Crownway Fuels

SHAREhub · Company management system · v1.0

← All worked examples

Crownway Hazel Hill DSEAR assessment

Completed fictional case in the live SHARE DSEAR audit format: inventory, all 24 activities, classification decisions, management arrangements, actions and review. Technical study and authorisation remain outstanding.

Crownway Hazel Hill DSEAR assessment

Crownway Fuels Ltd — FICTIONAL WORKED EXAMPLE

Dangerous substances and explosive atmospheres

SiteCWF-FS-05 Hazel Hill — invented roadside petrol station in England; no actual address
AssessorFictional desk assessment prepared for training. No site visit, named competent assessor or technical certification is represented.
Assessment date2026-11-10
Review date2027-11-10
Document statusDocument — review and completion required
Template version20261010-dsear-2

Complete the inventory and activity assessment for the actual operation. Verify controls and specialist evidence before deciding whether work may proceed. This document does not certify compliance or provide automated hazardous-area classification.

Contents

1 Assessment details

2 Substance inventory and quantities

3 Activity and hazard assessment

4 Hazardous areas and explosion safety

5 Management and emergency arrangements

6 Action plan

7 Competent review and use decision

8 Research and regulatory references

1 Assessment details

Return to contents

Assess the actual dangerous substances, quantities, work and foreseeable failures. Document prevention, mitigation, evidence and any restrictions. This assessment supports competent decisions and does not certify compliance or authorise hazardous work.

Document statusDRAFT — competent review and completion required
OrganisationCrownway Fuels Ltd — FICTIONAL WORKED EXAMPLE
SiteCWF-FS-05 Hazel Hill — invented roadside petrol station in England; no actual address
Assessor and competenceFictional desk assessment prepared for training. No site visit, named competent assessor or technical certification is represented.
Assessment date2026-11-10
Review due2027-11-10
JurisdictionEngland; Great Britain DSEAR baseline
Employees and groups14 fictional local staff across shifts; not an actual headcount allocation
ScopePetrol and diesel receipt, underground storage, retail dispensing, convenience shop, small packaged chemicals and maintenance interfaces. No EV chargers assumed; future installation needs change review. No LPG retail, bulk tanker loading or workshop. All observations, assets and evidence references below are invented.
People affectedSite and agency staff, tanker drivers, customers including children and disabled people, contractors, neighbours, passers-by and emergency responders.
Plans and connected spacesCWF-FS-05-P01 conceptual forecourt plan, D01 drainage study and Z01 zoning study are required; none supplied. Include vents, fill points, dispensers, ducts, drains, shop openings, boundaries and escape routes.
Operating conditionsStaffed retail 06:00–23:00; planned staffed deliveries. Ambient storage; no intentional heating. Assess unusual heat, flooding, power loss and peak demand.
InterfacesSite manager coordinates tanker operator, maintenance contractors, landlord/retailer interfaces and public traffic. Unattended delivery is the differentiating issue for this site.
ConsultationFictional case assumes site-manager, cashier, night/late-shift, driver and maintenance-role input. No actual consultation occurred. Local concerns and understanding must be recorded on adoption.

2 Substance inventory and quantities

Return to contents

Totals are grouped by unit. Missing quantities are flagged; volume, mass, gas volume and item count are not combined. Physical capacity does not establish an acceptable inventory or a hazardous zone.

L totalsCurrent: 68521Maximum: 108063Capacity: 120063
kg totalsCurrent: 20Maximum: 20Capacity: 20

2.1 Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario

Return to contents

Substance or productPetrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario
Storage area or assetUnderground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensers
Physical formLiquid
CLP physical hazards and H statementsAssumed H224 extremely flammable liquid and vapour; confirm actual CLP/SDS. Also aspiration and environmental hazards require separate review.
SDS identifier and versionFICTIONAL product profile; actual supplier SDS not supplied
SDS dateNot recorded — complete during assessment
Container or tank descriptionFictional underground divided fuel storage; individual tank chart required
Quantity unitL
Current inventory38500
Maximum planned inventory63000
Total container or tank capacity70000
Number of containers1
Nominal capacity per container70000
Quantity basis date and uncertaintyInvented inventory snapshot 10 November 2026. Maximum is the example operating cap, not an approved fill limit. Volumes are not COMAH mass calculations.
Operating and storage temperatureAmbient; seasonal and delivery-temperature limits need site confirmation
Operating and storage pressureAtmospheric storage; transfer pressure follows the approved equipment design
Flash point and test basisIndicative below -40 C; not supplier-tested data
Flammable limits LEL UEL and unitsIndicative petrol vapour about 1–8 % volume in air; confirm actual product SDS
Autoignition and other ignition propertiesStatic discharge, electrical arcs and hot surfaces considered; confirm actual ignition properties and equipment group/temperature class from supplier data
Dust properties and test basisNot applicable to this liquid; no combustible dust process
Incompatibilities and segregationSegregate from oxidisers and incompatible chemicals; use supplier-confirmed compatible materials
Containment capacity and design referenceFictional compatible containment and leak monitoring; actual design, capacity, condition and drainage not inspected

2.2 Road diesel B7

Return to contents

Substance or productRoad diesel B7
Storage area or assetUnderground diesel storage, lines and dispensers
Physical formLiquid
CLP physical hazards and H statementsAssumed H226 flammable liquid and vapour; verify actual grade classification. Combustible spray/mist hazard remains relevant even below flash point.
SDS identifier and versionFICTIONAL product profile; actual supplier SDS not supplied
SDS dateNot recorded — complete during assessment
Container or tank descriptionFictional underground diesel tank; individual tank chart required
Quantity unitL
Current inventory30000
Maximum planned inventory45000
Total container or tank capacity50000
Number of containers1
Nominal capacity per container50000
Quantity basis date and uncertaintyInvented inventory snapshot 10 November 2026. Maximum is the example operating cap, not an approved fill limit. Volumes are not COMAH mass calculations.
Operating and storage temperatureAmbient; seasonal and delivery-temperature limits need site confirmation
Operating and storage pressureAtmospheric storage; transfer pressure follows the approved equipment design
Flash point and test basisIndicative above 55 C; actual SDS/test basis required
Flammable limits LEL UEL and unitsSupplier values not supplied; flammable mist and hot-surface scenarios included
Autoignition and other ignition propertiesStatic discharge, electrical arcs and hot surfaces considered; confirm actual ignition properties and equipment group/temperature class from supplier data
Dust properties and test basisNot applicable to this liquid; no combustible dust process
Incompatibilities and segregationSegregate from oxidisers and incompatible chemicals; use supplier-confirmed compatible materials
Containment capacity and design referenceFictional compatible containment and leak monitoring; actual design, capacity, condition and drainage not inspected

