Completed fictional terminal MAPP covering policy commitments, all seven safety management areas, major-hazard scenarios and adoption requirements. Actual COMAH status remains to be determined.
Fuel terminal major accident prevention policy
Crownway Fuels Ltd. CWF-MAPP-TERM-01. Version 1.0. Prepared 10 November 2026.
COMPLETED FICTIONAL ARRANGEMENT. This Crownway example supports adaptation and learning. It represents no actual company issue, site approval, signature or completed operational evidence.
This policy sets the operator commitments and management arrangements for preventing major fuel-terminal accidents and limiting harm to people and the environment.
Fictional fuel terminal scenario in England. The example assumes road-tanker receipt and dispatch, atmospheric bulk storage of petrol and diesel, pumps, product pipework and vapour-handling systems. Marine, rail, LPG, hydrogen and process manufacture are outside this scenario. Actual inventory, layout, receptors and regulatory status are not supplied.
| Control field | Fictional policy status |
| Document | CWF-MAPP-TERM-01 version 1.0 prepared 10 November 2026 |
| Accountable owner | Terminal manager with board oversight |
| Approval and effective date | Not approved; actual operator approval and issue date required |
| Review | Annual company review and after relevant change or failure; statutory MAPP review no later than five years after its last review where COMAH applies |
Policy and operating commitment
Crownway will prevent major accidents and limit their consequences through effective engineering, competent people and a proportionate safety management system. We will protect workers, contractors, the public and the environment to a high level, comply with applicable duties and continually improve major-hazard control. We will identify foreseeable major accidents, reduce risk through suitable prevention and mitigation measures and demonstrate that the necessary measures are effective. We will not use a favourable risk rating, production demand or a completed form to override an unavailable critical safeguard.
The board will provide resources, time, competent independent challenge and clear authority. The terminal manager will maintain safe operating limits and stop affected receipt, storage or loading when containment, overfill protection, ignition control, safe isolation or emergency readiness is inadequate. Restart needs competent technical acceptance and a separate recorded operational decision. Every worker and contractor has authority to stop unsafe work and raise concerns without detriment.
Applicability and issue status
The company system uses a lower-tier COMAH teaching scenario. This policy does not establish that classification. Before adoption the operator must determine the establishment boundary and legal operator, identify every relevant dangerous substance and classification, convert maximum quantities to mass using justified product data, apply Schedule 1 named-substance/category rules and aggregation, and include foreseeable presence. Check hazardous-substances consent, environmental permissions and notification duties separately. Do not constrain the calculation to routine stock or equate tank volume with COMAH mass.
If the actual establishment is upper tier, this policy forms part of the required safety-report arrangements and does not replace the safety report, internal emergency plan or information for external emergency planning. If COMAH is inapplicable, retain justified major-hazard controls under applicable general, DSEAR, environmental and other duties. No regulatory notification, consent, approval or operational authorisation is represented here.
Organisation and personnel
The board is accountable for this policy and reviews major-hazard performance and resources. The terminal manager controls the site, staffing, operating restrictions and response readiness. Engineering owns mechanical integrity, protection systems and technical acceptance. The process-safety lead maintains the hazard studies, barrier standards and independent challenge. The environmental lead owns receptor, containment, drainage and pollution-prevention assessments. Shift supervisors control operations and handover. Operators and contractors follow the accepted limits, check plant state and report defects. These functions need named competent appointees, deputies and scope before controlled issue; this example appoints no real person.
Maintain a task-specific competence matrix covering transfer, tank gauging, alarm response, isolation, permits, emergency duties and technical review. Verify practical competence through observed performance and re-evaluate after change or failure. Determine adequate staffing, fatigue controls and supervision for normal, abnormal and emergency operation. Consult employees, representatives and contractors on assessments, procedures and change; record concerns, decisions and feedback. Procurement must preserve critical competence and lifecycle support.
Identification and evaluation of major hazards
Maintain an establishment inventory and hazard-study register covering normal operation, startup, shutdown, maintenance, abnormal operation and foreseeable external events. A competent multidisciplinary team will use suitable methods, such as HAZID, HAZOP and barrier analysis, and proportionate consequence and likelihood assessment. Evaluate overfill and large vapour clouds, pool and tank fires, explosion, transfer/line rupture, vehicle impact, loss of utilities, common-cause and human failures, cyber effects on safety functions, flooding, lightning, extreme weather, ageing and neighbouring/domino hazards. Include multiple failures and low-probability high-consequence events where credible.
