task-specific evidence.
Official guidance: HSE COMAH 2015 guidance
Official guidance: HSE operating procedures technical measures
Task decision: Current SDS, redlined and approved P&ID, property/design assumptions, hazard review, field walkdown, change record, tests and signed release.
Use the full topic for the decision points, practical examples, detailed control tables and source scope. HSE guidance applies to Great Britain; use HSENI for the Northern Ireland route and the source’s stated jurisdiction. A simplified guide does not change the page’s technical-review or approval status.
Apply it: Which official source and full-topic section will you use to resolve the next decision?
Simplified learning guide. Use the full topic, current official guidance and the actual work arrangements. Workplace scenarios labelled fictional are illustrative examples.
Process safety information is not simply a drawing archive. It is the technical evidence that explains what the process is, what hazardous materials are present, what conditions are safe, what could go wrong and which controls prevent or limit loss of control. Without reliable information, hazard studies become guesses, operating procedures become folklore and management of change becomes dangerous.
Process knowledge includes written records and lived understanding. Operators may know how the plant behaves during start-up, maintenance may know which valves pass, engineers may know why a relief device was sized a certain way, and emergency teams may need to know inventories and isolation points. A strong system captures, validates and shares that knowledge rather than leaving it in one person's head.
Helps people understand the process sequence and material flow.
P&IDs
Equipment, lines, valves, instruments, alarms, trips and relief devices.
Supports isolation, maintenance, hazard studies, operations and emergency response.
Hazardous properties
Flammability, toxicity, reactivity, corrosivity, stability and environmental hazard.
Defines credible harm and control priorities.
Safe operating limits
Temperature, pressure, level, flow, composition and inventory limits.
Shows when operation is moving outside the safe envelope.
Relief and vent basis
Overpressure scenarios, set pressures, capacities and disposal routes.
Protects against vessel rupture and uncontrolled discharge.
Materials of construction
Compatibility with process fluids and conditions.
Prevents corrosion, embrittlement, failure or contamination.
Cause and effect logic
What alarms, trips, interlocks and shutdowns should do.
Allows testing and operator response to be checked.
The useful information set connects hazardous-substance identity and inventory, reaction and physical properties, safe operating limits, process flow and line diagrams, equipment design, control logic, relief and shutdown basis, procedures and emergency assumptions. Each item needs an owner, revision and evidence that it matches the installed plant. An operator needs to know which document governs today’s task and which unknown requires a hold, not merely where the archive is stored.
The harm path begins when a stale drawing, property value or operating limit informs a real decision. A crew may isolate the wrong line or commission an unreviewed bypass; containment or protective capacity can then fail, releasing pressure, flammable or toxic material. The relevant consequence depends on the actual substance and energy, so a generic document check cannot replace field verification and a competent hazard review. Hold the change when information and installed plant disagree. Source: HSE COMAH 2015 guidance
A process flow diagram (PFD) shows the main process path, while a piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) records detailed connections and control points. Confirm both against the as-built installation where a change could affect a major-accident barrier.
Applied case
Fictional exercise: A transfer decision has the substance sheet but no confirmed receiving configuration.
Substance
Properties help identify material hazards.
Plant
Configuration and operation need their own controlled basis.
Test your decision
What is accurate?
Useful substance information exists, but the route and receiving basis remain unresolved.
The sheet alone proves the transfer is suitable.
All information in the pack has no value.
Compare the explanation
Useful substance information exists, but the route and receiving basis remain unresolved.
Different information sources answer different process questions.
Distinguish available records from current applicable records.
Photorealistic illustrative UK workplace scene. Review checks: Avoid / redesign: Eliminate a hazardous configuration or redundant transfer path when design allows; update the design basis and verify the physical change so obsolete drawings cannot keep the old route alive in a later procedure. Control the task: Isolate and engineer critical deviations with verified containment, interlocks, relief and independent shutdown. Verify before release: Read the full task example, checks and stop points on this page.
Control the information used for work
Information must be identifiable, retrievable and relevant to the actual arrangement. A drawing on a screen is not necessarily the current approved version. Check equipment identity, status and scope before using it to support a decision.