2.3 Alcohol-based screenwash concentrate

Return to contents

Substance or productAlcohol-based screenwash concentrate
Storage area or assetDesignated shop stock and protected back-store
Physical formLiquid
CLP physical hazards and H statementsAssumed H225 highly flammable liquid and vapour; actual mixture classification must be checked
SDS identifier and versionFICTIONAL product profile; actual supplier SDS not supplied
SDS dateNot recorded — complete during assessment
Container or tank description12 closed 5 L packs
Quantity unitL
Current inventory20
Maximum planned inventory60
Total container or tank capacity60
Number of containers12
Nominal capacity per container5
Quantity basis date and uncertaintyInvented inventory snapshot 10 November 2026. Maximum is the example operating cap, not an approved fill limit. Volumes are not COMAH mass calculations.
Operating and storage temperatureAmbient; seasonal and delivery-temperature limits need site confirmation
Operating and storage pressureAtmospheric storage; transfer pressure follows the approved equipment design
Flash point and test basisAssumed under 23 C for this fictional concentrate; verify actual SDS
Flammable limits LEL UEL and unitsMixture specific; not supplied
Autoignition and other ignition propertiesStatic discharge, electrical arcs and hot surfaces considered; confirm actual ignition properties and equipment group/temperature class from supplier data
Dust properties and test basisNot applicable to this liquid; no combustible dust process
Incompatibilities and segregationSegregate from oxidisers and incompatible chemicals; use supplier-confirmed compatible materials
Containment capacity and design referenceFictional compatible containment and leak monitoring; actual design, capacity, condition and drainage not inspected

2.4 Flammable maintenance aerosols

Return to contents

Substance or productFlammable maintenance aerosols
Storage area or assetRestricted maintenance stock
Physical formLiquid
CLP physical hazards and H statementsAssumed H222 extremely flammable aerosol and H229 pressurised container may burst if heated; confirm actual product
SDS identifier and versionFICTIONAL product profile; actual supplier SDS not supplied
SDS dateNot recorded — complete during assessment
Container or tank description6 closed 0.5 L aerosol cans
Quantity unitL
Current inventory1
Maximum planned inventory3
Total container or tank capacity3
Number of containers6
Nominal capacity per container0.5
Quantity basis date and uncertaintyInvented inventory snapshot 10 November 2026. Maximum is the example operating cap, not an approved fill limit. Volumes are not COMAH mass calculations.
Operating and storage temperatureAmbient; seasonal and delivery-temperature limits need site confirmation
Operating and storage pressurePressurised can; actual pressure not supplied
Flash point and test basisNot used alone for aerosol classification
Flammable limits LEL UEL and unitsPropellant/mixture dependent; actual SDS required
Autoignition and other ignition propertiesStatic discharge, electrical arcs and hot surfaces considered; confirm actual ignition properties and equipment group/temperature class from supplier data
Dust properties and test basisNot applicable to this liquid; no combustible dust process
Incompatibilities and segregationSegregate from oxidisers and incompatible chemicals; use supplier-confirmed compatible materials
Containment capacity and design referenceFictional compatible containment and leak monitoring; actual design, capacity, condition and drainage not inspected

2.5 Portable extinguisher contents

Return to contents

Substance or productPortable extinguisher contents
Storage area or assetProtected designated extinguisher positions
Physical formPressurised extinguishing media
CLP physical hazards and H statementsPressure-release/projectile and oxygen-displacement hazards where applicable; agent-dependent classification not confirmed
SDS identifier and versionFICTIONAL product profile; actual supplier SDS not supplied
SDS dateNot recorded — complete during assessment
Container or tank descriptionFictional portable extinguishers; actual asset schedule required
Quantity unitkg
Current inventory20
Maximum planned inventory20
Total container or tank capacity20
Number of containers4
Nominal capacity per container5
Quantity basis date and uncertaintyInvented inventory snapshot 10 November 2026. Maximum is the example operating cap, not an approved fill limit. Volumes are not COMAH mass calculations.
Operating and storage temperatureAmbient; seasonal and delivery-temperature limits need site confirmation
Operating and storage pressureManufacturer pressure data required
Flash point and test basisNonflammable medium assumed; confirm extinguisher type
Flammable limits LEL UEL and unitsNot applicable to nonflammable assumed medium
Autoignition and other ignition propertiesStatic discharge, electrical arcs and hot surfaces considered; confirm actual ignition properties and equipment group/temperature class from supplier data
Dust properties and test basisNo combustible dust process; extinguisher powder exposure considered in response assessment
Incompatibilities and segregationSegregate from oxidisers and incompatible chemicals; use supplier-confirmed compatible materials
Containment capacity and design referenceFictional compatible containment and leak monitoring; actual design, capacity, condition and drainage not inspected

3 Activity and hazard assessment

Return to contents

All 24 activities are screened. Suggested controls are research-based prompts, not confirmation of implementation. Remove inapplicable suggestions and add site-specific safeguards. Record the actual control, its verification and further actions.

3.1 Receipt and delivery acceptance

Return to contents

Wrong product, damaged packaging, unidentified residues or an unplanned delivery can introduce incompatible substances, leaks and ignition hazards before the material reaches storage.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesPetrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers
Actual scenarioWrong product, inadequate ullage or unclear tank identification during delivery acceptance. SIGNIFICANT FINDING: The proposed night delivery has no demonstrated receiving-site control or dependable emergency contact arrangement. Restrict deliveries to staffed and coordinated periods pending a competent delivery-system review.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsCheck order, product identity, tank chart, usable ullage, receiving tank and delivery route with the driver before connection; reject incompatible or excess delivery.
Mitigation and stop conditionsThe proposed night delivery has no demonstrated receiving-site control or dependable emergency contact arrangement. Restrict deliveries to staffed and coordinated periods pending a competent delivery-system review.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-RECEIPT: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityHigh
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Avoid unnecessary deliveries and minimise stock. Verify product identity, current SDS, quantity and destination before acceptance. Check packaging, seals, labels and temperature or pressure concerns; segregate incompatible deliveries. Keep the unloading area clear of ignition and public access. Quarantine damaged or unidentified stock using a safe agreed method. Allocate a trained receiving person and an escalation route.

Suggested verification evidence

Delivery booking, product and SDS checks, acceptance record, damaged-load response and a mapped receiving area.

3.2 Packaged liquids aerosols and chemical storage

Return to contents

Leaking drums, cans or aerosols, excessive inventory, incompatible neighbours and exposure to heat can lead to spreading fire, container rupture or harmful reactions.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesAlcohol-based screenwash concentrate | Designated shop stock and protected back-storeFlammable maintenance aerosols | Restricted maintenance stock
Actual scenarioLeaking flammable screenwash or aerosol retail stock ignites near electrical equipment or an escape route.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsReduce display quantities; segregate compatible closed stock away from heat, ignition, drains and escape routes; inspect damaged containers and isolate returns.
Mitigation and stop conditionsEvacuate on fire or significant vapour release. Only trained staff deal with a small safe spill using the emergency procedure.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-PACKAGED-STORAGE: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Remove redundant products and reduce working stock. Select compatible containers and suitable storage construction from competent assessment. Separate incompatible classes and protect from impact, heat and ignition. Confirm containment, ventilation, drainage isolation and fire separation for the actual inventory. Keep escape routes clear. Define inspection, leak response and maximum planned stock; do not assume an arbitrary litre allowance is safe.

