Completed fictional case in the live SHARE DSEAR audit format: inventory, all 24 activities, classification decisions, management arrangements, actions and review. Technical study and authorisation remain outstanding.
Crownway Birch Cross DSEAR assessment
Crownway Fuels Ltd — FICTIONAL WORKED EXAMPLE
Dangerous substances and explosive atmospheres
| Site | CWF-FS-02 Birch Cross — invented suburban petrol station in England; no actual address |
| Assessor | Fictional desk assessment prepared for training. No site visit, named competent assessor or technical certification is represented. |
| Assessment date | 2026-11-10 |
| Review date | 2027-11-10 |
| Document status | Document — review and completion required |
| Template version | 20261010-dsear-2 |
Complete the inventory and activity assessment for the actual operation. Verify controls and specialist evidence before deciding whether work may proceed. This document does not certify compliance or provide automated hazardous-area classification.
Contents
1 Assessment details
2 Substance inventory and quantities
3 Activity and hazard assessment
4 Hazardous areas and explosion safety
5 Management and emergency arrangements
6 Action plan
7 Competent review and use decision
8 Research and regulatory references
1 Assessment details
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Assess the actual dangerous substances, quantities, work and foreseeable failures. Document prevention, mitigation, evidence and any restrictions. This assessment supports competent decisions and does not certify compliance or authorise hazardous work.
| Document status | DRAFT — competent review and completion required |
| Organisation | Crownway Fuels Ltd — FICTIONAL WORKED EXAMPLE |
| Site | CWF-FS-02 Birch Cross — invented suburban petrol station in England; no actual address |
| Assessor and competence | Fictional desk assessment prepared for training. No site visit, named competent assessor or technical certification is represented. |
| Assessment date | 2026-11-10 |
| Review due | 2027-11-10 |
| Jurisdiction | England; Great Britain DSEAR baseline |
| Employees and groups | 14 fictional local staff across shifts; not an actual headcount allocation |
| Scope | Petrol and diesel receipt, underground storage, retail dispensing, convenience shop, small packaged chemicals and maintenance interfaces. No EV chargers assumed; future installation needs change review. No LPG retail, bulk tanker loading or workshop. All observations, assets and evidence references below are invented. |
| People affected | Site and agency staff, tanker drivers, customers including children and disabled people, contractors, neighbours, passers-by and emergency responders. |
| Plans and connected spaces | CWF-FS-02-P01 conceptual forecourt plan, D01 drainage study and Z01 zoning study are required; none supplied. Include vents, fill points, dispensers, ducts, drains, shop openings, boundaries and escape routes. |
| Operating conditions | Staffed retail 06:00–23:00; planned staffed deliveries. Ambient storage; no intentional heating. Assess unusual heat, flooding, power loss and peak demand. |
| Interfaces | Site manager coordinates tanker operator, maintenance contractors, landlord/retailer interfaces and public traffic. Vent termination is the differentiating issue for this site. |
| Consultation | Fictional case assumes site-manager, cashier, night/late-shift, driver and maintenance-role input. No actual consultation occurred. Local concerns and understanding must be recorded on adoption. |
2 Substance inventory and quantities
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Totals are grouped by unit. Missing quantities are flagged; volume, mass, gas volume and item count are not combined. Physical capacity does not establish an acceptable inventory or a hazardous zone.
| L totals | Current: 51521Maximum: 81063Capacity: 90063 |
| kg totals | Current: 20Maximum: 20Capacity: 20 |
2.1 Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario
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| Substance or product | Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario |
| Storage area or asset | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensers |
| Physical form | Liquid |
| CLP physical hazards and H statements | Assumed H224 extremely flammable liquid and vapour; confirm actual CLP/SDS. Also aspiration and environmental hazards require separate review. |
| SDS identifier and version | FICTIONAL product profile; actual supplier SDS not supplied |
| SDS date | Not recorded — complete during assessment |
| Container or tank description | Fictional underground divided fuel storage; individual tank chart required |
| Quantity unit | L |
| Current inventory | 27500 |
| Maximum planned inventory | 45000 |
| Total container or tank capacity | 50000 |
| Number of containers | 1 |
| Nominal capacity per container | 50000 |
| Quantity basis date and uncertainty | Invented inventory snapshot 10 November 2026. Maximum is the example operating cap, not an approved fill limit. Volumes are not COMAH mass calculations. |
| Operating and storage temperature | Ambient; seasonal and delivery-temperature limits need site confirmation |
| Operating and storage pressure | Atmospheric storage; transfer pressure follows the approved equipment design |
| Flash point and test basis | Indicative below -40 C; not supplier-tested data |
| Flammable limits LEL UEL and units | Indicative petrol vapour about 1–8 % volume in air; confirm actual product SDS |
| Autoignition and other ignition properties | Static discharge, electrical arcs and hot surfaces considered; confirm actual ignition properties and equipment group/temperature class from supplier data |
| Dust properties and test basis | Not applicable to this liquid; no combustible dust process |
| Incompatibilities and segregation | Segregate from oxidisers and incompatible chemicals; use supplier-confirmed compatible materials |
| Containment capacity and design reference | Fictional compatible containment and leak monitoring; actual design, capacity, condition and drainage not inspected |
2.2 Road diesel B7
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| Substance or product | Road diesel B7 |
| Storage area or asset | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers |
| Physical form | Liquid |
| CLP physical hazards and H statements | Assumed H226 flammable liquid and vapour; verify actual grade classification. Combustible spray/mist hazard remains relevant even below flash point. |
| SDS identifier and version | FICTIONAL product profile; actual supplier SDS not supplied |
| SDS date | Not recorded — complete during assessment |
| Container or tank description | Fictional underground diesel tank; individual tank chart required |
| Quantity unit | L |
| Current inventory | 24000 |
| Maximum planned inventory | 36000 |
| Total container or tank capacity | 40000 |
| Number of containers | 1 |
| Nominal capacity per container | 40000 |
| Quantity basis date and uncertainty | Invented inventory snapshot 10 November 2026. Maximum is the example operating cap, not an approved fill limit. Volumes are not COMAH mass calculations. |
| Operating and storage temperature | Ambient; seasonal and delivery-temperature limits need site confirmation |
| Operating and storage pressure | Atmospheric storage; transfer pressure follows the approved equipment design |
| Flash point and test basis | Indicative above 55 C; actual SDS/test basis required |
| Flammable limits LEL UEL and units | Supplier values not supplied; flammable mist and hot-surface scenarios included |
| Autoignition and other ignition properties | Static discharge, electrical arcs and hot surfaces considered; confirm actual ignition properties and equipment group/temperature class from supplier data |
| Dust properties and test basis | Not applicable to this liquid; no combustible dust process |
| Incompatibilities and segregation | Segregate from oxidisers and incompatible chemicals; use supplier-confirmed compatible materials |