When a mismatch appears, use the controlled clarification and restriction route. Do not silently edit the operating copy or choose whichever document is most convenient. Preserve the decision rationale and manage superseded versions so later users can understand history without confusing it with current instruction.
What should a process safety information evidence pack contain?
The evidence pack should let someone trace a scenario from hazardous inventory to current controls and records.
For a serious learning hub, the evidence pack must go beyond a file list. It should show that information is current, owned, reviewed after change and useful to people doing the work. A competent reviewer should be able to sample one vessel, line or operation and follow the information chain from drawings and design limits to procedures, permits, training and emergency response.
Evidence should also show information gaps and uncertainty. Where drawings are being updated, relief data is missing, a study is overdue or a temporary arrangement exists, the risk and interim controls should be visible.
Current piping, valves, vents, drains, instruments, alarms, trips, relief devices and isolation points are controlled and field verified.
Old redlined drawings used for permits, isolations or hazard studies.
PFDs and process descriptions
Material flows, major equipment, stream names and process steps are understood by operators, engineers and learners.
People know individual tasks but not the process sequence or credible escalation route.
SDS and hazardous-property data
SDS, flammability, toxicity, reactivity, compatibility, environmental hazard and decomposition information are linked to COSHH, DSEAR and procedures.
SDS is stored as procurement paperwork and not translated into operating controls.
Operating envelopes
Normal operating range, abnormal range, alarm response and safe operating boundary are defined for pressure, temperature, level, flow, inventory and composition.
Normal settings are known but the safe envelope and required responses are unclear.
Safe operating limits
Critical maximum/minimum limits, alarm set points, trip points and operator actions are documented, trained and reviewed after change.
Limits exist in design files but are not visible in operating procedures or control-room prompts.
Relief and design basis
Relief scenarios, sizing assumptions, set pressure, blocked-outlet controls, discharge destination and inspection/test records are traceable.
A relief device is listed but no one can explain the scenario it protects.
HAZOP and LOPA records
Design intent, deviations, causes, consequences, safeguards, independent protection layers (IPLs), action close-out and residual assumptions are current and accessible.
Study files sit in archive and are not used during management of change (MOC), pre-start-up safety review or operating review.
MOC history
Process, material, equipment, software, staffing, procedure and temporary changes show risk review, approvals, training and information updates.
MOCs close while P&IDs, procedures, training or safe limits remain out of date.
Asset register
Equipment tags, safety-critical status, inspection class, materials, pressure rating, alarm/trip links and maintenance strategy are aligned.
Asset records do not match the plant or the safety-critical element register.
Inspection and test records
Inspection, proof testing, calibration, functional testing and defect close-out show that critical equipment still meets its basis of safety.
Records exist but cannot be connected back to the relevant barrier or scenario.
Cause and effect
Alarms, interlocks, trips and shutdown actions are current, tested and understood by users.
Logic changed but operators and maintainers were not briefed.
Field verification
Sampling confirms the technical record matches the real plant and that temporary arrangements are visible.
No systematic comparison between database, drawing and field condition.
Applied case
Fictional exercise: Two route drawings conflict; one has no status and the installed configuration is unconfirmed.
Available
A file can be opened.
Applicable
Its status and relationship to the current task are established.
Test your decision
What should happen?
Pick the more attractive drawing.
Merge both by personal judgement and operate.
Resolve the current controlled basis through the responsible process.
Compare the explanation
Resolve the current controlled basis through the responsible process.
Accessible information is not automatically authoritative or applicable.
Distinguish major-accident intent from generic aspiration.
Existing SHAREhub photographic illustration. The written fictional case supplies the condition and decision evidence.
Make policy specific to prevention
A prevention policy should explain the organisation’s commitment and overall approach to major-accident control where that framework applies. It needs connection to the management arrangements that deliver it, rather than a generic promise that safety comes first.
Do not assume every establishment has identical statutory document duties. Establish applicability and jurisdiction through responsible review. At awareness level, ask how the stated intent reaches roles, resources and control of the actual scenario. A policy can guide action but is not evidence that the required functions are currently available.
What must a MAPP connect to real work?
The policy should state aims, principles, management responsibility and commitment, then point to the safety management arrangements that deliver them.