Suggested verification evidence

Storage layout, stock record, compatibility assessment, store design, container checks and evidence of corrective work.

3.3 Bulk tanks and fixed storage installations

Return to contents

Corrosion, seal or vent failure, overfill, wrong tank selection, vehicle impact or external fire can release a large connected inventory and escalate to adjoining assets or off-site receptors.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesPetrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers
Actual scenarioLoss of underground tank containment or overfill releases petrol vapour into chambers, ducts or drains.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsMaintain compatible tanks and pipework; reconcile inventory; monitor leak indications; verify ullage, gauge alarms and delivery limits; investigate unexplained losses before more receipts.
Mitigation and stop conditionsSuspend receipt and affected dispensing on alarm or unexplained loss. Secure migration pathways and obtain competent investigation.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-BULK-STORAGE: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Reduce inventory and release points where practicable. Verify tank design, product compatibility, operating envelope and integrity. Assess venting, overfill protection, independent shutdown where required, safe isolation, containment and drainage. Protect against impact and external fire. Define inspection and test intervals from competent engineering input and control impairments. Confirm hazardous-area and emergency studies for the actual layout.

Suggested verification evidence

Tank register, capacity and maximum inventory, drawings, integrity records, level and shutdown tests, containment assessment and impairment log.

3.4 Compressed and liquefied gases

Return to contents

Cylinder leakage, damaged valves, incorrect regulators, heat exposure or uncontrolled movement can cause flammable releases, pressure rupture, jet fire or oxygen enrichment.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesPortable extinguisher contents | Protected designated extinguisher positions
Actual scenarioDamaged portable extinguisher cylinder could release pressure or become a projectile in fire.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsNo retail LPG, LPG autogas or workshop gas cylinders are assumed. Include only maintained portable fire extinguishers with protected locations and authorised servicing.
Mitigation and stop conditionsWithdraw from fire exposure and provide responders with locations. Staff do not refill cylinders or dismantle valves.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-CYLINDERS: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Minimise cylinders and substitute a safer process where possible. Identify contents and rated fittings, restrain cylinders and protect valves during movement. Separate incompatible gases and provide assessed ventilation and safe storage conditions. Prevent impact and heat exposure. Check leaks using an authorised method. Use trained people for connection, isolation and changeover; account for full, partly used and empty cylinders.

Suggested verification evidence

Cylinder inventory, gas SDS, storage assessment, regulator suitability, leak checks and movement instructions.

3.5 Internal handling and movement

Return to contents

Dropped containers, unstable loads, collisions and movement through occupied or ignition-prone areas can release dangerous substances and expose workers or visitors.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesAlcohol-based screenwash concentrate | Designated shop stock and protected back-storeFlammable maintenance aerosols | Restricted maintenance stock
Actual scenarioDropped screenwash cartons or damaged aerosols release flammable liquid or propellant during stock handling.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsUse intact packs, a clear route and suitable handling aids; keep stock away from vehicle movement, heater sources and drains; contain damaged packs promptly.
Mitigation and stop conditionsStop stock movement on leaking packs. Exclude ignition and secure affected area; escalate substantial or uncertain release.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-INTERNAL-MOVEMENT: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Avoid repeated handling and reduce quantities moved per task. Choose compatible closed containers, suitable lifting or transport equipment and restrained loads. Assess routes, vehicle interaction, gradients, weather and drainage. Separate pedestrians and protect containers from damage. Check packaging before movement, brief handlers and define a safe damaged-container response. PPE supports residual handling risks.

Suggested verification evidence

Route assessment, handling method, load restraint, equipment checks and trained handler observations.

3.6 Tanker and bulk delivery unloading

Return to contents

Wrong connection, hose failure, overfill, static discharge, premature vehicle movement or loss of communication can cause a substantial release at the delivery interface.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesPetrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers
Actual scenarioTanker hose or coupling failure releases petrol during gravity unloading and vapour return.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsCoordinate driver and receiving operator; establish delivery exclusion and escape routes; check hose/coupling compatibility, product and ullage; control ignition, use the designed vapour-return arrangement and delivery checklist.
Mitigation and stop conditionsDriver stops transfer using the safe emergency method. Raise alarm, exclude public and call emergency services as needed; no unsafe approach to a release.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-UNLOADING: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Confirm product, source, destination, available capacity and agreed quantity with both parties. Inspect rated compatible hoses, couplings and seals; verify valves and line-up. Establish assessed static-control and earthing measures where required, ignition exclusion and vehicle immobilisation. Test communication and identify remote stop devices. Supervise transfer, define lost-communication and alarm responses, and isolate, depressurise and drain before disconnection.

Suggested verification evidence

Joint transfer checklist, tank ullage record, hose inspections, earthing checks where required, stop-system tests and signed handover.

3.7 Loading vehicles and dispatch

Return to contents

Incorrect compartment, excessive fill, failed connection, vapour release, vehicle movement or an unsafe handover can expose drivers, loading operators and adjacent people to fire or explosion.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesPetrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers
Actual scenarioPublic refuelling spills petrol or drives away with a nozzle connected.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsUse supervised retail dispensing, maintained nozzles and hoses, clear operating instructions, ignition restrictions and accessible emergency stops. No bulk tanker loading or trade container filling service is assumed.
Mitigation and stop conditionsStop dispensing for unsafe conduct, spill, damaged hose or emergency-stop impairment. Evacuate when vapour release or fire makes the area unsafe.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-LOADING: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Verify vehicle and compartment compatibility, product identification, permitted fill and loading sequence. Use assessed closed loading and vapour controls where required. Check hose support, couplings, bonding or earthing arrangements and shutdown. Control traffic and ignition sources and prevent pull-away. Maintain a named controller, monitor the operation and stop on loss of a critical safeguard. Confirm isolation, secure closures and quantity reconciliation before release.

Suggested verification evidence

Loading plan, vehicle and compartment checks, quantity reconciliation, connection checks, shutdown test and dispatch acceptance.

3.8 Pumping and transfer between plant

Return to contents

Leaking seals or joints, incorrect line-up, blocked discharge, high pressure or temperature and utility failure can release vapour, mist or liquid into vulnerable spaces.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesPetrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers
Actual scenarioLeak from a dispenser or buried product line produces a flammable atmosphere near equipment or below grade.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsUse compatible designed pipework and equipment, leak monitoring, isolation and planned maintenance; keep chambers free of accumulated product and stop on integrity concerns.
Mitigation and stop conditionsIsolate affected circuit safely and secure the area. Investigate the loss and verify integrity before operational return.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-TRANSFER: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Avoid unnecessary joints and open transfers. Verify compatible pump, pipe, hose and valve duty and a safe operating envelope. Check destination capacity and flow path before starting. Assess pressure relief, containment, leak detection, ventilation and shutdown. Define fail-safe response to power, air, instrument or ventilation loss. Control bypasses and monitor representative operation; isolate connected inventory before repair.

Suggested verification evidence

Process drawing, line-up confirmation, operating limits, leak inspections, relief and shutdown evidence and abnormal-condition response.