| Containment capacity and design reference | Fictional compatible containment and leak monitoring; actual design, capacity, condition and drainage not inspected |
2.3 Alcohol-based screenwash concentrate
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| Substance or product | Alcohol-based screenwash concentrate |
| Storage area or asset | Designated shop stock and protected back-store |
| Physical form | Liquid |
| CLP physical hazards and H statements | Assumed H225 highly flammable liquid and vapour; actual mixture classification must be checked |
| SDS identifier and version | FICTIONAL product profile; actual supplier SDS not supplied |
| SDS date | Not recorded — complete during assessment |
| Container or tank description | 12 closed 5 L packs |
| Quantity unit | L |
| Current inventory | 20 |
| Maximum planned inventory | 60 |
| Total container or tank capacity | 60 |
| Number of containers | 12 |
| Nominal capacity per container | 5 |
| Quantity basis date and uncertainty | Invented inventory snapshot 10 November 2026. Maximum is the example operating cap, not an approved fill limit. Volumes are not COMAH mass calculations. |
| Operating and storage temperature | Ambient; seasonal and delivery-temperature limits need site confirmation |
| Operating and storage pressure | Atmospheric storage; transfer pressure follows the approved equipment design |
| Flash point and test basis | Assumed under 23 C for this fictional concentrate; verify actual SDS |
| Flammable limits LEL UEL and units | Mixture specific; not supplied |
| Autoignition and other ignition properties | Static discharge, electrical arcs and hot surfaces considered; confirm actual ignition properties and equipment group/temperature class from supplier data |
| Dust properties and test basis | Not applicable to this liquid; no combustible dust process |
| Incompatibilities and segregation | Segregate from oxidisers and incompatible chemicals; use supplier-confirmed compatible materials |
| Containment capacity and design reference | Fictional compatible containment and leak monitoring; actual design, capacity, condition and drainage not inspected |
2.4 Flammable maintenance aerosols
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| Substance or product | Flammable maintenance aerosols |
| Storage area or asset | Restricted maintenance stock |
| Physical form | Liquid |
| CLP physical hazards and H statements | Assumed H222 extremely flammable aerosol and H229 pressurised container may burst if heated; confirm actual product |
| SDS identifier and version | FICTIONAL product profile; actual supplier SDS not supplied |
| SDS date | Not recorded — complete during assessment |
| Container or tank description | 6 closed 0.5 L aerosol cans |
| Quantity unit | L |
| Current inventory | 1 |
| Maximum planned inventory | 3 |
| Total container or tank capacity | 3 |
| Number of containers | 6 |
| Nominal capacity per container | 0.5 |
| Quantity basis date and uncertainty | Invented inventory snapshot 10 November 2026. Maximum is the example operating cap, not an approved fill limit. Volumes are not COMAH mass calculations. |
| Operating and storage temperature | Ambient; seasonal and delivery-temperature limits need site confirmation |
| Operating and storage pressure | Pressurised can; actual pressure not supplied |
| Flash point and test basis | Not used alone for aerosol classification |
| Flammable limits LEL UEL and units | Propellant/mixture dependent; actual SDS required |
| Autoignition and other ignition properties | Static discharge, electrical arcs and hot surfaces considered; confirm actual ignition properties and equipment group/temperature class from supplier data |
| Dust properties and test basis | Not applicable to this liquid; no combustible dust process |
| Incompatibilities and segregation | Segregate from oxidisers and incompatible chemicals; use supplier-confirmed compatible materials |
| Containment capacity and design reference | Fictional compatible containment and leak monitoring; actual design, capacity, condition and drainage not inspected |
2.5 Portable extinguisher contents
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| Substance or product | Portable extinguisher contents |
| Storage area or asset | Protected designated extinguisher positions |
| Physical form | Pressurised extinguishing media |
| CLP physical hazards and H statements | Pressure-release/projectile and oxygen-displacement hazards where applicable; agent-dependent classification not confirmed |
| SDS identifier and version | FICTIONAL product profile; actual supplier SDS not supplied |
| SDS date | Not recorded — complete during assessment |
| Container or tank description | Fictional portable extinguishers; actual asset schedule required |
| Quantity unit | kg |
| Current inventory | 20 |
| Maximum planned inventory | 20 |
| Total container or tank capacity | 20 |
| Number of containers | 4 |
| Nominal capacity per container | 5 |
| Quantity basis date and uncertainty | Invented inventory snapshot 10 November 2026. Maximum is the example operating cap, not an approved fill limit. Volumes are not COMAH mass calculations. |
| Operating and storage temperature | Ambient; seasonal and delivery-temperature limits need site confirmation |
| Operating and storage pressure | Manufacturer pressure data required |
| Flash point and test basis | Nonflammable medium assumed; confirm extinguisher type |
| Flammable limits LEL UEL and units | Not applicable to nonflammable assumed medium |
| Autoignition and other ignition properties | Static discharge, electrical arcs and hot surfaces considered; confirm actual ignition properties and equipment group/temperature class from supplier data |
| Dust properties and test basis | No combustible dust process; extinguisher powder exposure considered in response assessment |
| Incompatibilities and segregation | Segregate from oxidisers and incompatible chemicals; use supplier-confirmed compatible materials |
| Containment capacity and design reference | Fictional compatible containment and leak monitoring; actual design, capacity, condition and drainage not inspected |
3 Activity and hazard assessment
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All 24 activities are screened. Suggested controls are research-based prompts, not confirmation of implementation. Remove inapplicable suggestions and add site-specific safeguards. Record the actual control, its verification and further actions.
3.1 Receipt and delivery acceptance
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Wrong product, damaged packaging, unidentified residues or an unplanned delivery can introduce incompatible substances, leaks and ignition hazards before the material reaches storage.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers |
| Actual scenario | Wrong product, inadequate ullage or unclear tank identification during delivery acceptance. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | Check order, product identity, tank chart, usable ullage, receiving tank and delivery route with the driver before connection; reject incompatible or excess delivery. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Stop for inconsistent gauges, labels, product or communication. Retain stock reconciliation and joint receiving checks. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-RECEIPT: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Avoid unnecessary deliveries and minimise stock. Verify product identity, current SDS, quantity and destination before acceptance. Check packaging, seals, labels and temperature or pressure concerns; segregate incompatible deliveries. Keep the unloading area clear of ignition and public access. Quarantine damaged or unidentified stock using a safe agreed method. Allocate a trained receiving person and an escalation route.
Suggested verification evidence
Delivery booking, product and SDS checks, acceptance record, damaged-load response and a mapped receiving area.