A short policy can refer to detailed systems for people and competence, hazard identification, operating control, management of change, emergency planning, monitoring, audit and review. The test is whether those systems control the actual dangerous substances and scenarios. A signed statement with no named owners, resources or follow-up is weak evidence. HSE COMAH 2015 overview and HSE L111 COMAH 2015 guidance.
Explain safety-case thinking without claiming universal document duties.
Photorealistic illustrative UK workplace scene. Review checks: Avoid / redesign: Engineering and logistics evaluate removing the storage or transfer step, or redesigning the operation so the identified tank-overfill scenario cannot occur. Control the task: Competent designers specify prevention and mitigation for the actual plant, including suitable overfill protection, separation and containment where the scenario requires them. Verify before release: Record the credible scenario and whether the change truly removes it.
Read an argument as claim and evidence
A reasoned demonstration links a claim to evidence and explains why that evidence supports it. “The transfer is controlled” is a claim. The relevant scenario, protective functions, verification and management arrangements provide parts of the basis.
A formal safety report has specific applicability; safety-case thinking is a way to examine an argument, not permission to declare legal compliance. Test scope and assumptions. A test on different equipment or an obsolete configuration cannot support the present claim without a justified connection. An impressive narrative should not conceal a missing premise.
What does “safety-case thinking” add?
It gives a reader a traceable argument: this hazardous inventory can produce these credible events; these controls prevent or limit them; this evidence shows the controls are suitable and working.
For each severe scenario, connect initiating events and escalation to preventive and mitigating measures. Name performance standards, assumptions, dependencies, owners, inspection or test results, impairments and remaining actions. State where uncertainty remains. A thick report with no clear link from hazard to live barrier evidence does not demonstrate control. HSE COMAH 2015 overview and HSE HSG254 Developing process safety indicators.
Scenario claim evidence and challenge
Claim
Evidence
Challenge
Tank overfill is prevented
Level control, independent trip design and effective test.
Illustrative evidence chain: overfill prevention claim → named operations owner → credited detection/logic/final-element function and dependencies → current specified-scope test record → unresolved dangerous defect → hold the affected transfer and fund correction. A policy signature does not repair the failed evidence.
Applied case
Fictional exercise: A pack claims current overfill protection using a test for another vessel.
Claim
What is being asserted?
Support
Why does this evidence apply to that assertion?
Test your decision
What is the problem?
The evidence is not shown to support the claim for this equipment.
The claim becomes valid when repeated.
Every test record is irrelevant.
Compare the explanation
The evidence is not shown to support the claim for this equipment.
A demonstration needs a traceable claim-evidence relationship.
Connect responsibilities with competence and support.
Photorealistic illustrative UK workplace scene. Review checks: Change at source: Clear normal, abnormal, start-up and shutdown instructions. Make it observable: Field-verified procedures and revision history. Keep useful evidence: Transfer log, proof-test record, bypass decision, defect action, owner, technical approval and hand-back record.
Give system ownership practical authority
The system needs owners for decisions, information and verification, with clear interfaces between them. A named owner without competence, time or escalation support may not be able to deliver the assigned function.
Examine a real decision such as acceptance after maintenance. Who provides evidence, who decides and who communicates restrictions? Keep the roles distinct where necessary. A department label or a chart does not establish that the interface works during nights, absence or contractor work. The system must be usable under those ordinary operating conditions.
How should competence, contractors and human factors be built into PSM?
PSM depends on people who are competent, authorised, supported and given systems that are usable under real operating conditions.
Training attendance is not competence. Competence needs practical assessment, refreshers, supervision and clear authorisation for safety critical roles and tasks.
Contractors can affect major accident risk through maintenance, isolation, hot work, excavation, lifting, cleaning, inspection, testing and shutdown work. The host site must set rules, communicate hazards, verify competence and supervise interfaces.
Human factors should be designed into the system. Procedures, alarms, control rooms, staffing, fatigue, workload, communication and handover all shape whether people can respond reliably when barriers are challenged.