Map occupied buildings, boundaries, watercourses, groundwater, drainage, ecological receptors and neighbouring activities. Evaluate off-site harm and major accidents to the environment with the same seriousness as harm to people. Define prevention and mitigation barriers, required performance, independence, assumptions and proof. Record remaining uncertainty and options for risk reduction. Resolve material gaps before accepting affected operations. New knowledge, incidents or invalid assumptions trigger reassessment.
Operational control
Use controlled procedures for receipt, storage, loading, inventory reconciliation, sampling, start-up, shutdown, maintenance and emergency response. Establish technically justified tank operating limits, safe fill levels and delivery acceptance criteria. Verify receiving capacity, product and line-up before transfer; maintain effective communication and protect tanker routes. Use independent protection where the design requires it and test the full protective function against its defined standard. Separate routine control from credited independent protection and assess common failures.
Maintain containment, seals, hoses, couplings, valves, pumps, tanks and pipework through an asset-integrity programme informed by deterioration mechanisms and inspection findings. Control corrosion, settlement, loss of wall thickness, leaks and defective protection. Inspect and test hazardous-area equipment, earthing, bonding and lightning protection against the accepted design. Manage critical spare parts and unauthorised substitutions. Permit-to-work and positive isolation control opening plant, hot work, entry and simultaneous work. Prove isolation before intrusive work and verify reinstatement before handback.
Impairments and management of change
Record every critical-control impairment with the affected equipment, failed standard, credible consequence, immediate restriction, competent decision, owner, restoration deadline and escalation. Default to stopping the affected operation when a necessary safeguard is unavailable or its condition is uncertain. Any justified temporary arrangement requires an assessed equivalent level of control, defined scope, approval within authority, expiry and monitoring. It cannot waive a statutory requirement or conceal an unresolved critical failure.
Assess changes to substances, inventories, tank service, hardware, software, alarm setpoints, logic, layout, drainage, operating procedures, staffing, organisation and contractors before implementation. Include temporary changes and replacement equipment that is not demonstrably like for like. Identify consent, notification, DSEAR and COMAH review implications, consult affected people and update hazard studies, drawings, procedures and training. A readiness review confirms tests, documentation, competence and emergency interfaces before startup. Temporary changes have restoration plans and cannot be extended automatically.
Planning for emergencies
Maintain a terminal-specific emergency plan based on the credible scenarios and their escalation. Provide dependable detection, alarm and communications, safe remote isolation, escape and muster, personnel accounting, public protection and emergency access. Coordinate with fire and rescue, ambulance, police, the Environment Agency, local authorities and relevant neighbours. Identify response roles, safe intervention limits, product information, vulnerable people and out-of-hours contacts. Staff must not approach uncontrolled releases, enter unsafe atmospheres or improvise rescue.
Determine firefighting, cooling, foam compatibility and availability, water supply, drainage isolation, contaminated firewater retention and spill-recovery requirements from competent fire and environmental engineering studies. This policy specifies no universal bund or firewater capacity. Verify actual capacity, integrity, operation and access against the accepted design and scenarios. Plan for loss of power, failed drainage controls, prolonged incidents and off-site pollution. Exercise the plan across shifts and with responders as appropriate; record lessons and demonstrate corrective effectiveness. If upper tier, apply the specific internal and external planning, consultation, testing and review duties.
Monitoring performance
Set a documented barrier performance standard for each credited safeguard: purpose, protected scenario, equipment scope, functional requirements, availability, independence, test method, acceptance criteria, responsible role and response to failure. Monitor leading indicators from actual work and lagging indicators from events. Shift handover highlights tank state, active transfers, bypasses, overdue tests, unresolved alarms and work permits. Critical failures escalate immediately to the terminal manager and board as appropriate; they do not wait for the monthly review.