3.2 Packaged liquids aerosols and chemical storage
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Leaking drums, cans or aerosols, excessive inventory, incompatible neighbours and exposure to heat can lead to spreading fire, container rupture or harmful reactions.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Alcohol-based screenwash concentrate | Designated shop stock and protected back-storeFlammable maintenance aerosols | Restricted maintenance stock |
| Actual scenario | Leaking flammable screenwash or aerosol retail stock ignites near electrical equipment or an escape route. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | Reduce display quantities; segregate compatible closed stock away from heat, ignition, drains and escape routes; inspect damaged containers and isolate returns. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Evacuate on fire or significant vapour release. Only trained staff deal with a small safe spill using the emergency procedure. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-PACKAGED-STORAGE: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Remove redundant products and reduce working stock. Select compatible containers and suitable storage construction from competent assessment. Separate incompatible classes and protect from impact, heat and ignition. Confirm containment, ventilation, drainage isolation and fire separation for the actual inventory. Keep escape routes clear. Define inspection, leak response and maximum planned stock; do not assume an arbitrary litre allowance is safe.
Suggested verification evidence
Storage layout, stock record, compatibility assessment, store design, container checks and evidence of corrective work.
3.3 Bulk tanks and fixed storage installations
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Corrosion, seal or vent failure, overfill, wrong tank selection, vehicle impact or external fire can release a large connected inventory and escalate to adjoining assets or off-site receptors.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers |
| Actual scenario | Loss of underground tank containment or overfill releases petrol vapour into chambers, ducts or drains. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | Maintain compatible tanks and pipework; reconcile inventory; monitor leak indications; verify ullage, gauge alarms and delivery limits; investigate unexplained losses before more receipts. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Suspend receipt and affected dispensing on alarm or unexplained loss. Secure migration pathways and obtain competent investigation. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-BULK-STORAGE: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Reduce inventory and release points where practicable. Verify tank design, product compatibility, operating envelope and integrity. Assess venting, overfill protection, independent shutdown where required, safe isolation, containment and drainage. Protect against impact and external fire. Define inspection and test intervals from competent engineering input and control impairments. Confirm hazardous-area and emergency studies for the actual layout.
Suggested verification evidence
Tank register, capacity and maximum inventory, drawings, integrity records, level and shutdown tests, containment assessment and impairment log.
3.4 Compressed and liquefied gases
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Cylinder leakage, damaged valves, incorrect regulators, heat exposure or uncontrolled movement can cause flammable releases, pressure rupture, jet fire or oxygen enrichment.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Portable extinguisher contents | Protected designated extinguisher positions |
| Actual scenario | Damaged portable extinguisher cylinder could release pressure or become a projectile in fire. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | No retail LPG, LPG autogas or workshop gas cylinders are assumed. Include only maintained portable fire extinguishers with protected locations and authorised servicing. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Withdraw from fire exposure and provide responders with locations. Staff do not refill cylinders or dismantle valves. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-CYLINDERS: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Minimise cylinders and substitute a safer process where possible. Identify contents and rated fittings, restrain cylinders and protect valves during movement. Separate incompatible gases and provide assessed ventilation and safe storage conditions. Prevent impact and heat exposure. Check leaks using an authorised method. Use trained people for connection, isolation and changeover; account for full, partly used and empty cylinders.
Suggested verification evidence
Cylinder inventory, gas SDS, storage assessment, regulator suitability, leak checks and movement instructions.
3.5 Internal handling and movement
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Dropped containers, unstable loads, collisions and movement through occupied or ignition-prone areas can release dangerous substances and expose workers or visitors.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Alcohol-based screenwash concentrate | Designated shop stock and protected back-storeFlammable maintenance aerosols | Restricted maintenance stock |
| Actual scenario | Dropped screenwash cartons or damaged aerosols release flammable liquid or propellant during stock handling. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | Use intact packs, a clear route and suitable handling aids; keep stock away from vehicle movement, heater sources and drains; contain damaged packs promptly. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Stop stock movement on leaking packs. Exclude ignition and secure affected area; escalate substantial or uncertain release. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-INTERNAL-MOVEMENT: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Avoid repeated handling and reduce quantities moved per task. Choose compatible closed containers, suitable lifting or transport equipment and restrained loads. Assess routes, vehicle interaction, gradients, weather and drainage. Separate pedestrians and protect containers from damage. Check packaging before movement, brief handlers and define a safe damaged-container response. PPE supports residual handling risks.
Suggested verification evidence
Route assessment, handling method, load restraint, equipment checks and trained handler observations.
3.6 Tanker and bulk delivery unloading
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Wrong connection, hose failure, overfill, static discharge, premature vehicle movement or loss of communication can cause a substantial release at the delivery interface.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers |
| Actual scenario | Tanker hose or coupling failure releases petrol during gravity unloading and vapour return. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | Coordinate driver and receiving operator; establish delivery exclusion and escape routes; check hose/coupling compatibility, product and ullage; control ignition, use the designed vapour-return arrangement and delivery checklist. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Driver stops transfer using the safe emergency method. Raise alarm, exclude public and call emergency services as needed; no unsafe approach to a release. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-UNLOADING: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Confirm product, source, destination, available capacity and agreed quantity with both parties. Inspect rated compatible hoses, couplings and seals; verify valves and line-up. Establish assessed static-control and earthing measures where required, ignition exclusion and vehicle immobilisation. Test communication and identify remote stop devices. Supervise transfer, define lost-communication and alarm responses, and isolate, depressurise and drain before disconnection.
Suggested verification evidence
Joint transfer checklist, tank ullage record, hose inspections, earthing checks where required, stop-system tests and signed handover.
3.7 Loading vehicles and dispatch
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Incorrect compartment, excessive fill, failed connection, vapour release, vehicle movement or an unsafe handover can expose drivers, loading operators and adjacent people to fire or explosion.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers |
| Actual scenario | Public refuelling spills petrol or drives away with a nozzle connected. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | Use supervised retail dispensing, maintained nozzles and hoses, clear operating instructions, ignition restrictions and accessible emergency stops. No bulk tanker loading or trade container filling service is assumed. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Stop dispensing for unsafe conduct, spill, damaged hose or emergency-stop impairment. Evacuate when vapour release or fire makes the area unsafe. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-LOADING: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Verify vehicle and compartment compatibility, product identification, permitted fill and loading sequence. Use assessed closed loading and vapour controls where required. Check hose support, couplings, bonding or earthing arrangements and shutdown. Control traffic and ignition sources and prevent pull-away. Maintain a named controller, monitor the operation and stop on loss of a critical safeguard. Confirm isolation, secure closures and quantity reconciliation before release.
Suggested verification evidence
Loading plan, vehicle and compartment checks, quantity reconciliation, connection checks, shutdown test and dispatch acceptance.