Role
Learning
Demonstration
Assessor
Record
Reassess when
Operator
Know process limits and stop points
Respond to overfill scenario
Shift lead
Drill and log
Change or alarm
Supervisor
Manage bypass and safe restart
Review test and permit
PSM lead
Decision log
Impairment
Engineer
Own barrier performance basis
Trace one safeguard
Technical authority
Design/test file
MOC
Maintenance
Restore safety-critical assets
Demonstrate test and hand-back
Engineering lead
Work order
Defect
Emergency lead
Exercise credible escalation
Run scenario drill
Site manager
Exercise record
Plan change
Director
Challenge high-consequence barrier health
Trace scenario to evidence
Independent assurance
Board action
Backlog
Applied case
Fictional exercise: The daytime owner is absent and no competent cover is identified for handback decisions.
Allocated
A role appears in the system.
Workable
The role can obtain information and act within its limits.
Test your decision
What is missing?
Only a larger organisation chart.
Equal decision authority for anyone present.
A workable cover and escalation arrangement within defined authority.
Compare the explanation
A workable cover and escalation arrangement within defined authority.
Separate routine operation from intervention and return.
Photorealistic illustrative UK workplace scene. Review checks: Setting: Transfer of flammable liquid to a storage tank with credible overfill and vapour-release consequences. Act: Check inventory, level instrumentation, independent trip test, bypass register, operator response and containment condition. Hold / review: Do not transfer if a critical trip is bypassed, failed or unverified, or if the receiving capacity is uncertain.
Link instructions to control of work
Normal operation, maintenance intervention and restart can require different controls and decision points. The system should make those transitions explicit. A permit or job sheet does not replace process information, isolation verification or operational acceptance where required.
Trace the handover of equipment condition and authority through the task. Keep restrictions visible until the relevant release conditions are met. This awareness exercise does not issue permits or provide an isolation method; it tests whether the organisation’s arrangements connect the stages rather than leaving a gap between completed work and operation.
How should operating discipline be managed?
Operating discipline should keep the process within the safe envelope during normal, abnormal, start-up, shutdown and emergency conditions.
Operating procedures should be usable. If they are too long, out of date, unclear or not matched to field conditions, people will create informal workarounds. A good PSM system field-verifies procedures with operators and includes what to do when conditions are abnormal.
Shift handover, alarm management, permit interfaces and start-up control deserve special attention because major accidents often occur when the plant is not in steady state.
Connect inspection findings to the controlled process.
Existing SHAREhub 2D teaching schematic. Use alongside the explanation and fictional case in this lesson.
Make integrity an operating input
Integrity arrangements examine whether equipment remains suitable for its service. Findings, restrictions and verification must reach the people making operating decisions. A completed inspection is not useful assurance if its unresolved limitation remains hidden in another system.
Avoid assigning universal inspection intervals or acceptance criteria from awareness material. Competent arrangements establish those requirements for the equipment and applicable regime. The learner can identify whether evidence is current, relevant and acted on, without declaring engineering fitness from a photograph or a generic checklist.
How does asset integrity fit into the PSM system?
Asset integrity keeps containment, safety critical equipment and protective systems reliable throughout the asset lifecycle.
Asset integrity is where process safety often becomes visible: corrosion, inspection deferrals, overdue relief valve tests, temporary repairs, leaking seals, impaired firewater systems and maintenance backlog all tell leaders whether the plant is drifting.
The PSM system should classify safety critical equipment, define inspection and test requirements, manage impairments, review backlog as major accident risk and prevent production pressure from normalising degraded safeguards.
Distinguish an improvement purpose from a convenient number.
Existing SHAREhub photographic illustration. The written fictional case supplies the condition and decision evidence.
Choose an objective linked to a barrier
An objective should address a defined weakness or control outcome. A target then makes progress examinable without distorting the task. “Improve safety” gives little guidance about what must change or how the result will be assessed.
For a route-selection problem, the objective may concern reliable identification and handover. Suitable evidence relates to those functions, not an unrelated injury rate. State the owner, scope and response to a shortfall. Targets must not encourage superficial completion or conceal difficult conditions in order to reach a favourable total.
What are process safety objectives, targets and indicators?
They are the measurable aims and evidence used to track whether major accident controls are being maintained.
Best-practice guide · six simple steps
Best-practice guide: Process Safety Objectives, Targets and Indicators
Start with the key actions, then explore value, a workplace example, harm, stronger controls and further help. Choose a step or use Previous and Next; the guide does not advance automatically.