3.9 Decanting sampling and point-of-use quantities

Return to contents

Open pouring or sampling can generate vapour or mist, create spills or static and leave unidentified residues close to workers and ignition sources.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesPetrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers
Actual scenarioA customer fills an unsuitable portable petrol container, causing leakage and vapour ignition.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsStaff enforce current lawful container and dispensing arrangements, suitable labelled closed containers and a stable safe filling position. No improvised shop decanting or staff sampling is allowed.
Mitigation and stop conditionsRefuse unsuitable filling and stop unsafe dispensing. Specialist sampling needs its own method, equipment suitability and briefing.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-DECANTING: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Substitute a less dangerous product or closed dispensing where practicable. Limit point-of-use quantity and opening time. Use compatible labelled containers and assessed dispensing, containment, ventilation and static controls. Separate from ignition and public routes. Define sampling positions, secure closures and safe waste collection. Check the method when product, temperature, container or dispensing rate changes.

Suggested verification evidence

Task method, dispensing suitability, labels, quantities, ventilation checks and sample or residue disposal record.

3.10 Mixing reactions and incompatible substances

Return to contents

Incompatible products, contamination, wrong addition sequence, oxidisers or unstable materials can produce heat, gas, pressure or a rapidly escalating reaction.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesPetrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensersAlcohol-based screenwash concentrate | Designated shop stock and protected back-storeFlammable maintenance aerosols | Restricted maintenance stock
Actual scenarioDelivery into the wrong tank or incompatible waste mixing changes vapour behaviour or causes reaction.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsNo process blending occurs. Verify product and connection identity and segregate fuels, cleaning agents and waste; prohibit improvised mixtures or adding unapproved chemicals to tanks.
Mitigation and stop conditionsQuarantine any misdelivery or unknown mixture. Stop affected use and obtain supplier and specialist recovery instructions.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-MIXING: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Remove incompatible combinations and select safer materials or processes. Obtain competent chemical assessment of combinations, operating limits and foreseeable contamination. Separate storage, lines and tools where needed. Control addition order, rate, temperature, pressure, ventilation and emergency isolation using an assessed process. Verify product identity before charging. Stop if compatibility or reaction behaviour is uncertain; do not improvise neutralisation.

Suggested verification evidence

Compatibility assessment, approved formulation or process, addition sequence, operating-limit evidence and reaction emergency plan.

3.11 Spraying coating and solvent use

Return to contents

Fine flammable mist and solvent vapour may ignite at conditions where a bulk-liquid assumption gives false reassurance; residues and unsuitable equipment can add fuel or ignition.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesAlcohol-based screenwash concentrate | Designated shop stock and protected back-storeFlammable maintenance aerosols | Restricted maintenance stock
Actual scenarioAn aerosol maintenance lubricant creates a local flammable cloud close to an ignition source.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsRestrict aerosols to the minimum task quantity in a ventilated safe area outside fuel hazardous areas; prefer a suitable nonflammable alternative. No solvent spraying or spray booth is assumed.
Mitigation and stop conditionsStop if location or ignition control is uncertain. Contractor coating or spraying requires a separate assessment and work coordination.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-SPRAYING: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Prefer a safer product or application method. Minimise released material and enclose or segregate the process. Verify extraction, airflow and interlocks for the actual spray duty, with assessed hazardous areas and suitable equipment. Control ignition sources, filters, cleaning and waste. Set shutdown conditions for extraction failure and manage coating or solvent changes. Apply separate COSHH controls for health exposure.

Suggested verification evidence

Application assessment, product SDS, extraction commissioning and checks, equipment register, cleaning records and COSHH assessment.

3.12 Combustible dust generation and collection

Return to contents

Dust clouds, deposits and confined equipment can produce primary and secondary explosions. Changing particle size, dryness or material composition may invalidate previous assumptions.

ApplicabilityNot applicable
Linked substancesNot recorded — complete during assessment
Actual scenarioNo combustible dust-generating process is assumed.
People and consequencesNot recorded — complete during assessment
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsNot recorded — complete during assessment
Mitigation and stop conditionsNot recorded — complete during assessment
Verification and limitationsFictional shop sells sealed retail packs; no bulk flour, milling, sanding or dust extraction.
Assessor risk priorityLow
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyRetail shelf stock does not introduce an assumed explosive dust process here. Reassess if a bakery, powder handling or contractor dust-generating operation is introduced.

Suggested controls to consider

Reduce dust generation and substitute a safer process where feasible. Obtain representative material explosibility data when needed; do not infer safety from appearance. Enclose and extract sources using suitable equipment. Assess dust deposits, ignition, earthing, separation and engineered explosion protection where required. Choose a safe cleaning method and prevent dust redistribution by uncontrolled compressed air or dry sweeping.

Suggested verification evidence

Material test basis, dust-area classification, extraction and protection design, cleaning inspections and equipment maintenance.

3.13 Cleaning spill control and housekeeping

Return to contents

Solvent cleaning, disturbed dust, contaminated tools or migration into drains and pits can create a release and ignition scenario beyond the immediate cleaning area.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesPetrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers
Actual scenarioCleaning or spill recovery spreads fuel into drains, occupied areas or ignition sources.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsSelect less hazardous cleaning products, remove ignition sources and protect drains where safe; staff handle only small assessed spills with compatible equipment; never hose fuel into drainage.
Mitigation and stop conditionsAlarm, isolate and exclude people for significant or uncertain spills. Specialist recovery and waste disposal follow the emergency plan.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-CLEANING: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Choose a less hazardous cleaning method and minimise product quantity. Assess residue, container and surface compatibility. Isolate affected equipment and ignition sources as necessary; maintain suitable ventilation. Define spill limits, safe access, waste collection and escalation for trained responders. Prevent spread to drains or occupied areas. Do not send untrained people into a vapour cloud or undertake an improvised rescue.

Suggested verification evidence

Cleaning method, spill-response limits, isolation checks, suitable cleaning equipment, waste record and observed housekeeping.

3.14 Waste residues and empty containers

Return to contents

Empty containers can retain dangerous vapour or residues. Mixed wastes, self-heating material and delayed removal can create fire, reaction or pressure hazards.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesPetrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers
Actual scenarioFuel-contaminated absorbents or nominally empty containers emit flammable vapour in a closed store.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsUse compatible labelled closed waste receptacles in the designated protected ventilated location, segregated from oxidisers, heat and drains; limit accumulation and use an authorised waste route.
Mitigation and stop conditionsStop use of leaking or unidentified waste containers. Escalate heat, vapour or fire; retain waste identification and collection evidence.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-WASTE: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Reduce waste at source and segregate incompatible residues. Retain identification and use compatible secure containers with an assessed storage arrangement. Account for nominally empty vessels and aerosols. Avoid ignition and uncontrolled crushing, cutting or reuse. Define collection intervals, authorised contractors and safe handover. Assess any cleaning or decontamination separately; a container labelled empty is not gas-free.