| Company example indicator | Decision and accountable role |
| Critical protection tests and failures | Engineering tracks tests due/completed, failed full-loop tests and overdue safety work. Failed/unknown necessary protection restricts the affected operation. |
| Containment and transfer integrity | Operations records loss of containment, unexplained stock discrepancies and transfer deviations. Investigate and isolate affected assets where required. |
| Impairments and changes | Terminal manager reviews live impairments, time overdue, temporary changes near expiry and startup actions. No automatic extension. |
| Emergency and environmental readiness | Response/environmental leads track failed alarm/drainage tests, exercise actions and retention readiness; resolve material gaps before affected operations. |
Incident investigation audit and review
Report loss of containment, demands on protective systems, overfills, fires, near misses and environmental releases promptly. Make the area safe and preserve evidence. A competent investigation examines technical, human and organisational causes, including barrier performance and the decisions that allowed exposure. Determine statutory reporting and notification criteria and timescales separately, including COMAH, RIDDOR and environmental duties where applicable. Share relevant learning across Crownway and with external parties when required. Assign actions with interim restrictions, owner, due date and an effectiveness test; close only on verified evidence.
Use a risk-based assurance programme that samples the policy, hazard studies, procedures, plant state and actual execution. Auditors need competence and sufficient independence from the work examined. Test barrier effectiveness rather than accepting document existence or signature counts. Record scope, evidence, limitations, findings and escalation. Independent technical review is required where internal competence or objectivity is insufficient.
The terminal manager will conduct monthly barrier-performance review; the board will examine major-hazard risks, resources and serious impairments quarterly and perform a documented annual management review. These are fictional company commitments. Review this MAPP earlier after relevant inventory/process changes, organisational change, incidents, new knowledge or evidence that it is no longer suitable. Where COMAH applies, review no later than five years after the last review and revise and retain it where necessary. Record decisions, revised objectives, resourcing, consultation, communication and follow-through; retain current and superseded controlled versions.
Safety management system implementation map
| Schedule 2 area | Controlled arrangements and adoption evidence |
| Organisation and personnel | Organisation chart, role appointments, competence matrix, staffing and consultation records |
| Major-hazard identification and evaluation | Inventory/tier calculation, hazard studies, receptor plans, risk decisions and barrier register |
| Operational control | Terminal operating procedures, integrity programme, DSEAR study, isolation/permit arrangements and shift records |
| Management of change | Change assessment, statutory screen, readiness review and temporary-change control |
| Emergency planning | Scenario-based plan, responder liaison, engineered response provisions and exercises |
| Performance monitoring | Barrier standards, indicators, defect and event investigation, action verification |
| Audit and review | Independent assurance plan, management review and MAPP revision history |
The Crownway general management-system library supplies supporting frameworks for legal review, competence, maintenance, permits, emergency planning, contractor control, change and assurance. Terminal-specific engineering studies, limits, procedures and genuine records must supplement them. A forecourt checklist or generic company policy is not a terminal safety study.
Adoption priorities and controlled issue
| Prerequisite | Responsible function and required evidence |
| Establish applicability | Actual operator and boundary; maximum substance mass/classification and Schedule 1 aggregation; COMAH notification and separate consent/permission review by HSE/legal lead |
| Accept the technical basis | Competent terminal hazard, containment, firewater, hazardous-area, equipment and protection studies; justified operating limits and resolved startup actions by engineering/process safety |
| Demonstrate implementation | Named competent roles, shift cover, approved procedures, current inspection and test results, impairment control, emergency plan and exercises by terminal manager |
| Approve and communicate | Actual accountable operator approval, effective date, version control, workforce consultation and briefings; no copied example signature by document controller and board |
No actual site engineering data, named appointees, inspection results, consent, regulatory acceptance or signatures are invented. The commitments are fully written as a fictional policy for adaptation. The actual operator may issue it only after the defined scope and evidence have been reviewed and the necessary measures implemented.
| Actual controlled issue field | Complete only when genuinely decided |
| Operator and establishment | |
| Competent technical review and remaining restrictions | |
| Accountable operator approval and date | |
| Effective date and review date | |
| Communication and implementation evidence | |
Primary references
COMAH 2015 regulation 7 and Schedule 2
HSE COMAH duties and MAPP guidance
HSE guide to COMAH 2015 L111
HSE bulk flammable-liquid storage HSG176
HSE process safety performance indicators HSG254
HSE DSEAR guidance
Prepared 10 November 2026. Regulatory applicability is site dependent; this policy does not establish COMAH tier, certify compliance or replace required technical studies.