Keep one card or the full set for social sharing, team briefings and learning. Each PDF contains one card per page. Read the full topic for explanations, questions and source links.
Read all six steps as text
1. What are process safety objectives, targets and indicators?
A weak indicator can hide a real harm path: an overfill trip is bypassed, the dashboard averages it with healthy equipment, transfer continues, and fuel can escape into a vapour cloud that ignites or harms people and the environment.
Avoid / redesign: Eliminate, Reduce including substitution, Isolate, Control, personal protective equipment (PPE) and Discipline (ERICPD) is a prompt for decisions.
Control the task: They are related frameworks, not identical laws; apply them to the actual task and check the resulting control.
Verify before release: Eliminate, Reduce including substitution, Isolate, Control, personal protective equipment (PPE) and Discipline (ERICPD) is a prompt for decisions.
A weak indicator can hide a real harm path: an overfill trip is bypassed, the dashboard averages it with healthy equipment, transfer continues, and fuel can escape into a vapour cloud that ignites or harms people and the environment. The stop trigger belongs to the individual critical barrier, not a fleet-wide green percentage. A process-safety objective describes the major-accident outcome to prevent and the barrier standard to sustain.
Apply it: Which part of this plan would you check at the workface before authorising the task?
2. Turn process safety objectives, targets and indicators knowledge into a decision
Use the evidence to improve the actual work arrangement.
Change at source: Eliminate, Reduce including substitution, Isolate, Control, personal protective equipment (PPE) and Discipline (ERICPD) is a prompt for decisions.
Make it observable: Eliminate, Reduce including substitution, Isolate, Control, personal protective equipment (PPE) and Discipline (ERICPD) is a prompt for decisions.
Keep useful evidence: Indicator specification, data extract, barrier standard, alarm/trip test, action owner, stop/release decision and trend review.
A process-safety objective describes the major-accident outcome to prevent and the barrier standard to sustain. A target sets a defined threshold and response; an indicator supplies evidence from the field. Indicator specification, data extract, barrier standard, alarm/trip test, action owner, stop/release decision and trend review.
Apply it: What evidence would show that the change improves this task, rather than only completing a record?
Fictional example: a practical application of the existing topic lesson.
Setting: the process operator reviews fuel-storage overfill indicators for tank transfer operations.
Act: Link each objective to tank limits, independent trip, alarm, transfer procedure, containment and emergency response; define data source and denominator.
Hold / review: Pause the affected transfer if independent overfill protection is unproved or an alarm/limit discrepancy cannot be resolved, regardless of overall score.
Review overdue proof tests, bypass duration, high-level alarms, MOC backlog and near misses together; investigate any red barrier signal in the field. Close defects with proof-test and field evidence, revise the threshold if it failed to reveal the problem, and record the management decision.
Apply it: At which point would you hold this example, and what evidence would allow it to proceed?
5. Choose controls for process safety objectives, targets and indicators
Start with the stronger practicable options and verify their effect.
Change the work: Eliminate, Reduce including substitution, Isolate, Control, personal protective equipment (PPE) and Discipline (ERICPD) is a prompt for decisions.
Verify the barriers: They are related frameworks, not identical laws; apply them to the actual task and check the resulting control.
Sustain the controls: Eliminate the overfill scenario where a redesigned transfer or reduced inventory can remove it.
Review the decision: Record that decision as an objective and verify the field configuration; an indicator cannot compensate for an avoidable hazard.
Change the work: Eliminate, Reduce including substitution, Isolate, Control, personal protective equipment (PPE) and Discipline (ERICPD) is a prompt for decisions. Strengthen prevention: HSE’s five-level hierarchy prioritises elimination, substitution, engineering controls, administrative controls and PPE. Verify the barriers: They are related frameworks, not identical laws; apply them to the actual task and check the resulting control. Sustain the controls: Eliminate the overfill scenario where a redesigned transfer or reduced inventory can remove it. Review the decision: Record that decision as an objective and verify the field configuration; an indicator cannot compensate for an avoidable hazard. Read the full control table for qualifications, ownership and verification. Use the actual task and applicable jurisdiction; existing technical approval remains unchanged.
Apply it: Which stronger option can be used here, and who will verify it before accepting the remaining risk?