Suggested verification evidence

Waste inventory, compatibility checks, collection record, container condition and contractor acceptance.

3.15 Inspection and planned maintenance

Return to contents

Work on pumps, tanks, seals or protective systems can open a release path, introduce ignition or disable a critical safeguard while normal operations continue nearby.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesPetrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers
Actual scenarioDefective seals, protective systems or unsuitable replacement components create a leak or ignition source.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsUse competent forecourt contractors, an asset register, manufacturer criteria and risk-based inspection and functional tests; control impairments and verify Ex suitability of replacements.
Mitigation and stop conditionsWithdraw affected equipment when critical protection fails or is uncertain. A service ticket alone does not demonstrate safe reinstatement.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-MAINTENANCE: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Plan work to remove hazardous inventory or stop conflicting operations where practicable. Identify all energy and material sources, establish and verify isolation, depressurise and control residues using an assessed method. Coordinate permits, contractors, temporary equipment and impaired safeguards. Provide task-specific competence and testing. Record mechanical completion and verify restoration, integrity and operating readiness before hand-back.

Suggested verification evidence

Maintenance scope, isolation certificate, permit, impairment controls, inspection findings, test evidence and accepted hand-back.

3.16 Line breaking and opening vessels

Return to contents

Residual pressure, trapped liquid, a passing valve or incorrect isolation can release dangerous material when a flange, drain, filter or manway is opened.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesPetrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers
Actual scenarioResidual petrol or pressure escapes when a contractor opens product pipework.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsNo routine employee line breaking. Contractor scope requires identified positive isolation, drainage and depressurisation, safe collection, atmosphere checks and verified equipment state under permit.
Mitigation and stop conditionsDo not open plant with an unproved isolation. Suspend on unexpected pressure, product or atmosphere and re-establish a safe state.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-LINE-BREAKING: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Avoid opening live systems. Verify identification and an isolation scheme appropriate to the hazard, including connected lines and trapped sections. Prove zero energy and material removal using a competent planned method; do not rely on an instrument reading alone. Control release direction, exclusion, ventilation, spill containment and ignition. Establish permit prerequisites, supervision and stop criteria. Confirm safe reinstatement and integrity before return.

Suggested verification evidence

Isolation drawing, verification record, draining or purging basis, permit, opening method and reinstatement test.

3.17 Hot work and ignition-producing maintenance

Return to contents

Welding, grinding or heated surfaces can ignite flammable residues, deposits or releases from nearby plant, drains or simultaneous work.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesPetrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers
Actual scenarioWelding, grinding or other sparks ignite fuel vapour or contaminated residues.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsAvoid hot work and use cold methods where practicable. Exceptional work requires a separate competent method, defined isolation, gas testing, exclusion, fire precautions and permit coordination.
Mitigation and stop conditionsNo hot work during a conflicting delivery or within an uncontrolled hazardous area. Stop for changing conditions or expired/failed precautions.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-HOT-WORK: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Use a cold method or relocate the task where practicable. Remove or make the dangerous material safe through a competent plan, with verified isolation and preparation. Review adjacent equipment, connected openings and simultaneous work. Apply a risk-based permit with testing where required, suitable equipment, supervision, fire watch and post-work checks. A permit or a single gas reading does not prove continuing safety.

Suggested verification evidence

Cold-work decision, preparation and isolation evidence, permit, test method, monitoring arrangements and post-work release.

3.18 Tank pits and confined-space interfaces

Return to contents

Vapour or dust can accumulate in tanks, pits and connected spaces; inerting can also create an oxygen-deficient atmosphere. Entry or attempted rescue can expose several people.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesPetrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers
Actual scenarioPetrol vapour or oxygen deficiency accumulates in pits, tanks or chambers and overcomes an entrant.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsAvoid entry and use remote methods. Entry requires a specialist confined-space assessment, verified isolation, atmosphere monitoring and a suitable staffed rescue arrangement. Retail staff never enter tanks.
Mitigation and stop conditionsPrevent unauthorised entry and attempted rescue. Call emergency services; do not improvise entry or assume an apparently empty tank is safe.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-ENTRY: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Avoid entry by using external methods. Assess both DSEAR and confined-space risks, including connected systems, residues and oxygen displacement. Use verified isolation, competent atmospheric assessment and maintained ventilation where appropriate. Plan authorised access, communication and rescue with suitable trained resources before entry. Select appropriate equipment and prevent ignition. Do not infer breathable conditions from absence of a flammable-gas alarm.

Suggested verification evidence

Entry-avoidance decision, confined-space assessment, isolation, atmospheric-test basis, entry permit and rehearsed rescue arrangements.

3.19 Electrical mechanical and portable equipment

Return to contents

Arcs, hot surfaces, friction, impact, static, portable devices or unsuitable temporary equipment can ignite a foreseeable explosive atmosphere.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesPetrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers
Actual scenarioElectrical arcing, static, mechanical sparks or hot surfaces ignite a release.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsSpecify and verify equipment against competent area classification and substance properties, including portable devices, clothing, earthing and bonding where required; control ignition sources during abnormal work.
Mitigation and stop conditionsIsolate suspect or damaged equipment safely. No energisation of new or modified equipment pending suitability and explosion-safety verification.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-EQUIPMENT: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Eliminate unnecessary ignition sources and prevent dangerous atmosphere formation. Match equipment and protective systems to the competent area-classification and substance characteristics. Record electrical and non-electrical suitability, inspection and maintenance. Control portable items, tools, vehicle access and temporary installations. Assess antistatic clothing where required. Quarantine unsuitable or defective equipment and control any proposed substitution.

Suggested verification evidence

Ignition-source register, classification drawing, equipment suitability and inspection, temporary-device approval and defects.

3.20 Battery charging and energy systems

Return to contents

Depending on technology and duty, charging can generate flammable gas, electrical ignition or thermal runaway and can interact with nearby stored dangerous substances.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesPetrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers
Actual scenarioNo public EV charging is installed in this fictional layout. Contractor rechargeable tools and small shop batteries can still introduce ignition and fire.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsCharge small devices only in a designated safe location away from fuel areas and combustible stock, using suitable undamaged equipment. Any future EV installation is a formal change.
Mitigation and stop conditionsStop affected charging for damage, smoke, overheating or fuel-release conflict. Keep people away and follow responder advice; no staff battery firefighting.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-CHARGING: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Select suitable technology and charging arrangements through a task-specific assessment. Identify actual gas or fire mechanisms rather than treating every battery as identical. Separate from incompatible stores, public routes and vulnerable ignition locations. Provide assessed ventilation where gas can be generated, rated chargers and defect controls. Define damaged-battery handling and emergency response; obtain specialist advice for large or unusual systems.

Suggested verification evidence

Battery and charger specifications, charging assessment, ventilation basis where relevant, defects and emergency arrangements.