3.8 Pumping and transfer between plant
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Leaking seals or joints, incorrect line-up, blocked discharge, high pressure or temperature and utility failure can release vapour, mist or liquid into vulnerable spaces.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers |
| Actual scenario | Leak from a dispenser or buried product line produces a flammable atmosphere near equipment or below grade. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | Use compatible designed pipework and equipment, leak monitoring, isolation and planned maintenance; keep chambers free of accumulated product and stop on integrity concerns. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Isolate affected circuit safely and secure the area. Investigate the loss and verify integrity before operational return. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-TRANSFER: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Avoid unnecessary joints and open transfers. Verify compatible pump, pipe, hose and valve duty and a safe operating envelope. Check destination capacity and flow path before starting. Assess pressure relief, containment, leak detection, ventilation and shutdown. Define fail-safe response to power, air, instrument or ventilation loss. Control bypasses and monitor representative operation; isolate connected inventory before repair.
Suggested verification evidence
Process drawing, line-up confirmation, operating limits, leak inspections, relief and shutdown evidence and abnormal-condition response.
3.9 Decanting sampling and point-of-use quantities
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Open pouring or sampling can generate vapour or mist, create spills or static and leave unidentified residues close to workers and ignition sources.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers |
| Actual scenario | A customer fills an unsuitable portable petrol container, causing leakage and vapour ignition. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | Staff enforce current lawful container and dispensing arrangements, suitable labelled closed containers and a stable safe filling position. No improvised shop decanting or staff sampling is allowed. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Refuse unsuitable filling and stop unsafe dispensing. Specialist sampling needs its own method, equipment suitability and briefing. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-DECANTING: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Substitute a less dangerous product or closed dispensing where practicable. Limit point-of-use quantity and opening time. Use compatible labelled containers and assessed dispensing, containment, ventilation and static controls. Separate from ignition and public routes. Define sampling positions, secure closures and safe waste collection. Check the method when product, temperature, container or dispensing rate changes.
Suggested verification evidence
Task method, dispensing suitability, labels, quantities, ventilation checks and sample or residue disposal record.
3.10 Mixing reactions and incompatible substances
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Incompatible products, contamination, wrong addition sequence, oxidisers or unstable materials can produce heat, gas, pressure or a rapidly escalating reaction.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensersAlcohol-based screenwash concentrate | Designated shop stock and protected back-storeFlammable maintenance aerosols | Restricted maintenance stock |
| Actual scenario | Delivery into the wrong tank or incompatible waste mixing changes vapour behaviour or causes reaction. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | No process blending occurs. Verify product and connection identity and segregate fuels, cleaning agents and waste; prohibit improvised mixtures or adding unapproved chemicals to tanks. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Quarantine any misdelivery or unknown mixture. Stop affected use and obtain supplier and specialist recovery instructions. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-MIXING: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Remove incompatible combinations and select safer materials or processes. Obtain competent chemical assessment of combinations, operating limits and foreseeable contamination. Separate storage, lines and tools where needed. Control addition order, rate, temperature, pressure, ventilation and emergency isolation using an assessed process. Verify product identity before charging. Stop if compatibility or reaction behaviour is uncertain; do not improvise neutralisation.
Suggested verification evidence
Compatibility assessment, approved formulation or process, addition sequence, operating-limit evidence and reaction emergency plan.
3.11 Spraying coating and solvent use
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Fine flammable mist and solvent vapour may ignite at conditions where a bulk-liquid assumption gives false reassurance; residues and unsuitable equipment can add fuel or ignition.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Alcohol-based screenwash concentrate | Designated shop stock and protected back-storeFlammable maintenance aerosols | Restricted maintenance stock |
| Actual scenario | An aerosol maintenance lubricant creates a local flammable cloud close to an ignition source. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | Restrict aerosols to the minimum task quantity in a ventilated safe area outside fuel hazardous areas; prefer a suitable nonflammable alternative. No solvent spraying or spray booth is assumed. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Stop if location or ignition control is uncertain. Contractor coating or spraying requires a separate assessment and work coordination. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-SPRAYING: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Prefer a safer product or application method. Minimise released material and enclose or segregate the process. Verify extraction, airflow and interlocks for the actual spray duty, with assessed hazardous areas and suitable equipment. Control ignition sources, filters, cleaning and waste. Set shutdown conditions for extraction failure and manage coating or solvent changes. Apply separate COSHH controls for health exposure.
Suggested verification evidence
Application assessment, product SDS, extraction commissioning and checks, equipment register, cleaning records and COSHH assessment.
3.12 Combustible dust generation and collection
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Dust clouds, deposits and confined equipment can produce primary and secondary explosions. Changing particle size, dryness or material composition may invalidate previous assumptions.
| Applicability | Not applicable |
| Linked substances | Not recorded — complete during assessment |
| Actual scenario | No combustible dust-generating process is assumed. |
| People and consequences | Not recorded — complete during assessment |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | Not recorded — complete during assessment |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Not recorded — complete during assessment |
| Verification and limitations | Fictional shop sells sealed retail packs; no bulk flour, milling, sanding or dust extraction. |
| Assessor risk priority | Low |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Retail shelf stock does not introduce an assumed explosive dust process here. Reassess if a bakery, powder handling or contractor dust-generating operation is introduced. |
Suggested controls to consider
Reduce dust generation and substitute a safer process where feasible. Obtain representative material explosibility data when needed; do not infer safety from appearance. Enclose and extract sources using suitable equipment. Assess dust deposits, ignition, earthing, separation and engineered explosion protection where required. Choose a safe cleaning method and prevent dust redistribution by uncontrolled compressed air or dry sweeping.
Suggested verification evidence
Material test basis, dust-area classification, extraction and protection design, cleaning inspections and equipment maintenance.
3.13 Cleaning spill control and housekeeping
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Solvent cleaning, disturbed dust, contaminated tools or migration into drains and pits can create a release and ignition scenario beyond the immediate cleaning area.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers |
| Actual scenario | Cleaning or spill recovery spreads fuel into drains, occupied areas or ignition sources. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | Select less hazardous cleaning products, remove ignition sources and protect drains where safe; staff handle only small assessed spills with compatible equipment; never hose fuel into drainage. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Alarm, isolate and exclude people for significant or uncertain spills. Specialist recovery and waste disposal follow the emergency plan. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-CLEANING: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Choose a less hazardous cleaning method and minimise product quantity. Assess residue, container and surface compatibility. Isolate affected equipment and ignition sources as necessary; maintain suitable ventilation. Define spill limits, safe access, waste collection and escalation for trained responders. Prevent spread to drains or occupied areas. Do not send untrained people into a vapour cloud or undertake an improvised rescue.
Suggested verification evidence
Cleaning method, spill-response limits, isolation checks, suitable cleaning equipment, waste record and observed housekeeping.