6. Use the full process safety objectives, targets and indicators lesson
Follow the official sources below and retain the task-specific evidence.
Official guidance: HSE developing process safety indicators HSG254
Official guidance: HSE COMAH 2015 guidance
Task decision: Indicator specification, data extract, barrier standard, alarm/trip test, action owner, stop/release decision and trend review.
Use the full topic for the decision points, practical examples, detailed control tables and source scope. HSE guidance applies to Great Britain; use HSENI for the Northern Ireland route and the source’s stated jurisdiction. A simplified guide does not change the page’s technical-review or approval status.
Apply it: Which official source and full-topic section will you use to resolve the next decision?
Simplified learning guide. Use the full topic, current official guidance and the actual work arrangements. Workplace scenarios labelled fictional are illustrative examples.
Objectives define what the organisation is trying to improve or maintain, such as reducing loss-of-containment events, strengthening critical-control verification or eliminating overdue safety-critical maintenance. Targets define the expected performance level. Indicators show whether the system is moving towards or away from control.
The best indicators are linked to scenarios and barriers. A training completion percentage is weak if it does not prove competence in a safety-critical task. A better indicator might be the percentage of sampled isolations where the isolation plan, lock/tag, zero-energy verification and handback were all correct.
Term
Meaning
Process safety example
Objective
A desired improvement or control state.
Improve overfill-prevention barrier reliability.
Target
A specific expected performance level.
100 percent proof tests completed by due date.
Leading indicator
A measure of control condition before harm occurs.
Safety-critical maintenance overdue rate.
Lagging indicator
A measure of events, failures or harm after something has occurred.
Loss-of-containment events and high-potential near misses.
Trigger level
A threshold that prompts action.
Any overdue safety-critical test triggers immediate asset-specific escalation and a hold/release decision against the credited barrier standard. Track non-critical backlog separately.
Data owner
Person accountable for quality and response.
Maintenance manager owns proof-test indicator.
Action rule
What happens when data shows weakness.
Stop, restrict, escalate, investigate or resource.
Start with the credible scenario, such as overfill of a fuel tank, then identify the controls relied on to prevent or mitigate it. Choose a leading measure of the control system, such as proof tests completed to standard, and a lagging measure of failure, such as high-level demands or loss of containment. Give each measure a definition, owner, source, threshold and action. A green percentage can hide one overdue test on the only independent trip; the decision must be barrier-specific.
A weak indicator can hide a real harm path: an overfill trip is bypassed, the dashboard averages it with healthy equipment, transfer continues, and fuel can escape into a vapour cloud that ignites or harms people and the environment. The stop trigger belongs to the individual critical barrier, not a fleet-wide green percentage. Source: HSE developing process safety indicators HSG254
Applied case
Fictional exercise: A route-control weakness is given a target of more posters.
Objective
What control outcome should improve?
Target
How will meaningful progress be examined?
Test your decision
What would improve the objective?
Increase the poster target further.
Use only injury absence as proof.
Define the route-control outcome and evidence of its practical improvement.
Compare the explanation
Define the route-control outcome and evidence of its practical improvement.
The measure should relate to the function being improved.
Interpret leading and lagging information in context.
Photorealistic illustrative UK workplace scene. Review checks: Avoid / redesign: Eliminate, Reduce including substitution, Isolate, Control, personal protective equipment (PPE) and Discipline (ERICPD) is a prompt for decisions. Control the task: They are related frameworks, not identical laws; apply them to the actual task and check the resulting control. Verify before release: Eliminate, Reduce including substitution, Isolate, Control, personal protective equipment (PPE) and Discipline (ERICPD) is a prompt for decisions.
Pair activities with outcomes
Measures can examine control activities or outcomes indicating that control was lost. Both need context. A completed verification count may conceal poor-quality tests, while an absence of releases may say little about a rare scenario’s protection.
Use a complementary set connected to the scenario. Check definitions, missing data, scope and the response when a measure signals concern. Do not combine unrelated numbers into one score that hides a critical function. The purpose is a better decision, not a permanently green chart.
Pair a control check with a failure signal
A useful performance measure is linked to a major-event scenario and a particular barrier, with an owner and a response when performance deteriorates.