3.21 Start-up shutdown failures and abnormal operation

Return to contents

Loss of power, cooling, ventilation, instrumentation or communications, process upset and unauthorised bypasses can defeat several safeguards at the same time.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesPetrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers
Actual scenarioPower failure, flooding, gauge failure or vehicle impact removes protection and creates an uncontrolled release.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsDefine a safe shutdown state, alarm response and stock checks; protect against impact and water ingress; hand over impairments and confirm system state after loss of power.
Mitigation and stop conditionsSecure affected equipment and stop transfer on loss of critical protection. Investigation and competent testing precede separate restart authority.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-ABNORMAL: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Define a safe operating envelope and stop conditions. Design fail-safe isolation and protection from competent process assessment. Review start-up, shutdown, weather extremes, blocked flow, leakage and utility-loss scenarios. Control temporary measures and safety-system bypasses with authority, compensating controls and expiry. Investigate the cause and verify safeguards before restart; do not repeatedly reset an unexplained trip.

Suggested verification evidence

Operating limits, cause-and-effect information, abnormal procedures, protective-system tests, impairment log and restart authorisation.

3.22 Contractors construction and simultaneous work

Return to contents

One team can introduce ignition while another creates a release, disables detection, alters ventilation or blocks escape. Temporary works can change separation and occupancy.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesPetrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers
Actual scenarioDelivery, public access, EV installation and contractor work interact and defeat the delivery exclusion area.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsSite manager coordinates a single work schedule, interfaces, barriers, isolations and current permits; prohibit conflicting operations and brief drivers, contractors and shift staff.
Mitigation and stop conditionsSuspend all conflicting affected activities until the safe sequence and separation are restored. Revalidate after a scope or shift change.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-SIMOPS: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Remove conflicting activity or separate it by time and location. Nominate coordination responsibility and share relevant substance, zone and emergency information. Review contractor scope, equipment and competence. Coordinate permits and isolation, control temporary stores and maintain escape and emergency access. Reassess changing conditions and handovers. Confirm who may stop each activity and who authorises restoration.

Suggested verification evidence

Interface plan, contractor briefing, permit coordination, temporary-change assessment, handovers and stop-work decisions.

3.23 Fire explosion release and emergency response

Return to contents

A release or ignition may escalate through connected inventory, drains, adjacent assets or occupied areas; unsafe intervention can harm workers, visitors and responders.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesPetrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers
Actual scenarioA large fuel release or fire exposes customers, staff, neighbours and responders; delayed alarm worsens harm.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsMaintain accessible emergency stops, alarms, communications, clear escape routes, muster arrangements and current product information; exercise role-specific response across shifts.
Mitigation and stop conditionsAlarm and evacuate promptly; call 999 when required; isolate remotely only if safe. Keep access for responders; re-entry requires a controlled recovery decision.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-EMERGENCY: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Prevent the initiating release and ignition first. Establish assessed isolation, alarm and evacuation arrangements, with safe shutdown from suitable locations. Identify public and vulnerable people, escape limitations and off-site interfaces. Agree responder information, inventory access and communication. Restrict intervention to trained authorised roles within defined limits and test the plan. Plan welfare, investigation and technically verified restart.

Suggested verification evidence

Emergency plan, current inventory and layout, response limits, responder liaison, drill findings and restart procedure.

3.24 Decommissioning demolition and change of use

Return to contents

Redundant plant may contain hidden residues, trapped pressure or explosive atmospheres. Cutting, lifting and demolition can release or ignite material assumed to have been removed.

ApplicabilityApplicable
Linked substancesPetrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers
Actual scenarioResidual petrol in abandoned tanks or pipes remains explosive during removal or change of use.
People and consequencesStaff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant.
Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisionsNo demolition is authorised by this assessment. Before decommissioning use a competent specialist plan covering inventory removal, isolation, gas-free/inerting method, waste, permissions and future land use.
Mitigation and stop conditionsDo not cut, enter or abandon equipment based on an empty gauge. Verify the defined safe state and retain the decommissioning record.
Verification and limitationsCWF-FS-05-CASE-DECOMMISSION: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required.
Assessor risk priorityMedium
Exclusion reason or uncertaintyFictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion.

Suggested controls to consider

Plan removal using competent survey and verified substance identification. Avoid ignition-producing methods where feasible. Isolate, drain, purge or decontaminate through an assessed method, accounting for connected lines and recontamination. Define waste and contractor interfaces, demolition sequence and protection of occupied premises. Record the condition transferred to each party and verify each phase before proceeding.

Suggested verification evidence

Decommissioning plan, plant and residue survey, isolation and preparation evidence, contractor handover and disposal records.

4 Hazardous areas and explosion safety

Return to contents

A competent technical assessment must justify classification and extent. Quantities and SDS data alone do not establish zoning. Record release and ventilation assumptions, connected places, appropriate equipment and verification where required.

4.1 Underground petrol tanks, fill and vent system, dispensers and connected spaces

Return to contents

Area or assetUnderground petrol tanks, fill and vent system, dispensers and connected spaces
SubstancesPetrol vapour; diesel mists for abnormal release
Release and persistenceRoutine filling/displacement and dispensing plus seal, coupling, overfill and integrity failures. Include persistent vapour in below-grade spaces.
Ventilation availability and failureOpen-air forecourt assumed; pits, ducts, drains and occupied openings may retain vapour. Weather, obstructions and ventilation failures require technical study.
Classification decisionNot assessed
Extent and boundariesZone 0 within petrol vapour spaces and Zone 1/2 around releases are candidate considerations only; no design extents assigned.
Technical basis and assumptionsA competent release-grade and ventilation assessment is required. This worked case deliberately leaves engineering classification unresolved rather than inventing safe distances.
Drawing and revisionCWF-FS-05-Z01 required, not supplied; coordinate P01 and D01
Competent assessor and reportNo competent site survey or classification report supplied
Equipment suitabilityEquipment schedule, Ex markings, installation and inspection records to be checked against the accepted classification; ordinary equipment is not presumed suitable.
Overall explosion safety verificationOverall explosion-safety verification evidence not supplied. New/modified affected installation must not be brought into use before the required competent verification.
Review and temporary controlsHigh-priority action A02. Existing legal operation cannot be inferred from this example. The proposed night delivery has no demonstrated receiving-site control or dependable emergency contact arrangement. Restrict deliveries to staffed and coordinated periods pending a competent delivery-system review.

5 Management and emergency arrangements

Return to contents

Confirm the applicable jurisdiction. The duty references below use the Great Britain DSEAR 2002 baseline. For Northern Ireland check DSEAR 2003 and applicable amendments.

5.1 Scope and significant findings

Return to contents

DSEAR 5. Identify hazardous properties, current and maximum quantities, normal and abnormal conditions, material interactions, people affected and foreseeable scale of harm. Include connected openings, drains, pits and neighbouring activities. Record assessment limits and competent specialist studies needed.

Findings and decisionsInventory and all 24 activities screened; unattended delivery is the main site-specific issue. Quantities, physical properties and control claims are invented. A01 imposes the affected restriction.
Evidence and organisational referencesCase inventory and activity sections; real SDS, permissions, drawings and survey outstanding.
Accountable ownerHSE lead with site manager

5.2 Elimination reduction and engineered safeguards

Return to contents

DSEAR 6 and Schedule 1. Document substitution and inventory-reduction decisions. Verify containment, segregation, ventilation, ignition control, compatible design and maintenance. Record critical performance criteria, tests, impairments and mitigation. PPE and procedural discipline support the remaining controls; they do not replace source control.