3.14 Waste residues and empty containers
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Empty containers can retain dangerous vapour or residues. Mixed wastes, self-heating material and delayed removal can create fire, reaction or pressure hazards.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers |
| Actual scenario | Fuel-contaminated absorbents or nominally empty containers emit flammable vapour in a closed store. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | Use compatible labelled closed waste receptacles in the designated protected ventilated location, segregated from oxidisers, heat and drains; limit accumulation and use an authorised waste route. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Stop use of leaking or unidentified waste containers. Escalate heat, vapour or fire; retain waste identification and collection evidence. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-WASTE: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Reduce waste at source and segregate incompatible residues. Retain identification and use compatible secure containers with an assessed storage arrangement. Account for nominally empty vessels and aerosols. Avoid ignition and uncontrolled crushing, cutting or reuse. Define collection intervals, authorised contractors and safe handover. Assess any cleaning or decontamination separately; a container labelled empty is not gas-free.
Suggested verification evidence
Waste inventory, compatibility checks, collection record, container condition and contractor acceptance.
3.15 Inspection and planned maintenance
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Work on pumps, tanks, seals or protective systems can open a release path, introduce ignition or disable a critical safeguard while normal operations continue nearby.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers |
| Actual scenario | Defective seals, protective systems or unsuitable replacement components create a leak or ignition source. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | Use competent forecourt contractors, an asset register, manufacturer criteria and risk-based inspection and functional tests; control impairments and verify Ex suitability of replacements. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Withdraw affected equipment when critical protection fails or is uncertain. A service ticket alone does not demonstrate safe reinstatement. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-MAINTENANCE: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Plan work to remove hazardous inventory or stop conflicting operations where practicable. Identify all energy and material sources, establish and verify isolation, depressurise and control residues using an assessed method. Coordinate permits, contractors, temporary equipment and impaired safeguards. Provide task-specific competence and testing. Record mechanical completion and verify restoration, integrity and operating readiness before hand-back.
Suggested verification evidence
Maintenance scope, isolation certificate, permit, impairment controls, inspection findings, test evidence and accepted hand-back.
3.16 Line breaking and opening vessels
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Residual pressure, trapped liquid, a passing valve or incorrect isolation can release dangerous material when a flange, drain, filter or manway is opened.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers |
| Actual scenario | Residual petrol or pressure escapes when a contractor opens product pipework. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | No routine employee line breaking. Contractor scope requires identified positive isolation, drainage and depressurisation, safe collection, atmosphere checks and verified equipment state under permit. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Do not open plant with an unproved isolation. Suspend on unexpected pressure, product or atmosphere and re-establish a safe state. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-LINE-BREAKING: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Avoid opening live systems. Verify identification and an isolation scheme appropriate to the hazard, including connected lines and trapped sections. Prove zero energy and material removal using a competent planned method; do not rely on an instrument reading alone. Control release direction, exclusion, ventilation, spill containment and ignition. Establish permit prerequisites, supervision and stop criteria. Confirm safe reinstatement and integrity before return.
Suggested verification evidence
Isolation drawing, verification record, draining or purging basis, permit, opening method and reinstatement test.
3.17 Hot work and ignition-producing maintenance
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Welding, grinding or heated surfaces can ignite flammable residues, deposits or releases from nearby plant, drains or simultaneous work.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers |
| Actual scenario | Welding, grinding or other sparks ignite fuel vapour or contaminated residues. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | Avoid hot work and use cold methods where practicable. Exceptional work requires a separate competent method, defined isolation, gas testing, exclusion, fire precautions and permit coordination. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | No hot work during a conflicting delivery or within an uncontrolled hazardous area. Stop for changing conditions or expired/failed precautions. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-HOT-WORK: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Use a cold method or relocate the task where practicable. Remove or make the dangerous material safe through a competent plan, with verified isolation and preparation. Review adjacent equipment, connected openings and simultaneous work. Apply a risk-based permit with testing where required, suitable equipment, supervision, fire watch and post-work checks. A permit or a single gas reading does not prove continuing safety.
Suggested verification evidence
Cold-work decision, preparation and isolation evidence, permit, test method, monitoring arrangements and post-work release.
3.18 Tank pits and confined-space interfaces
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Vapour or dust can accumulate in tanks, pits and connected spaces; inerting can also create an oxygen-deficient atmosphere. Entry or attempted rescue can expose several people.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers |
| Actual scenario | Petrol vapour or oxygen deficiency accumulates in pits, tanks or chambers and overcomes an entrant. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | Avoid entry and use remote methods. Entry requires a specialist confined-space assessment, verified isolation, atmosphere monitoring and a suitable staffed rescue arrangement. Retail staff never enter tanks. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Prevent unauthorised entry and attempted rescue. Call emergency services; do not improvise entry or assume an apparently empty tank is safe. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-ENTRY: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Avoid entry by using external methods. Assess both DSEAR and confined-space risks, including connected systems, residues and oxygen displacement. Use verified isolation, competent atmospheric assessment and maintained ventilation where appropriate. Plan authorised access, communication and rescue with suitable trained resources before entry. Select appropriate equipment and prevent ignition. Do not infer breathable conditions from absence of a flammable-gas alarm.
Suggested verification evidence
Entry-avoidance decision, confined-space assessment, isolation, atmospheric-test basis, entry permit and rehearsed rescue arrangements.
3.19 Electrical mechanical and portable equipment
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Arcs, hot surfaces, friction, impact, static, portable devices or unsuitable temporary equipment can ignite a foreseeable explosive atmosphere.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers |
| Actual scenario | Electrical arcing, static, mechanical sparks or hot surfaces ignite a release. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | Specify and verify equipment against competent area classification and substance properties, including portable devices, clothing, earthing and bonding where required; control ignition sources during abnormal work. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Isolate suspect or damaged equipment safely. No energisation of new or modified equipment pending suitability and explosion-safety verification. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-EQUIPMENT: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Eliminate unnecessary ignition sources and prevent dangerous atmosphere formation. Match equipment and protective systems to the competent area-classification and substance characteristics. Record electrical and non-electrical suitability, inspection and maintenance. Control portable items, tools, vehicle access and temporary installations. Assess antistatic clothing where required. Quarantine unsuitable or defective equipment and control any proposed substitution.
Suggested verification evidence
Ignition-source register, classification drawing, equipment suitability and inspection, temporary-device approval and defects.
3.20 Battery charging and energy systems
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Depending on technology and duty, charging can generate flammable gas, electrical ignition or thermal runaway and can interact with nearby stored dangerous substances.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers |
| Actual scenario | No public EV charging is installed in this fictional layout. Contractor rechargeable tools and small shop batteries can still introduce ignition and fire. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | Charge small devices only in a designated safe location away from fuel areas and combustible stock, using suitable undamaged equipment. Any future EV installation is a formal change. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Stop affected charging for damage, smoke, overheating or fuel-release conflict. Keep people away and follow responder advice; no staff battery firefighting. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-CHARGING: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Select suitable technology and charging arrangements through a task-specific assessment. Identify actual gas or fire mechanisms rather than treating every battery as identical. Separate from incompatible stores, public routes and vulnerable ignition locations. Provide assessed ventilation where gas can be generated, rated chargers and defect controls. Define damaged-battery handling and emergency response; obtain specialist advice for large or unusual systems.