Fictional learning example
Separate the evidence from the decision
Part of the picture
What the example establishes
Scenario
An overfill could release a large inventory.
Control check
Are the specified overfill-function tests completed and defects resolved?
Failure signal
Have there been high-level demands, failed stops, releases or repeated operating excursions?
Pause and decide: Does counting completed tests establish that overfill prevention is effective?
Compare the reasoning
Not by itself. Check test scope, outcomes, open defects and whether the full function was demonstrated. Read activity measures with failure and demand information. Agree who reviews the pair and what triggers a restriction, investigation or management response.
How should indicators be designed from major accident scenarios?
Start with the scenario, identify the barrier, then choose measures that show whether the barrier is healthy.
A common weakness is starting with available data instead of starting with risk. The better route is: major accident scenario -> barrier function -> performance standard -> evidence source -> leading indicator -> lagging indicator -> trigger level -> management action.
This method prevents dashboards from becoming collections of easy numbers. The organisation may have excellent completion of generic inspections while missing the fact that critical alarms are overridden or that proof tests are overdue.
Design step
Question
Example
Scenario
What high-consequence event are we trying to prevent?
Tank overfill leading to vapour cloud explosion.
Barrier
Which control interrupts the event?
Independent high-high level trip.
Performance standard
What must the barrier do?
Detect high level and stop transfer on demand.
Evidence source
Where does data come from?
Proof-test record and bypass register.
Leading indicator
What shows health before failure?
Proof tests due, completed and failed.
Lagging indicator
What shows barrier demand/failure?
Overfill near miss or trip failure.
Trigger/action
What requires escalation?
Any failed test or overdue red action.
Applied case
Fictional exercise: All scheduled checks are counted complete, but several results remain unresolved.
Leading information
It can show whether a control activity is performed.
Outcome information
It can reveal loss of control but must be interpreted with context.
Test your decision
What should the review examine?
Only an average with unrelated measures.
The results and unresolved conditions as well as completion.
Completion alone as proof of effectiveness.
Compare the explanation
The results and unresolved conditions as well as completion.
Activity counts need evidence of relevant outcomes and quality.
Distinguish inspection, audit and management review.
Photorealistic illustrative UK workplace scene. Review checks: Avoid / redesign: Clear normal, abnormal, start-up and shutdown instructions. Control the task: Hazards, impairments, permits, alarms and abnormal conditions communicated. Verify before release: Field-verified procedures and revision history.
Use assurance to test a claim
An inspection can examine a condition at a point in time. An audit can test whether defined arrangements are implemented and supported by evidence. Management review considers performance, changes, resources and whether the system remains suitable. Their scopes overlap but are not interchangeable.
Choose the question before the checklist. A local observation may justify a finding about one interface without proving universal failure. Review actions against their purpose and confirm effectiveness. Attendance at review meetings cannot substitute for decisions on unresolved major-event controls.
How should PSM audit and management review work?
PSM audit and review should test field reality, barrier health, action effectiveness and leadership decisions.
A process safety audit should not only ask whether procedures exist. It should sample real jobs, maintenance history, barrier tests, MOC records, alarm response, emergency drills, action closure evidence and whether workers understand critical controls. See HSE managing for health and safety.
Management review should focus on major accident risk. Injury rates alone do not prove process safety. Leaders need to see barrier health, high-risk actions, risk acceptances, overdue safety critical work, weak signals and learning from incidents.
PSM assurance levels - PSM assurance levels
Assurance level
Typical activity
Output
First line
Supervisors and operators check permits, isolations, rounds, handover and barrier status.
Field checks and immediate corrections.
Second line
HSSE, engineering and technical authorities audit PSM elements and barrier evidence.
Findings, ranked actions and trend review.
Third line
Independent internal or external specialist reviews test system effectiveness.
Formal audit report and leadership action plan.
Management review
Senior leaders review indicators, impairments, actions and risk acceptance.
Decisions, resources and escalation.
Regulator engagement
COMAH inspections, safety report review or regulatory findings.
Regulator correspondence and verified response.
Applied case
Fictional exercise: A review receives only meeting attendance and no evidence about the unresolved handback interface.
Inspection
What condition is present in this sample?