Findings and decisionsPetrol retained because it is the intended retail product. Reduce working stock to justified demand, avoid unnecessary decanting, prefer less flammable cleaning products and use compatible closed engineered systems. The proposed night delivery has no demonstrated receiving-site control or dependable emergency contact arrangement. Restrict deliveries to staffed and coordinated periods pending a competent delivery-system review.
Evidence and organisational referencesFictional controls stated per activity. Actual leak detection, alarm, isolation, containment and maintenance tests need review.
Accountable ownerEngineering manager

5.3 Hazardous areas and explosion safety

Return to contents

DSEAR 7 and Schedules 2 to 4. Record competent classification decisions, extent, duration and release/ventilation assumptions; include drawings and equipment suitability. Where required, record verification of overall explosion safety before first operation. Consider antistatic clothing and EX signs. Quantities or an SDS alone do not establish a zone.

Findings and decisionsNo site classification is accepted. Obtain release/ventilation study including connected places, equipment suitability and required overall explosion-safety verification. Keep new or modified affected equipment out of service.
Evidence and organisational referencesZ01, P01 and D01 required; no technical acceptance claimed.
Accountable ownerCompetent Ex specialist appointed by engineering

5.4 Accidents incidents and emergencies

Return to contents

DSEAR 8. Record alarm, safe isolation, escape, responder liaison, public protection, emergency information, competent intervention limits, drills and recovery. Explain the basis for any assessment that additional emergency arrangements are unnecessary; review this when conditions change.

Findings and decisionsProvide prompt alarm, 999 call, safe remote isolation, evacuation, public exclusion and responder access. Staff do not enter tanks, approach uncontrolled fuel releases or fight EV battery fires. Test across shifts.
Evidence and organisational referencesFictional emergency procedure; actual emergency contacts, communications, isolation test and exercise evidence required.
Accountable ownerSite manager

5.5 Information instruction and training

Return to contents

DSEAR 9. Define role competence, substance and task briefings, induction, contractor and driver information, supervision, refresher triggers and practical verification. Share significant assessment findings and relevant emergency procedures with affected people.

Findings and decisionsVerify receiving-operator and driver coordination, dispenser supervision, spill response limits, contractor permits and shift cover. Give affected people the significant findings and check understanding.
Evidence and organisational referencesFictional briefing scenario only; actual training, competence and consultation records required.
Accountable ownerOperations manager

5.6 Contents identification and labelling

Return to contents

DSEAR 10. Verify identification of containers, tanks, pipes, temporary containers, residues and waste, with the associated hazards. Review damaged labels, mixed contents and changes; do not rely on memory or colour alone.

Findings and decisionsIdentify receiving tanks, fills, pipes and products consistently; check driver delivery documents against the site tank chart. Label waste and temporary containers; quarantine unknown contents.
Evidence and organisational referencesActual label survey, product mapping and current SDS register required; colour alone is insufficient.
Accountable ownerSite manager

5.7 Shared workplaces and coordination

Return to contents

DSEAR 11. Where applicable, identify the employer responsible for workplace coordination, other employers, drivers, contractors and neighbouring operations. Record the aim, shared measures, communication and permit or handover arrangements. Each employer retains its own duties.

Findings and decisionsCrownway as fictional workplace controller coordinates the delivery and contractor interfaces. Driver/employer and other employers retain their duties. Suspend conflicting hot work, public access or installation activity.
Evidence and organisational referencesDelivery plan, shared precautions, permit boundaries and signed handover must be genuinely completed before work.
Accountable ownerSite manager and tanker operator

5.8 Management of change and reassessment

Return to contents

DSEAR 5. Set review triggers for new products, quantities, process conditions, layout, ventilation, drainage, equipment, occupancy and protective-system impairments. Review after incidents or evidence that findings are no longer valid. Assess new dangerous-substance work and implement safeguards before commencement.

Findings and decisionsReview after product, quantity, layout, drainage, EV, staffing, operating-hours, software or protective-system changes and after a failure or new evidence. The annual example review date is a company planning choice; earlier triggers prevail.
Evidence and organisational referencesChange register, readiness review, updated assessment and temporary-change expiry required.
Accountable ownerEngineering and operations managers

5.9 Other assessments and specialist obligations

Return to contents

DSEAR Scope and legal interfaces. Record applicable COSHH health assessment, fire risk assessment, confined-space and pressure-system duties, petroleum permissions, carriage of dangerous goods and COMAH screening where relevant. Identify specialist designs and approvals; DSEAR totals or this template do not determine COMAH status or authorise hazardous work.

Findings and decisionsCheck petroleum certification and enforcing-authority requirements, fire assessment, COSHH, confined spaces, electrical safety and dangerous-goods roles separately. Confirm COMAH applicability from actual maximum masses, classifications and aggregation; litre totals do not determine tier.
Evidence and organisational referencesNo permission, environmental permit, COMAH conclusion or technical approval is issued by this assessment.
Accountable ownerHSE lead

6 Action plan

Return to contents

Assign a responsible person and due date, record interim restrictions and verify effectiveness before closure. An administrative closure does not release an unsafe activity.

6.1 Required action

Return to contents

Activity referencereceipt
Action and restrictionsThe proposed night delivery has no demonstrated receiving-site control or dependable emergency contact arrangement. Restrict deliveries to staffed and coordinated periods pending a competent delivery-system review.
PriorityHigh
OwnerSite manager and engineering manager
Due date2026-11-17
StatusOpen
Closure verificationFictional open finding; no genuine repair, closure or work release recorded.

6.2 Required action

Return to contents

Activity referenceequipment
Action and restrictionsCommission competent site DSEAR review and hazardous-area drawings including drains, ducts, vents, fills, dispensers and future equipment changes. Verify equipment suitability and required explosion-safety evidence. Maintain restrictions on new/modified affected equipment.
PriorityHigh
OwnerEngineering manager and competent Ex specialist
Due date2026-11-24
StatusOpen
Closure verificationNo study or verification supplied.

6.3 Required action

Return to contents

Activity referencebulk-storage
Action and restrictionsReplace fictional inventory/property assumptions with actual individual tank charts, maximum inventories, delivery limits, current supplier SDS and integrity/alarm test records. Resolve quantities and incompatible conditions before accepting receipt.
PriorityHigh
OwnerSite manager and HSE lead
Due date2026-11-17
StatusOpen
Closure verificationNo actual source evidence supplied.

6.4 Required action

Return to contents

Activity referenceemergency
Action and restrictionsVerify emergency stops, communications, evacuation and receiving-operator competence across shifts; run an exercise and test the effectiveness of the site-specific restriction before closure.
PriorityHigh
OwnerOperations manager
Due date2026-11-24
StatusOpen
Closure verificationNo genuine drill, briefing or acceptance represented.