Suggested verification evidence
Battery and charger specifications, charging assessment, ventilation basis where relevant, defects and emergency arrangements.
3.21 Start-up shutdown failures and abnormal operation
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Loss of power, cooling, ventilation, instrumentation or communications, process upset and unauthorised bypasses can defeat several safeguards at the same time.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers |
| Actual scenario | Power failure, flooding, gauge failure or vehicle impact removes protection and creates an uncontrolled release. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | Define a safe shutdown state, alarm response and stock checks; protect against impact and water ingress; hand over impairments and confirm system state after loss of power. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Secure affected equipment and stop transfer on loss of critical protection. Investigation and competent testing precede separate restart authority. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-ABNORMAL: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Define a safe operating envelope and stop conditions. Design fail-safe isolation and protection from competent process assessment. Review start-up, shutdown, weather extremes, blocked flow, leakage and utility-loss scenarios. Control temporary measures and safety-system bypasses with authority, compensating controls and expiry. Investigate the cause and verify safeguards before restart; do not repeatedly reset an unexplained trip.
Suggested verification evidence
Operating limits, cause-and-effect information, abnormal procedures, protective-system tests, impairment log and restart authorisation.
3.22 Contractors construction and simultaneous work
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One team can introduce ignition while another creates a release, disables detection, alters ventilation or blocks escape. Temporary works can change separation and occupancy.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers |
| Actual scenario | Delivery, public access, EV installation and contractor work interact and defeat the delivery exclusion area. SIGNIFICANT FINDING: A proposed shop ventilation inlet is close to the petrol vent discharge. Do not install or energise the inlet until the competent zoning and dispersion review accepts the layout. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | Site manager coordinates a single work schedule, interfaces, barriers, isolations and current permits; prohibit conflicting operations and brief drivers, contractors and shift staff. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | A proposed shop ventilation inlet is close to the petrol vent discharge. Do not install or energise the inlet until the competent zoning and dispersion review accepts the layout. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-SIMOPS: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | High |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Remove conflicting activity or separate it by time and location. Nominate coordination responsibility and share relevant substance, zone and emergency information. Review contractor scope, equipment and competence. Coordinate permits and isolation, control temporary stores and maintain escape and emergency access. Reassess changing conditions and handovers. Confirm who may stop each activity and who authorises restoration.
Suggested verification evidence
Interface plan, contractor briefing, permit coordination, temporary-change assessment, handovers and stop-work decisions.
3.23 Fire explosion release and emergency response
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A release or ignition may escalate through connected inventory, drains, adjacent assets or occupied areas; unsafe intervention can harm workers, visitors and responders.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers |
| Actual scenario | A large fuel release or fire exposes customers, staff, neighbours and responders; delayed alarm worsens harm. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | Maintain accessible emergency stops, alarms, communications, clear escape routes, muster arrangements and current product information; exercise role-specific response across shifts. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Alarm and evacuate promptly; call 999 when required; isolate remotely only if safe. Keep access for responders; re-entry requires a controlled recovery decision. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-EMERGENCY: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Prevent the initiating release and ignition first. Establish assessed isolation, alarm and evacuation arrangements, with safe shutdown from suitable locations. Identify public and vulnerable people, escape limitations and off-site interfaces. Agree responder information, inventory access and communication. Restrict intervention to trained authorised roles within defined limits and test the plan. Plan welfare, investigation and technically verified restart.
Suggested verification evidence
Emergency plan, current inventory and layout, response limits, responder liaison, drill findings and restart procedure.
3.24 Decommissioning demolition and change of use
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Redundant plant may contain hidden residues, trapped pressure or explosive atmospheres. Cutting, lifting and demolition can release or ignite material assumed to have been removed.
| Applicability | Applicable |
| Linked substances | Petrol E10 and premium petrol grouped for scenario | Underground petrol tanks and connected fill, vent, lines and dispensersRoad diesel B7 | Underground diesel storage, lines and dispensers |
| Actual scenario | Residual petrol in abandoned tanks or pipes remains explosive during removal or change of use. |
| People and consequences | Staff, public, drivers and contractors; credible fire, explosion, burns, pressure injury and off-site vapour migration as relevant. |
| Implemented prevention and ERICPD decisions | No demolition is authorised by this assessment. Before decommissioning use a competent specialist plan covering inventory removal, isolation, gas-free/inerting method, waste, permissions and future land use. |
| Mitigation and stop conditions | Do not cut, enter or abandon equipment based on an empty gauge. Verify the defined safe state and retain the decommissioning record. |
| Verification and limitations | CWF-FS-02-CASE-DECOMMISSION: invented desk-case control description, not an inspection or test record. Actual evidence and competent acceptance required. |
| Assessor risk priority | Medium |
| Exclusion reason or uncertainty | Fictional assessed conditions; residual priority is a follow-up priority, not a quantitative acceptability conclusion. |
Suggested controls to consider
Plan removal using competent survey and verified substance identification. Avoid ignition-producing methods where feasible. Isolate, drain, purge or decontaminate through an assessed method, accounting for connected lines and recontamination. Define waste and contractor interfaces, demolition sequence and protection of occupied premises. Record the condition transferred to each party and verify each phase before proceeding.
Suggested verification evidence
Decommissioning plan, plant and residue survey, isolation and preparation evidence, contractor handover and disposal records.
4 Hazardous areas and explosion safety
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A competent technical assessment must justify classification and extent. Quantities and SDS data alone do not establish zoning. Record release and ventilation assumptions, connected places, appropriate equipment and verification where required.
4.1 Underground petrol tanks, fill and vent system, dispensers and connected spaces
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| Area or asset | Underground petrol tanks, fill and vent system, dispensers and connected spaces |
| Substances | Petrol vapour; diesel mists for abnormal release |
| Release and persistence | Routine filling/displacement and dispensing plus seal, coupling, overfill and integrity failures. Include persistent vapour in below-grade spaces. |
| Ventilation availability and failure | Open-air forecourt assumed; pits, ducts, drains and occupied openings may retain vapour. Weather, obstructions and ventilation failures require technical study. |
| Classification decision | Not assessed |
| Extent and boundaries | Zone 0 within petrol vapour spaces and Zone 1/2 around releases are candidate considerations only; no design extents assigned. |
| Technical basis and assumptions | A competent release-grade and ventilation assessment is required. This worked case deliberately leaves engineering classification unresolved rather than inventing safe distances. |
| Drawing and revision | CWF-FS-02-Z01 required, not supplied; coordinate P01 and D01 |
| Competent assessor and report | No competent site survey or classification report supplied |
| Equipment suitability | Equipment schedule, Ex markings, installation and inspection records to be checked against the accepted classification; ordinary equipment is not presumed suitable. |
| Overall explosion safety verification | Overall explosion-safety verification evidence not supplied. New/modified affected installation must not be brought into use before the required competent verification. |
| Review and temporary controls | High-priority action A02. Existing legal operation cannot be inferred from this example. A proposed shop ventilation inlet is close to the petrol vent discharge. Do not install or energise the inlet until the competent zoning and dispersion review accepts the layout. |
5 Management and emergency arrangements
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Confirm the applicable jurisdiction. The duty references below use the Great Britain DSEAR 2002 baseline. For Northern Ireland check DSEAR 2003 and applicable amendments.