Review
What do the findings require the organisation to decide or change?
Test your decision
What is needed?
Evidence testing that interface and decisions on its remaining gaps.
More meeting invitations alone.
A claim that one missing record proves every system failed.
Compare the explanation
Evidence testing that interface and decisions on its remaining gaps.
Connect emergency arrangements with the assessed scenario.
Photorealistic illustrative UK workplace scene. Review checks: Change at source: Clear normal, abnormal, start-up and shutdown instructions. Make it observable: Field-verified procedures and revision history. Keep useful evidence: Transfer log, proof-test record, bypass decision, defect action, owner, technical approval and hand-back record.
Include mitigation and readiness
Even strong prevention needs an appropriate basis for response if control is lost. Emergency arrangements depend on the assessed event, people, information, interfaces and available resources. A generic plan name cannot establish readiness for every process scenario.
Use exercises and other relevant evidence to examine coordination without inventing real response tactics. Changes to inventory, access or organisation may affect readiness and need review. The learner identifies the connection and missing evidence; actual response follows the local assessed arrangements and competent direction.
How should emergency planning connect to the PSM system?
Emergency planning should be based on credible major accident scenarios, not generic evacuation arrangements alone.
Emergency plans should reflect the hazardous inventory and possible escalation. For a fuel terminal, this may include tank fire, bund fire, vapour cloud explosion, firewater runoff and neighbouring impacts. For a toxic process, it may include release detection, isolation, shelter, evacuation, public communication and responder protection.
Exercises should test incident command, communication, isolation, mutual aid, responder access, environmental protection and recovery. Learning should feed back into the PSM system.
Integrate system elements without overstating certainty.
Photorealistic illustrative UK workplace scene. Review checks: Setting: Transfer of flammable liquid to a storage tank with credible overfill and vapour-release consequences. Act: Check inventory, level instrumentation, independent trip test, bypass register, operator response and containment condition. Hold / review: Do not transfer if a critical trip is bypassed, failed or unverified, or if the receiving capacity is uncertain.
Build a connected assurance pack
A useful pack connects the scenario, current information, protective functions, responsible roles and evidence of their condition. Identify where the chain is complete and where it is not. A strong system makes uncertainty visible so the responsible decision can be made.
Do not let a complete-looking index replace examination of the contents. The fictional exercise should finish with a claim supported within scope, open questions, applicable restrictions and owners. It does not certify a real safety report, approve operation or declare the establishment compliant.
What proves a process safety system is working today?
For a credible major-accident scenario, show the current hazard basis, the preventive and mitigative barriers, their owners and performance criteria, and the latest evidence that each works. A policy or incident-free period alone is insufficient.
Barrier evidence model
Barrier area
What good looks like
Evidence
Cause
Identify credible causes rather than vague hazards.
Scenario list.
Top event
Define the loss of control, release, ignition, explosion or failed decision point.
Bow-tie or fault tree.
Consequence
Describe escalation, harm, business impact and emergency interface.
Consequence analysis.
Prevention barriers
Controls that stop the top event occurring.
Barrier register and performance standards.
Mitigation barriers
Controls that limit consequences after the top event.
Proof tests, inspections and drill evidence.
Impairment controls
Bypasses, degraded safeguards and overdue tests are authorised and temporary controls set.
Impairment log.
ALARP record
Risk reduction decisions are documented and periodically reviewed.
ALARP decision record.
A tank overfill scenario relies on level control, an independent high-high trip, operator response and bunding. Before transfer, operations checks the trip test and any override, maintenance resolves defects, and the responsible manager decides whether transfer can proceed. A failed or bypassed trip is a hold point, not a late dashboard exception.
Applied case
Fictional exercise: The pack has current process information and completed training, but an integrity limitation has not reached the operating basis.
Connected
Evidence must support the same scenario and arrangement.
Honest
A partial demonstration remains partial until its gap is resolved.
Test your decision
Which conclusion is justified?
All supplied evidence is worthless.
Some elements are evidenced; the integrity-to-operation interface remains unresolved.
The entire process is proven safe by document count.
Compare the explanation
Some elements are evidenced; the integrity-to-operation interface remains unresolved.
Assurance respects useful evidence while retaining specific gaps.