7 Competent review and use decision

Return to contents

Review confirmedPending
Reviewer or authorising personPending appointment of actual competent reviewer
Review dateNot recorded — complete during assessment
Use decision and referenceWorked assessment completed for learning; not accepted for live operation. Open actions and engineering limits remain. No real signature or company approval.
Restrictions and limitationsThe proposed night delivery has no demonstrated receiving-site control or dependable emergency contact arrangement. Restrict deliveries to staffed and coordinated periods pending a competent delivery-system review. New/modified affected installations remain out of use pending competent zoning, suitability and required verification. Existing site safety cannot be inferred from fictional evidence.

Required entries outstanding: 2

The completeness check identifies missing entries; it does not validate technical adequacy.

8 Research and regulatory references

Return to contents

SHARE assessment prompts are authored from the following versioned research chapters and official guidance. Product SDS, site data and competent technical studies must inform the completed assessment.

DSEAR 2002 as amended — Great Britainhttps://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2002/2776/contents
DSEAR 2003 — Northern Irelandhttps://www.legislation.gov.uk/nisr/2003/152/contents
HSE current DSEAR guidancehttps://www.hse.gov.uk/fireandexplosion/dsear.htm
HSE L138 second edition — DSEAR ACOP and guidancehttps://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/priced/l138.pdf
HSE hazardous areas and explosion safetyhttps://www.hse.gov.uk/fireandexplosion/atex.htm
HSE HSG71 — packaged dangerous substanceshttps://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/priced/hsg71.pdf
HSE HSG176 — flammable liquids in tankshttps://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/priced/hsg176.pdf
HSE HSG140 — use and handling of flammable liquidshttps://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/priced/hsg140.pdf
Flammable and Explosive Materials and DSEARDN-049 - DN3 11.3 - flammable-and-explosive-materials-and-dsear - Single Source of Truth.docxVersion: 2026-09-19T09:02:15.113120+00:00SHA-256: 56396382f40cc27432283fc9b28f867ad73a52628ffd2a54d52532e55659af9e
Loading, Unloading and Transfer OperationsPSM-049 - loading-unloading-and-transfer-operations - Single Source of Truth.docxVersion: 2026-10-04T04:52:05.002807+00:00SHA-256: bbe951ef473d5594a59d3146cba13b1319393a7d6e3aec0b8bf2ed7822d3b01b
Template version20261010-dsear-2 | sources checked 2026-10-09
Guidance boundaryL138 second edition is dated 2013 and predates the 2015 scope amendments. Read with current legislation and HSE guidance, including corrosive-to-metal and pressurised-gas risks. Separate health, fire, COMAH and transport obligations may apply.

9 Visual reference plates

Forecourt and hazardous area concepts

Review with activities 3.3, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 and 3.19 and the section 4 classification decision.

Zone 0 means an explosive gas atmosphere is present continuously, for long periods or frequently; Zone 1 may occur occasionally in normal operation; Zone 2 is unlikely in normal operation and, if it occurs, persists only briefly. The drawing suggests release locations, not accepted zone types or extents.

Confirm release grades, ventilation, pits, ducts, drains and openings. Check equipment suitability and required verification against competent site drawings. EV bay placement in the image is not an accepted separation design.

9 2 Fuel filling vents and interceptor

Review with activities 3.1, 3.3, 3.6, 3.13, 3.20 and section 5 response arrangements.

Identify each tank/product connection, vapour-return arrangement, vent termination, tanker position and escape route. The closed access covers indicate a separator location concept only; they do not show its internal condition, class, flow, capacity, outlet design or fuel/firewater retention provision.

Trace actual drainage to the verified discharge point and receptors. Check separator condition, compatible alarm system, maintenance and any designed isolation/shutoff. A separator is not assumed capable of retaining a tanker loss, miscible product or firefighting runoff.

9 3 Optional retail LPG bottle storage

Review with activities 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.19, 3.23 and the management of change arrangements.

The ten site cases assume no LPG retail. This optional feature illustrates the assessment needed before introducing it. Add actual cylinder sizes, numbers, maximum LPG mass including nominally empty cylinders, SDS and delivery/exchange arrangements. No cylinder filling is authorised.

Use competent siting and hazardous-area assessment and supplier instructions. Verify ventilation, security, valve protection, impact protection and separation from ignition, openings, drains and pits. LPG vapour can collect at low level. This plate is not proof of an acceptable cage location.

9 4 Entrance ESD manual points and alarms

Review with activities 3.19, 3.20, 3.23 and section 5 emergency and competence arrangements.

The fuel emergency-stop button, fire-alarm manual call point and tank/interceptor indications have different purposes. A common display does not establish common sensing, independent protection or automatic shutdown. No universal control position, accessibility dimension or cause-and-effect is specified.

Test the actual cause-and-effect with competent people and a safe method. Confirm what stops, which valves move, which alarms sound, where signals are received and how restoration is controlled. Do not assume ESD isolates every electrical circuit or operates drainage valves.

Visual reference appendix

Forecourt and hazardous area concepts
Forecourt and hazardous area concepts

Zone 0 means an explosive gas atmosphere is present continuously, for long periods or frequently; Zone 1 may occur occasionally in normal operation; Zone 2 is unlikely in normal operation and, if it occurs, persists only briefly. The drawing suggests release locations, not accepted zone types or extents.

Confirm release grades, ventilation, pits, ducts, drains and openings. Check equipment suitability and required verification against competent site drawings. EV bay placement in the image is not an accepted separation design.

Fuel filling vents and interceptor
Fuel filling vents and interceptor

Identify each tank/product connection, vapour-return arrangement, vent termination, tanker position and escape route. The closed access covers indicate a separator location concept only; they do not show its internal condition, class, flow, capacity, outlet design or fuel/firewater retention provision.

Trace actual drainage to the verified discharge point and receptors. Check separator condition, compatible alarm system, maintenance and any designed isolation/shutoff. A separator is not assumed capable of retaining a tanker loss, miscible product or firefighting runoff.

Optional retail LPG bottle storage
Optional retail LPG bottle storage

The ten site cases assume no LPG retail. This optional feature illustrates the assessment needed before introducing it. Add actual cylinder sizes, numbers, maximum LPG mass including nominally empty cylinders, SDS and delivery/exchange arrangements. No cylinder filling is authorised.

Use competent siting and hazardous-area assessment and supplier instructions. Verify ventilation, security, valve protection, impact protection and separation from ignition, openings, drains and pits. LPG vapour can collect at low level. This plate is not proof of an acceptable cage location.

Entrance ESD manual points and alarms
Entrance ESD manual points and alarms

The fuel emergency-stop button, fire-alarm manual call point and tank/interceptor indications have different purposes. A common display does not establish common sensing, independent protection or automatic shutdown. No universal control position, accessibility dimension or cause-and-effect is specified.

Test the actual cause-and-effect with competent people and a safe method. Confirm what stops, which valves move, which alarms sound, where signals are received and how restoration is controlled. Do not assume ESD isolates every electrical circuit or operates drainage valves.