5.1 Scope and significant findings
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DSEAR 5. Identify hazardous properties, current and maximum quantities, normal and abnormal conditions, material interactions, people affected and foreseeable scale of harm. Include connected openings, drains, pits and neighbouring activities. Record assessment limits and competent specialist studies needed.
| Findings and decisions | Inventory and all 24 activities screened; vent termination is the main site-specific issue. Quantities, physical properties and control claims are invented. A01 imposes the affected restriction. |
| Evidence and organisational references | Case inventory and activity sections; real SDS, permissions, drawings and survey outstanding. |
| Accountable owner | HSE lead with site manager |
5.2 Elimination reduction and engineered safeguards
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DSEAR 6 and Schedule 1. Document substitution and inventory-reduction decisions. Verify containment, segregation, ventilation, ignition control, compatible design and maintenance. Record critical performance criteria, tests, impairments and mitigation. PPE and procedural discipline support the remaining controls; they do not replace source control.
| Findings and decisions | Petrol retained because it is the intended retail product. Reduce working stock to justified demand, avoid unnecessary decanting, prefer less flammable cleaning products and use compatible closed engineered systems. A proposed shop ventilation inlet is close to the petrol vent discharge. Do not install or energise the inlet until the competent zoning and dispersion review accepts the layout. |
| Evidence and organisational references | Fictional controls stated per activity. Actual leak detection, alarm, isolation, containment and maintenance tests need review. |
| Accountable owner | Engineering manager |
5.3 Hazardous areas and explosion safety
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DSEAR 7 and Schedules 2 to 4. Record competent classification decisions, extent, duration and release/ventilation assumptions; include drawings and equipment suitability. Where required, record verification of overall explosion safety before first operation. Consider antistatic clothing and EX signs. Quantities or an SDS alone do not establish a zone.
| Findings and decisions | No site classification is accepted. Obtain release/ventilation study including connected places, equipment suitability and required overall explosion-safety verification. Keep new or modified affected equipment out of service. |
| Evidence and organisational references | Z01, P01 and D01 required; no technical acceptance claimed. |
| Accountable owner | Competent Ex specialist appointed by engineering |
5.4 Accidents incidents and emergencies
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DSEAR 8. Record alarm, safe isolation, escape, responder liaison, public protection, emergency information, competent intervention limits, drills and recovery. Explain the basis for any assessment that additional emergency arrangements are unnecessary; review this when conditions change.
| Findings and decisions | Provide prompt alarm, 999 call, safe remote isolation, evacuation, public exclusion and responder access. Staff do not enter tanks, approach uncontrolled fuel releases or fight EV battery fires. Test across shifts. |
| Evidence and organisational references | Fictional emergency procedure; actual emergency contacts, communications, isolation test and exercise evidence required. |
| Accountable owner | Site manager |
5.5 Information instruction and training
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DSEAR 9. Define role competence, substance and task briefings, induction, contractor and driver information, supervision, refresher triggers and practical verification. Share significant assessment findings and relevant emergency procedures with affected people.
| Findings and decisions | Verify receiving-operator and driver coordination, dispenser supervision, spill response limits, contractor permits and shift cover. Give affected people the significant findings and check understanding. |
| Evidence and organisational references | Fictional briefing scenario only; actual training, competence and consultation records required. |
| Accountable owner | Operations manager |
5.6 Contents identification and labelling
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DSEAR 10. Verify identification of containers, tanks, pipes, temporary containers, residues and waste, with the associated hazards. Review damaged labels, mixed contents and changes; do not rely on memory or colour alone.
| Findings and decisions | Identify receiving tanks, fills, pipes and products consistently; check driver delivery documents against the site tank chart. Label waste and temporary containers; quarantine unknown contents. |
| Evidence and organisational references | Actual label survey, product mapping and current SDS register required; colour alone is insufficient. |
| Accountable owner | Site manager |
5.7 Shared workplaces and coordination
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DSEAR 11. Where applicable, identify the employer responsible for workplace coordination, other employers, drivers, contractors and neighbouring operations. Record the aim, shared measures, communication and permit or handover arrangements. Each employer retains its own duties.
| Findings and decisions | Crownway as fictional workplace controller coordinates the delivery and contractor interfaces. Driver/employer and other employers retain their duties. Suspend conflicting hot work, public access or installation activity. |
| Evidence and organisational references | Delivery plan, shared precautions, permit boundaries and signed handover must be genuinely completed before work. |
| Accountable owner | Site manager and tanker operator |
5.8 Management of change and reassessment
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DSEAR 5. Set review triggers for new products, quantities, process conditions, layout, ventilation, drainage, equipment, occupancy and protective-system impairments. Review after incidents or evidence that findings are no longer valid. Assess new dangerous-substance work and implement safeguards before commencement.
| Findings and decisions | Review after product, quantity, layout, drainage, EV, staffing, operating-hours, software or protective-system changes and after a failure or new evidence. The annual example review date is a company planning choice; earlier triggers prevail. |
| Evidence and organisational references | Change register, readiness review, updated assessment and temporary-change expiry required. |
| Accountable owner | Engineering and operations managers |
5.9 Other assessments and specialist obligations
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DSEAR Scope and legal interfaces. Record applicable COSHH health assessment, fire risk assessment, confined-space and pressure-system duties, petroleum permissions, carriage of dangerous goods and COMAH screening where relevant. Identify specialist designs and approvals; DSEAR totals or this template do not determine COMAH status or authorise hazardous work.
| Findings and decisions | Check petroleum certification and enforcing-authority requirements, fire assessment, COSHH, confined spaces, electrical safety and dangerous-goods roles separately. Confirm COMAH applicability from actual maximum masses, classifications and aggregation; litre totals do not determine tier. |
| Evidence and organisational references | No permission, environmental permit, COMAH conclusion or technical approval is issued by this assessment. |
| Accountable owner | HSE lead |
6 Action plan
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Assign a responsible person and due date, record interim restrictions and verify effectiveness before closure. An administrative closure does not release an unsafe activity.
6.1 Required action
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| Activity reference | simops |
| Action and restrictions | A proposed shop ventilation inlet is close to the petrol vent discharge. Do not install or energise the inlet until the competent zoning and dispersion review accepts the layout. |
| Priority | High |
| Owner | Site manager and engineering manager |
| Due date | 2026-11-24 |
| Status | Open |
| Closure verification | Fictional open finding; no genuine repair, closure or work release recorded. |
6.2 Required action
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| Activity reference | equipment |
| Action and restrictions | Commission competent site DSEAR review and hazardous-area drawings including drains, ducts, vents, fills, dispensers and future equipment changes. Verify equipment suitability and required explosion-safety evidence. Maintain restrictions on new/modified affected equipment. |
| Priority | High |
| Owner | Engineering manager and competent Ex specialist |
| Due date | 2026-11-24 |
| Status | Open |
| Closure verification | No study or verification supplied. |
6.3 Required action
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| Activity reference | bulk-storage |
| Action and restrictions | Replace fictional inventory/property assumptions with actual individual tank charts, maximum inventories, delivery limits, current supplier SDS and integrity/alarm test records. Resolve quantities and incompatible conditions before accepting receipt. |
| Priority | High |
| Owner | Site manager and HSE lead |
| Due date | 2026-11-17 |
| Status | Open |
| Closure verification | No actual source evidence supplied. |
6.4 Required action
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| Activity reference | emergency |
| Action and restrictions | Verify emergency stops, communications, evacuation and receiving-operator competence across shifts; run an exercise and test the effectiveness of the site-specific restriction before closure. |
| Priority | High |
| Owner | Operations manager |
| Due date | 2026-11-24 |
| Status | Open |
| Closure verification | No genuine drill, briefing or acceptance represented. |
7 Competent review and use decision
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| Review confirmed | Pending |
| Reviewer or authorising person | Pending appointment of actual competent reviewer |
| Review date | Not recorded — complete during assessment |
| Use decision and reference | Worked assessment completed for learning; not accepted for live operation. Open actions and engineering limits remain. No real signature or company approval. |
| Restrictions and limitations | A proposed shop ventilation inlet is close to the petrol vent discharge. Do not install or energise the inlet until the competent zoning and dispersion review accepts the layout. New/modified affected installations remain out of use pending competent zoning, suitability and required verification. Existing site safety cannot be inferred from fictional evidence. |
Required entries outstanding: 2
The completeness check identifies missing entries; it does not validate technical adequacy.
8 Research and regulatory references
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SHARE assessment prompts are authored from the following versioned research chapters and official guidance. Product SDS, site data and competent technical studies must inform the completed assessment.
| DSEAR 2002 as amended — Great Britain | https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2002/2776/contents |
| DSEAR 2003 — Northern Ireland | https://www.legislation.gov.uk/nisr/2003/152/contents |
| HSE current DSEAR guidance | https://www.hse.gov.uk/fireandexplosion/dsear.htm |
| HSE L138 second edition — DSEAR ACOP and guidance | https://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/priced/l138.pdf |
| HSE hazardous areas and explosion safety | https://www.hse.gov.uk/fireandexplosion/atex.htm |
| HSE HSG71 — packaged dangerous substances | https://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/priced/hsg71.pdf |
| HSE HSG176 — flammable liquids in tanks | https://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/priced/hsg176.pdf |
| HSE HSG140 — use and handling of flammable liquids | https://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/priced/hsg140.pdf |
| Flammable and Explosive Materials and DSEAR | DN-049 - DN3 11.3 - flammable-and-explosive-materials-and-dsear - Single Source of Truth.docxVersion: 2026-09-19T09:02:15.113120+00:00SHA-256: 56396382f40cc27432283fc9b28f867ad73a52628ffd2a54d52532e55659af9e |
| Loading, Unloading and Transfer Operations | PSM-049 - loading-unloading-and-transfer-operations - Single Source of Truth.docxVersion: 2026-10-04T04:52:05.002807+00:00SHA-256: bbe951ef473d5594a59d3146cba13b1319393a7d6e3aec0b8bf2ed7822d3b01b |
| Template version | 20261010-dsear-2 | sources checked 2026-10-09 |
| Guidance boundary | L138 second edition is dated 2013 and predates the 2015 scope amendments. Read with current legislation and HSE guidance, including corrosive-to-metal and pressurised-gas risks. Separate health, fire, COMAH and transport obligations may apply. |
9 Visual reference plates
Forecourt and hazardous area concepts
Review with activities 3.3, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 and 3.19 and the section 4 classification decision.
Zone 0 means an explosive gas atmosphere is present continuously, for long periods or frequently; Zone 1 may occur occasionally in normal operation; Zone 2 is unlikely in normal operation and, if it occurs, persists only briefly. The drawing suggests release locations, not accepted zone types or extents.
Confirm release grades, ventilation, pits, ducts, drains and openings. Check equipment suitability and required verification against competent site drawings. EV bay placement in the image is not an accepted separation design.
9 2 Fuel filling vents and interceptor
Review with activities 3.1, 3.3, 3.6, 3.13, 3.20 and section 5 response arrangements.
Identify each tank/product connection, vapour-return arrangement, vent termination, tanker position and escape route. The closed access covers indicate a separator location concept only; they do not show its internal condition, class, flow, capacity, outlet design or fuel/firewater retention provision.
Trace actual drainage to the verified discharge point and receptors. Check separator condition, compatible alarm system, maintenance and any designed isolation/shutoff. A separator is not assumed capable of retaining a tanker loss, miscible product or firefighting runoff.
9 3 Optional retail LPG bottle storage
Review with activities 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.19, 3.23 and the management of change arrangements.
The ten site cases assume no LPG retail. This optional feature illustrates the assessment needed before introducing it. Add actual cylinder sizes, numbers, maximum LPG mass including nominally empty cylinders, SDS and delivery/exchange arrangements. No cylinder filling is authorised.
Use competent siting and hazardous-area assessment and supplier instructions. Verify ventilation, security, valve protection, impact protection and separation from ignition, openings, drains and pits. LPG vapour can collect at low level. This plate is not proof of an acceptable cage location.
9 4 Entrance ESD manual points and alarms
Review with activities 3.19, 3.20, 3.23 and section 5 emergency and competence arrangements.
The fuel emergency-stop button, fire-alarm manual call point and tank/interceptor indications have different purposes. A common display does not establish common sensing, independent protection or automatic shutdown. No universal control position, accessibility dimension or cause-and-effect is specified.
Test the actual cause-and-effect with competent people and a safe method. Confirm what stops, which valves move, which alarms sound, where signals are received and how restoration is controlled. Do not assume ESD isolates every electrical circuit or operates drainage valves.